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In the absence of markets for environmental quality, researchers resort to 
stated and revealed preference techniques to estimate the benefits of environmental 
programs. One of the most widely used revealed preference approaches is hedonic 
property value models, where the value of an environmental commodity is inferred 
from its impact on home prices. There are, however, two practical issues in obtaining 
valid welfare estimates. The first is omitted variable bias, where the estimated 
impacts are confounded by omitted characteristics of the housing bundle. The second 
is whether the measure of environmental quality assumed in the hedonic models is the 
one that buyers and sellers in the market are aware of, and care about.  
Stated preference approaches offer an opportunity to examine and, in some 
cases, circumvent these issues. I present three studies exploring the use of hedonic 
and stated preference methods in estimating the impacts of environmental 
disamenities on home values. The first study is an extensive hedonic analysis of 
  
leaking underground storage tanks (LUSTs). I construct a quasi experiment and 
implement several econometric techniques to address omitted variable bias, paying 
special attention to alternative environmental quality measures.  
I then present two stated preference studies, where the disamenities are 
conveyed using clearly specified quantitative measures. The first study focuses on 
LUSTs and groundwater pollution, which is expressed as parts-per-billion of benzene. 
This reflects the actual information given to households in the hedonic study. The 
second stated preference study asks respondents to choose among hypothetical 
homes, which vary in terms of price and mortality risks associated with local air 
pollution.  
 In my hedonic application I find that LUSTs generally have little effect on 
home values. I argue that this is because people typically do not have much 
information regarding this disamenity. This conjecture is confirmed by the significant 
depreciation at homes where households are well informed, as well as in the stated 
preference studies, where respondents are informed as part of the study design. While 
hedonics is a useful non-market valuation tool, in some applications pursuing both 
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Chapter 1: An Introduction 
To what level should we regulate and clean up pollution? Economists 
recommend that the benefits of an environmental regulation or cleanup program be 
compared with the costs. It is, however, often difficult to estimate the benefits of 
preventing and remediating pollution. In many cases a large portion of these benefits 
stems from goods and services (e.g., health risks, ecological services) that are not 
traded in markets, and so we cannot directly infer their values.  
In the absence of markets for environmental goods and human health risks, 
researchers resort to stated and revealed preference techniques for placing a value on 
these goods. Stated preference approaches directly elicit peoples‘ values from 
responses to hypothetical situations posed in a questionnaire. Revealed preference 
methods infer the value of an environmental amenity or disamenity indirectly by 
observing actual behaviors or related markets.  
One of the most attractive and widely used revealed preference approaches is 
hedonic property value models, which posit that the price of a differentiated good, 
such as a home, is a function of the attributes of that good, including environmental 
quality. We infer peoples‘ values towards environmental goods by analyzing the 
prices of market goods that are at least partially characterized by the environmental 
commodity of interest. In the context of housing, the price of a home (or a monotonic 
transformation of it) is regressed on characteristics of the home, its location, and the 
surrounding environment. Rosen (1974) first laid the theoretical framework showing 
that marginal welfare estimates can be obtained solely from the hedonic price 




Furthermore, for sufficiently localized goods, even non-marginal welfare impacts can 
be estimated directly from the hedonic price function (Palmquist, 2005). 
Hedonic property value models have been applied to various environmental 
amenities and disamenities, including air quality and visibility (Chattopadhyay, 1999; 
Kim and Goldsmith, 2009), water quality (Leggett and Bockstael, 2000; Walsh et al., 
2011), open space (Bell and Bockstael, 2000; Cho et al., 2009), noise (Pope, 2008, 
Day et al., 2007), land contamination and cleanup (Kiel and Williams, 2007), and 
health risks (Gayer et al., 2000, 2002; Davis, 2004). The widespread use of hedonic 
models is at least partially due to the increasing availability of property transaction 
data, advances in quasi-experimental and spatial econometric techniques, and 
developments in geographic information systems (GIS), which allow us to link 
property transactions to environmental goods of interest.  
In general, hedonic approaches are viewed favorably because they rely on 
actual transactions in a marketplace. Studies often focus on housing markets because 
they are generally active, have lots of participants, and allow researchers to infer 
welfare effects on households (who are often the population most affected by a shift 
in environmental quality). There are, however, two practical issues in obtaining valid 
welfare estimates from the econometric models. The first is omitted variable bias. If 
the environmental amenity or disamenity is correlated with other omitted 
characteristics of a home or neighborhood, then the estimated marginal implicit prices 
may end up capturing the latter‘s effects on property values.  
Second, researchers typically make assumptions regarding the public‘s 




the housing market measure this good. Such assumptions are often necessary, but 
rarely tested, and if proven invalid we may in fact be incorrectly inferring welfare 
effects from changes in property values. 
Stated preference methods offer an opportunity to circumvent these issues. 
First, in a hypothetical questionnaire researchers can design a clean experiment that 
eliminates confounding influences. Second, people respond to valuation questions 
using the information and measure of environmental quality specified by the 
researcher. Therefore, we know people are aware of the environmental good being 
studied, and evaluate it using the same measure specified in the econometric models 
(assuming that the measures are clear to respondents). These advantages stem from 
the fact that stated preference surveys are hypothetical, which is the main criticism 
against the approach (Freeman, 1993, pg. 176). 
In this dissertation I explore the use of hedonic property value and stated 
preference methods for measuring the effects of environmental disamenities on house 
prices, and ultimately towards estimating the benefits of environmental programs that 
prevent and clean up pollution. In chapter 2, I present an extensive hedonic property 
value study examining how a relatively understudied environmental disamenity, 
leaking underground storage tanks (LUSTs), affects house prices and transaction 
rates.  
There are over 495,000 identified LUST sites (e.g., gas stations) across the 
United States (US EPA, 2011). Petroleum and other hazardous substances from these 
LUSTs can adversely affect the health of local residents, especially those who rely on 




counties (Baltimore, Frederick, and Baltimore City), for which I compiled a unique 
and comprehensive dataset of homes and transactions, neighborhood characteristics, 
UST facilities, leak investigations, and groundwater well contamination tests, from 
1996-2007. 
I pay particular attention to (i) addressing omitted variable bias from 
unobserved neighborhood characteristics, and to (ii) alternative measures of 
environmental quality, and home buyers and sellers‘ awareness of these measures. To 
address the former, I include an extensive set of home and neighborhood attributes in 
the right-hand side of the hedonic model, including neighborhood fixed effects. I 
incorporate a quasi-experimental framework that compares homes near leaking and 
non-leaking tanks, and exploits the temporal and spatial variation in the discovery of 
LUSTs.  Repeat sales and spatial autoregressive models are also estimated. 
Typically, hedonic property value studies measure an environmental 
disamenity by a home‘s proximity to it (Boyle and Kiel, 2001; Farber, 1998), and 
examine how the implicit price of proximity varies across contamination and cleanup 
events. These events represent new information, which may change home buyers and 
sellers‘ perceptions of the disamenity; in theory, any resulting welfare shifts should 
be reflected in the change in the premium for distance from the disamenity. However, 
in my hedonic application it is unclear whether home buyers and sellers are always 
aware of a LUST and the cleanup events at the site.  
A unique aspect of my study is that I account for home-specific variation in 
information and pollution, which I measure with domestic groundwater well tests and 




need to assume that households are aware of the disamenity: I know they are.  In fact, 
only among these tested homes do I find evidence of a decline in value (9-12%). I 
conclude the chapter by discussing the feasibility of a nationwide benefits study of 
the Underground Storage Tank (UST) program via hedonics versus alternative stated 
preference approaches.  
Framing stated preference studies in the context of home values seems like a 
natural step to facilitate cross-method comparisons. However there are only a few 
stated preference studies on environmental goods and home values (Earnhart, 2001, 
2002; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2002; Chattopadhyay et al., 2005; Simons and Winson-
Geideman, 2005; Phaneuf et al., 2010). All of these studies convey the level of 
environmental quality in qualitative terms. For example, Chattopadhyay et al. (2005) 
present respondents with four different pollution scenarios (additional pollution, no 
change, partial clean-up, and full clean-up). Phaneuf et al. (2010) take a similar 
approach, and also vary the distance of a hypothetical home from the disamenity. 
While these measures may be relatively comparable to previous hedonic property 
value studies, I believe it remains unclear how survey respondents (and home buyers 
and sellers in the actual market) interpret such qualitative descriptions of changes in 
environmental quality.  
In chapters 3 and 4, I present two stated preference studies that examine how 
pollution affects home values when the disamenity is conveyed using quantitative 
measures that are clearly specified to the respondents, namely (i) pollutant 
concentrations and (ii) objective health risks. Chapter 3 is a stated preference study 




underground storage tanks and groundwater pollution. I convey the severity of 
pollution as X parts-per-billion of benzene in the groundwater. Corresponding with 
the hedonic analysis in chapter 2, the information presented to respondents mimics 
that sent to households whose private wells were actually tested for LUST 
contamination. 
The survey was self-administered by a convenience sample of Maryland 
residents. My interests lie in making within sample comparisons across several 
randomly assigned treatments, namely hypothetical pollution levels at a home, and 
whether an exposure pathway is present. In general, I find that stated home prices 
decrease 18% to 24% due to a LUST, even when the groundwater beneath the home 
is not contaminated and an exposure pathway is not present. The respondents in this 
sample believe that the higher the levels of contamination, the larger the loss in home 
values, an effect that is more pronounced once the regulatory standard is exceeded, 
and is strongest when an exposure pathway, and thus health risks, are present. 
Chapter 4 presents a stated preference study where I ask respondents to 
choose among hypothetical variants of their home, which vary in terms of price and 
the mortality risks associated with local air pollution levels. To my knowledge this is 
the first stated preference study to examine respondents‘ Willingness to Pay (WTP) 
for properties using a quantitative and clearly specified measure of health risks (e.g., 
an X in 1,000 probability of dying). The survey was implemented on a representative 
sample of residents aged 40-60 in Italy and the United Kingdom.   
From the results I infer a Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) of about €1.828 to 




and depending on whether the respondents own or rent their home.
2
 I find 
heterogeneity in respondents‘ WTP for a mortality risk reduction depending on socio-
economic characteristics, and beliefs and perceptions regarding their local air 
pollution levels and the associated health risks. 
Chapter 5 concludes, comparing the strengths and weaknesses of hedonic 
property value and stated preference approaches in estimating the benefits of 
environmental programs. In my hedonic application I find LUSTs generally have 
little effect on local home values. I believe that home buyers and sellers (at least in 
these Maryland counties) are typically unaware of this disamenity. In contrast, I do 
find a significant depreciation at homes where I know buyers and sellers are well 
informed, as well as in the stated preference studies, where respondents are explicitly 
informed as part of the study design. In some cases, pursuing both approaches will 
help economists better characterize how environmental quality affects property 





                                                 
2
 Converted to US dollars using 0.75464 exchange rate, which was the average for the year 2010 




Chapter 2: What Do Property Values Really Tell Us? A 
Hedonic Study of Pollution from Underground Storage 
Tanks 
By: Dennis Guignet 
I. Introduction 
Over the last 30 years there has been considerable interest in, and controversy 
about, the US Environmental Protection Agency‘s (EPA) cleanup programs, such as 
Superfund and the Underground Storage Tank Program. There are several studies that 
suggest that these programs do yield benefits (see Farber, 1998; Boyle and Kiel, 
2001), but whether they pass a benefit-cost analysis at the national level has been 
brought into question (e.g., Greenstone and Gallagher, 2008). In this paper I focus on 
the benefits of one of these cleanup programs, the Underground Storage Tank (UST) 
Program, and the use of hedonic property value methods to estimate the nationwide 
benefits of preventing and cleaning up leaks.  
Congress first mandated the EPA to establish a comprehensive program 
regulating USTs in 1984. Since then about 495,000 leaking underground storage 
tanks (LUSTs) have been identified, and over 470,450 cleanups have been undertaken 
(US EPA, 2011), making it perhaps the largest remediation programs for which this 
agency is responsible.  
There are currently about 600,000 industrial and commercial facilities that 
store petroleum or other hazardous substances in underground tanks (US EPA, 2011).  
Tanks may leak as a result of corrosion, cracks, defective piping, or spills during 




health and the environment.  For people, the greatest potential threat is contamination 
of groundwater (US EPA, 2011). 
The benefits of preventing or cleaning up a leak at a UST are mainly 
experienced by the residents in close proximity (i.e., a few hundred meters). Gas 
stations and other UST facilities are numerous and widespread, and so are leaks, 
which suggests that the aggregate benefits of the UST program may be large. 
However, to my knowledge there has been little research to estimate just how large 
these benefits might be.
3
  
There are three main approaches to estimate the benefits of the UST program. 
The first is the damage function approach, where one estimates the reduction in risks 
to human health and ecological systems due to the prevention or cleanup of a LUST, 
and then assigns a value to this reduction based on past studies or policy. The 
drawback, however, is that the required risk information is site-specific, and notably 
absent from the Agency documents I examine in this study, as well as related studies.
4
  
The second approach is a stated preference study, where one elicits benefit 
estimates from what survey respondents‘ state they would do in a hypothetical 
situation. An advantage of this approach is that the researcher can specify a scenario 
to elicit many aspects of the benefits of the UST program, including reduced human 
health and ecological risks, improved aesthetics, etc. Actual site-specific details are 
                                                 
3
 Exceptions include Simons et al. (1997, 1999), Simons and Winson-Geideman (2005), and Zabel and 
Guignet (2011). These studies examine how one (or a few) LUST site(s) affect local home values (see 
section III.D). 
4
For example, to my knowledge there are no epidemiological studies specifically on petroleum 
contamination from LUSTs, nor attempts to extrapolate risk assessment findings for individual 
contaminants to a state or national scale. Vrijheid (2000) reviews over 50 epidemiological studies on 
residents surrounding contaminated sites, but in all of these studies petroleum was only one of many 





not necessary since stated preference surveys are hypothetical. The primary criticism 
against this technique is that what people say in a hypothetical situation may not 
reflect their true actions (Freeman, 1993, pg. 176). 
A third approach, which is the one pursued here, is the hedonic property value 
model.  Hedonics is an attractive technique for estimating the benefits of preventing 
and cleaning up leaks because it relies on actual market behavior, and presumably 
captures all aspects of the benefits.  
If buyers and sellers in the housing market are (i) aware of a LUST and (ii) 
perceive it as a disamenity or risk to human health, then one would expect home 
prices to decrease upon the discovery of a leak, and to rebound back to pre-leak levels 
after cleanup. If (i) and (ii) do not hold, then property values may be unaffected.  It is 
also possible that prices may not rebound after cleanup because the site may still be 
perceived as a threat, and there may be a lingering social stigma (Messer et al, 2006; 
Gregory and Scatterfield, 2002).  
In this paper, I ask five research questions. First, does being near a LUST 
affect property values, and how does this change when cleanup is undertaken and 
completed? Second, does the effect of leaks on home values depend on the presence 
of the primary exposure pathway (private groundwater wells)? Third, how do prices 
vary with additional information on well water contamination? Fourth, does LUST 
contamination and cleanup deter home transactions, and if so, is there evidence of 
―self-selection‖ into the sample of home sales? Fifth, what are the implications 
towards estimating the national benefits of the UST program via hedonics, versus an 




To answer these questions, I conduct a hedonic house price study based on a 
unique and comprehensive dataset of homes and transactions, neighborhood 
characteristics, UST facilities, leak investigations, and groundwater well 
contamination tests for three Maryland counties (Baltimore, Frederick, and Baltimore 
City) from 1996-2007. Disentangling the implicit price of LUSTs and cleanups is 
challenging because the placement of UST facilities (and hence potential leaks) may 
be correlated with the spatial distribution of other amenities and disamenities. 
Moreover, the UST facilities themselves pose both desirable and undesirable 
characteristics besides contamination.  
 I take several steps to reduce potentially confounding effects on home values. 
I include (i) extensive controls in the hedonic regressions (home and neighborhood 
attributes), (ii) neighborhood fixed effects, and (iii) comparable non-leaking USTs.  
The latter, along with temporal variation in the discovery of leaks, allow for a spatial 
difference-in-difference regression framework (see Horsch and Lewis, 2009). I also 
implement a ―propensity score‖ type of hedonic model, where in the first stage I 
estimate the probability that a leak is discovered at the individual UST facilities. 
Repeat sales and spatial econometric models are estimated to check the robustness of 
the results.  
A unique contribution of this paper is that instead of measuring the risk solely 
by proximity to the disamenity, as done in many previous studies (Boyle and Kiel, 
2001; Farber, 1998), I also account for home-specific variation in information and 
pollution, which I measure with domestic groundwater well tests from the Maryland 




effect on the price of nearby homes (e.g., within 500 meters), even if a home relies on 
a private well.  However, I do find a 9-12% depreciation among homes where the 
private well was tested for contamination. These households face actual (or 
suspected) risks and are relatively well-informed since they receive correspondence 
from MDE.  
To examine the fourth question of whether LUSTs deter transactions, I 
estimate a model of annual sale occurrence at individual homes. I argue that this 
approach is superior to looking at transaction rates in an area because it uses a more 
spatially refined unit of observation, and individual house characteristics (in addition 
to characteristics of the neighborhood) can be used to explain sales activity.  This 
allows me to examine whether higher-end homes are more likely to sell in the face of 
pollution, which could imply that hedonic methods underestimate the benefits of 
cleanup. 
I find that transactions are half as likely to occur when a nearby LUST is 
undergoing ―active cleanup‖ (e.g., tank removal, soil excavation, pumping and 
treatment of groundwater), an effect that is more prominent among homes relying on 
private wells. Visual cues associated with cleanup may lead to revisions in risk 
perceptions, and given the unpublicized nature of most LUSTs, this may be the first 
event making people aware of the pollution problem.  
These findings raise questions about whether hedonic property value methods 
are the best approach to estimate the national benefits of the UST program. Prices 
depend on buyers‘ and sellers‘ risk perceptions, which in turn depend on public 




measure on a local, let alone a national, scale. Moreover, compiling the necessary 
data on USTs and leaks for a broader hedonic study would be extremely difficult, if 
not impossible. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides some 
background information on LUSTs.  Section III reviews the literature.   The 
theoretical and empirical models are outlined in section IV. I describe the data in 
section V, and present the results of the hedonic model in section VI.  Section VII 
presents the annual sale occurrence model.  Section VIII concludes and discusses the 
policy implications.  
 
II. Background 
II.A. Regulatory Background 
In the early 1980s, the states and the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) first became aware that a large number of the USTs at gas stations, factories, 
refineries, and other commercial and industrial facilities were leaking contaminants 
into the surrounding soil, and surface- and groundwater.  In 1984 Congress addressed 
this issue by adding Subtitle I to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, which 
created a comprehensive program regulating USTs.   
As a result, in 1986 the EPA required owners to register all existing and new 
USTs to the appropriate State agency.  In 1988, technical standards were issued, 
requiring that (i) existing tanks be retrofitted with corrosion protection by December 
22, 1998, (ii) new tanks be constructed to follow specified corrosion protection 




devices.  Owners of leaking tanks were to be held liable for cleanup, and to provide 
financial assurance for the cost of corrective action and for compensating third parties 
for any damages.  The EPA encouraged the States to develop their own UST 
programs, for which they could seek formal approval.   
As of September 2010, there are about 495,000 known UST releases 
throughout the United States.  Cleanups have been initiated at 470,460 LUST sites, 
and completed at 401,874 sites (US EPA, 2011).  For comparison, there are currently 
a total of 1,281 sites on the Federal National Priorities List (NPL) and 346 sites have 
been deleted.
5
 With the cost of cleanup ranging from a few thousand to millions of 
dollars at each LUST (US EPA, 2004; Khan et al., 2004), and given the extensive 
Federal and State involvement, it is useful and important to find out what the benefits 
of cleanup and prevention are.  
II.B. Exposure to and Effects of LUST Pollution 
Contaminants from a LUST seep into the soil and local groundwater. These 
pollutants may migrate to surrounding water bodies and ecological systems via 
surface run-off or groundwater flows.  Adverse human health effects may arise from 
consumption of contaminated groundwater, inhalation of vapors, and dermal contact 
with contaminants.  Those most at risk are among the 15% of Americans who rely on 
private groundwater wells, which are not regulated by the Safe Drinking Water Act, 
and for which there are no testing, monitoring, and treatment requirements.
6
   
                                                 
5
 The NPL is the list of Superfund sites which have been assessed to be the most harmful and are 
therefore inline for or in the process of remediation through CERCLA (US EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/index.htm, accessed October 20, 2010). 
6




 The majority of the EPA regulated USTs contain petroleum substances, the 
by-products of which include harmful compounds, such as benzene (a proven 
carcinogen), and toluene, ethyl benzene, and xylenes (commonly abbreviated as 
BTEX), which affect the kidneys, liver, and nervous system.
7
  Motor fuel can contain 
harmful additives, such as Methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), a former gasoline 
additive and suspected carcinogen.
8
 
II.C. Public Knowledge of LUSTs 
Many hedonic studies rely on proximity to a disamenity to measure risks 
(Boyle and Kiel, 2001; Farber, 1998), and in doing so assume that buyers and sellers 
in the market are aware of the disamenity and associated events. While people can see 
gas stations, and other UST facilities, it is unclear whether they are always aware of a 
LUST near their home. USTs are underground and there may be no obvious visual 
cues of contamination. These facilities often provide services, which the public may 
find useful and not necessarily associate with a potential environmental disamenity.  
When a leak does occur, there is little media attention, if any, and if there is it is 
restricted to only the most severe cases.
9
   
The Maryland Department of Environment (MDE) requires a responsible 
party (usually the UST owner) to notify the public only in the most severe cases, 
                                                 
7
 US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/safewater/contaminants/index.html#listmcl, accessed July 28, 2009. 
8
 Toccalino (2005); and US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/MTBE/, accessed January 20, 2009. 
9
 A Lexis Nexis and Google search for local news articles from 1997-2008 on LUSTs in Maryland 
uncovered 19 articles covering only 10 LUST sites.  For comparison there are 138 LUSTs just in the 
three Maryland counties considered in this paper.  Search keywords included combinations of 




where a corrective action plan is necessary.
10
 Notification is only required for 
―members of the public directly affected by the release and planned corrective action‖ 
(COMAR, 26.10.09.08).  Under Maryland real estate disclosure laws, sellers are not 
required to disclose information about any nearby pollution unless the for-sale 
property is actually contaminated.  Testing is, however, a prerequisite for the sale of 
any home using a private groundwater well.
11
   
It is unclear if residents are aware of a LUST just because they live in close 
proximity to it.  However, if MDE suspects that contamination has migrated into a 
private groundwater well, they will notify the residents, usually with a personal letter 
informing them about the LUST and requesting to test their well.  After testing, MDE 
sends a follow-up letter with the test results and regulatory standards.  If 
contamination is found, additional tests, and notification letters, may occur.  In 
summary, residents at homes where testing occurs can be presumed to be well-
informed about the LUST and contamination at their homes. 
 
III. Previous Literature 
III.A. The Hedonic Price Method 
In the absence of marketplaces where environmental quality or health risks are 
traded, economists resort to revealed- and stated-preference methods for placing a 
monetary value on these goods. Hedonics is a commonly used revealed preference 
approach. In a differentiated good market (e.g. housing) the matching of buyers and 
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 At more severe LUST sites the responsible party may be required to submit a corrective action plan, 
which must provide adequate protection for human health and the environment (COMAR 
26.10.09.07). 
11




sellers forms a hedonic price schedule, where the price of the differentiated good is a 
function of the attributes composing that good.  The marginal contribution of each 
attribute to the overall value of the good is the marginal implicit price.  Rosen (1974) 
demonstrated that in equilibrium the marginal implicit price equates to the buyer‘s 
marginal willingness to pay, implying that marginal welfare estimates can be obtained 
with no information on people‘s underlying preferences, and that only the hedonic 
equation needs to be estimated. This is commonly referred to as Rosen‘s first stage.  
To estimate non-marginal welfare changes one may have to pursue the second 
stage of Rosen‘s procedure, and estimate the underlying demand functions.
12
  
However, under certain assumptions non-marginal welfare impacts from sufficiently 
local disamenities (i.e. only affect a few homes so as not to shift the hedonic price 
function) are simply windfall gains or losses to the property owners, and therefore can 
be estimated solely from the hedonic price function (Palmquist, 2005). I make this 
assumption since pollution from a LUST usually only migrates a few hundred meters, 
at most. 
    Hedonic models have been used extensively to value air quality and 
visibility (e.g. Chattopadhyay, 1999; Kim and Goldsmith, 2009), water quality (e.g. 
Leggett and Bockstael, 2000; Walsh et al., 2011), noise (e.g. Pope, 2008, Day et al., 
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 As first presented by Brown and Rosen (1982) and further discussed by Epple (1987), among others, 
this second stage procedure generally lacks proper identification because buyers simultaneously 
choose implicit prices when choosing housing characteristics. Two approaches have arisen to 
circumvent this identification problem (see Bockstael and McConnell, Ch. 6, pg 177).  First, one can 
make specific functional form assumptions that imply identification mathematically.  Second, 
analyzing several markets at once introduces proper instruments into the hedonic price function.  In 
essence, analyzing several markets allows us to observe the ―same‖ households‘ choices when facing 
different price schedules, thus tracing out the underlying bid functions. In contrast, Ekeland et al. 
(2004) argue that identification of the bid and offer functions can be obtained by using data within a 





2007) and health risks.
13
  There are several areas of research that are particularly 
important to understanding the effects of LUSTs on home values.   
III.B. Water Quality and Residential Property Values 
To my knowledge the few studies investigating the effects of groundwater 
contamination on residential property prices generally find little or no effect.  Malone 
and Barrows (1990) found that nitrates in the groundwater did not affect home prices. 
Examining seven different towns in Wisconsin, Page and Rabinowitz (1993) report 
that assessed values are not affected by well contamination from landfills, industrial 
sites, or pesticide run-off.  Dotzour (1997) finds that groundwater pollution does not 
lead to a significant difference in the average home price in Wichita, Kansas, which is 
not surprising since most (if not all) of the homes were connected to the public water 
system, implying there were no immediate health risks. 
 Focusing on two towns in Maine where residents do rely on private wells, 
Boyle et al. (2010) find that home prices decline by 0.5-1% for each 0.01 mg/l of 
arsenic above the 0.05 mg/l standard set by the EPA. This depreciation appears to be 
temporary since prices rebound within a few years.  Boyle et al. speculate this may be 
due to the availability of in-home water treatment systems or dissipation of perceived 
risks once media attention stops. 
 The majority of hedonic studies on water quality focus on surface water 
(Boyle and Kiel, 2001).  For example, Leggett and Bockstael (2000) analyze the 
effect of fecal coliforms in the Chesapeake Bay on home values in Anne Arundel 
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 See Boyle and Kiel (2001) for a review of hedonic studies organized by environmental disamenity.  





County, Maryland, and find that values do decrease. They also emphasize the need to 
control for other disamenity effects (e.g. noise, odor, and aesthetics) associated with 
the source of contamination; not doing so introduces omitted variable bias.   
III.C. Contaminated Sites and Residential Property Values 
There is a significant literature on the effects of larger contaminated sites (e.g. 
Superfund sites) on home values.  Often the identification strategy in these hedonic 
studies is to account for proximity to the site, and allow the implicit price of 
proximity to differ before and after a contamination-related event (e.g. discovery of 
contamination, listing on the NPL, cleanup being undertaken, and cleanup 
completion).  Each event represents new information that revises public perceptions 
of environmental and health risks, and in turn, affects property values.  The change in 
the premium for distance from a site reflects a change in residents‘ welfare.   
Kohlhase (1991) and Michaels and Smith (1990) are among the earliest to 
study the effects of contaminated sites on property values.  Farber (1998) reviews 
these and subsequent hedonic studies and finds that property values increase, on 
average, by $3,500 for each additional mile from a contaminated site. However, there 
is significant variation across studies, ranging from $190 to $11,450 per mile (Boyle 
and Kiel, 2001).  Most find that home prices decrease when a site is placed on the 
NPL (Kiel, 1995; Farber, 1998; Boyle and Kiel, 2001; Jackson, 2001), but Kiel and 
Williams (2007) find that this may not be the case at all sites.  
Evidence that home values rebound during and after cleanup is mixed (Kiel 
and Zabel, 2001; Dale et al., 1999; McCluskey and Rausser, 2003; Kiel and Williams, 




because of a lingering social stigma (e.g., Messer et al, 2006; Gregory and 
Scatterfield, 2002). The site may still be perceived as a threat, and the surrounding 
community publicly shunned. 
Some researchers explicitly model risk perceptions and how individuals 
update their beliefs due to new information. Focusing on a Superfund site in Grand 
Rapids, MI, Gayer et al. (2000, 2002) are able to estimate the value per statistical 
cancer case avoided, which they find to be $3.9-8.3 million. Similarly, Davis (2004) 
finds the value to avoid a statistical case of pediatric leukemia to be $3-9.2 million.
14
  
Most of the above studies only focus on a small subset of contaminated sites 
that may not be representative of all sites in the US. Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) 
conduct a nationwide study to see whether median home prices within a census tract 
are affected by Superfund sites.
15
 They implement a quasi-experimental framework 
that reduces omitted variable bias (from the non-random distribution of sites) by 
exploiting the initial Superfund selection rule. They find that the listing of a 
Superfund site on the NPL does not affect median home prices, and conclude that, on 
average, the remediation costs outweigh the benefits.   
Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins (2010) recently revisit this analysis and find 
that after accounting for a finer spatial resolution and within tract heterogeneity, the 
deletion of a Superfund site from the NPL does significantly increase house prices. 
They also find considerable heterogeneity in the effects of Superfund sites on home 
values, which confirms Kiel and Williams‘s (2007) earlier findings. 
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 Davis (2004) does not specifically analyze a contaminated site, but rather how being in a County 
with an abnormally high and unexplained rate of childhood leukemia affects property values.   
15
 Technically speaking this is not a hedonic analysis, Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) estimate the 
median home price within a census tract as a function of aggregated statistics of the housing stock and 




III.D. LUSTs and Residential Property Values 
While there is a significant literature on how larger types of contaminated 
sites affect property values, comparability of these studies to LUSTs is unclear.  
LUSTs are more numerous, less publicized, relatively smaller in size, and pollution is 
presumably more local.
16
 LUSTs are comparatively homogeneous in that 
contamination mainly consists of petroleum products, and the sites are generally gas 
stations, or other similar types of commercial and industrial facilities.
17
  In contrast, 
Superfund and other contaminated sites are comprised of a wide assortment of prior 
land uses and pollutants. Most hedonic studies focusing on larger contaminated sites 
are concerned with just a single site or assume that only the nearest site affects 
property values, but there are numerous USTs and LUSTs within a single housing 
market.   
There are few revealed preference studies on LUSTs and residential property 
values.
18
 Simons et al. (1997) estimate a hedonic model using a cross-section of home 
sales in 1992 in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and find a 17% depreciation among homes 
within 300 ft of a registered LUST. They find no effect associated with proximity to 
registered non-leaking tanks or non-registered LUSTs.  Simons et al. (1999) analyze 
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 For example, Rice et al. (1995) find petroleum groundwater plumes in California rarely extend 
beyond 250 feet from a LUST. In this paper I find plumes migrated offsite at only 27 (19.6%) of the 
LUSTs. In contrast, hedonic studies on Superfund sites find property values are sometimes affected 
miles from the site. 
17
 The UST program explicitly targets petroleum contamination, but USTs that store other hazardous 
substances are regulated under this program as well (EPA, 2011). Such hazardous substances are also 
regulated by other federal programs, such as RCRA. In this study I focus on UST facilities that store 
petroleum products and that are regulated by the Maryland Department of Environment‘s Oil Control 
Program. 
18
 Simons and Winson-Geideman (2005) conduct a stated preference study across eight States 
(Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Alabama, Illinois, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Texas).  They 
ask respondents to bid on hypothetical homes and find that (i) LUST activity reduces the likelihood 
that a respondent will bid, (ii) bids are on average 31% lower when the groundwater is contaminated, 




home sales from 1994-1996 in Cuyahoga County, and find that LUST 
―contamination‖ from nearby gas stations reduces home values by 14-16%.
19
 Isakson 
and Ecker (2010) focus on 50 USTs in Cedar Falls, Iowa, which environmental 
regulators categorized as ―no risk,‖ ―low risk,‖ and ―high risk.‖ They find that the 
prices of homes adjacent to a high risk LUST are about 11% lower.  Due to the small 
sample size and the cross-sectional nature of these studies, one must use caution when 
interpreting these results as causal.  
In contrast, I utilize a large panel of home sales over 11 years, which allows 
me to better identify the causal impact of LUSTs on property values. Using the same 
dataset, my study extends on an earlier analysis by Zabel and Guignet (2011), where 
we emphasized the need to exploit both spatial and temporal variation in identifying 
the causal effects of LUSTs on home values.
20
  
Zabel and Guignet (2011) include neighborhood fixed effects and spatial 
econometric techniques to minimize potential biases from unobserved spatially 
correlated influences on house prices. Even more importantly, in Zabel and Guignet 
we observe home sales before and after the leak, allowing us to establish a pre-leak 
baseline, and analyze how prices change upon the discovery of a LUST, and 
completion of a leak investigation. In other words, we implemented a difference-in-
difference type of methodology. We examined home prices within 100, 200, 500, 
1000, and 2000 meters of a LUST, and checked whether the impact of a leak varied 
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 Simons et al. (1999) define contamination based on a 3 point scale, where 1= well test confirmed 
contamination at the home, 2= home is adjacent and down-gradient from a LUST, and 3= home is 
adjacent to a ‗1‘ or ‗2‘, down-gradient, and within 50-100 ft of the contamination plume. Only 11 
contaminated homes were sold which is too few for a typical hedonic study.  Instead they compare the 
actual sales price to the predicted price from a hedonic regression that did not explicitly account for 
LUSTs.   
20
 Zabel and Guignet (2011) is a revised version of a publicly available NCEE working paper, Zabel 




depending on the severity of contamination, the presence of an exposure pathway, 
and publicity surrounding the site. In general, we found that the typical LUST had 
little effect on home values, but more publicized (and more contaminated) sites can 
cause up to a 10% depreciation at homes in close proximity (i.e., up to 1,000 meters).   
In this dissertation chapter, I further exploit this quasi-experimental 
framework by focusing only on leaks at UST facilities registered with Maryland‘s Oil 
Control Program. In contrast, Zabel and Guignet (2011) focus on all LUSTs, 
including historical sites where regulators were previously unaware that an old 
inactive UST was (or had been) present. When focusing only on registered USTs a 
clear counterfactual exists, homes near non-leaking facilities, which can be compared 
to homes near leaking USTs, both before and after the leak. This framework allows 
me to estimate difference-in-difference and ―propensity score‖ types of hedonic 
models (see section IV.C). 
I also extend on Zabel and Guignet‘s (2011) study by estimating a repeat sales 
model, analyzing how prices are affected during cleanup activities, and investigating 
how leaks impact transaction rates at individual homes. In contrast to previous work, 
in this study I utilize home-specific variation in information and environmental 
quality, namely well tests and correspondence from MDE. 
III.E. How to Measure Risk 
Despite its widespread use, it remains unclear whether distance to the source 
of pollution is always an acceptable proxy for environmental and health risks, 
especially in the context of LUSTs.  First of all, if the general public is unaware of the 




risk. In this case, there would be no price premium for distance of a home from the 
disamenity, even though households may in fact hold such a premium if they were 
aware of the disamenity. Second, simply looking at proximity to a LUST assumes 
that the spatial extent of the effect on property values is the same across all sites, and 
homogeneous in all directions, but this may not be true.  The spread of contamination 
plumes are complicated by unobserved groundwater flows (Page and Rabinowitz, 
1993).  Cameron (2006) shows the importance of accounting for directional 
heterogeneity around a contaminated site and presents a method for doing so, but her 
approach is not applicable here because the effect of LUSTs on home values is too 
local and there are too few sales to statistically analyze individual sites.   
 I examine the home price impact of proximity to a LUST and various events 
(e.g. leak discovery, cleanup undertaken, and cleanup completion), which represent 
new risk information.  In addition, I have compiled a unique dataset of private well 
contamination tests and correspondence from MDE, which allows me to identify 
households who are relatively well-informed and face actual (or suspected) risks.  
Well contamination levels are observed at the end of the complicated hydrogeological 
processes, and thus provide a measure of risk that already accounts for spatial 
heterogeneity of contamination around an individual LUST site, and across sites.   
 
IV. The Model 
IV.A. Theoretical Framework: What is the Effect of LUSTs on Home Prices? 
I argue that the implicit price of proximity to a pollution source, such as a 




nuisances.  However, taking advantage of informational events such as leak 
discovery, cleanup, and well testing, allows me to identify the implicit price of 
pollution without these confounding effects. 
In what follows I present a simple model to guide my empirical work. I 
assume a state dependent expected utility framework, where there are two states: (i) 
―Good‖ where a household experiences no adverse health or environmental outcomes 
from a leak and receives utility           , and (ii) ―Bad‖ where the household 
does experience adverse outcomes, and receives utility            .21   Let   
denote a numeraire composite good,   is home and neighborhood characteristics 
(unrelated to USTs), and     is proximity to (or density of) nearby UST facilities, 
regardless of whether a leak has occurred.   
 A household derives utility directly from the housing services provided by  , 
as well as UST facilities (such as gas stations) that offer goods and services, and 
possibly nuisances (e.g. displeasing aesthetics, traffic congestion, crime, and noise).  
When a household chooses a home they also choose a location, which comprises all 
attributes of that location, including    .  I assume that (i) utility is weakly higher in 
the ―good‖ state            , and (ii) the marginal utility of income (MUI) is 
strictly positive in both states   
  
  
   
  
  
   . 
 A household‘s expectations are based on subjective, or perceived, 
probabilities.  The perceived probability of realizing the ―bad‖ state is           , 
where   denotes information about LUSTs and groundwater contamination (e.g. leak 
occurrence, cleanup, and well contamination). Notice that simply living near a non-
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 This is an application of a theoretical model first developed by Hallstrom and Smith (2005), who 




leaking UST may affect risk perceptions.  For example, a household may worry about 
a potential leak occurring in the future. 
 The household maximizes its subjective expected utility by choosing a 
housing bundle                  and the numeraire .  Perceived risk is implicitly 
chosen when choosing a home and its location.  Formally,   
                                                    (1)
                                     
where y is exogenously determined income, and      is the hedonic price function.  
Under assumption (ii) the budget constraint holds with equality.  Solving for   in the 
budget constraint and plugging it into the expected utility function yields, 
    
      
                                          (2)
                                        .   
The first order condition (FOC) with respect to     is, 
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where E(MUI) denotes the expected marginal utility of income. Analogous to Rosen‘s 
(1974) standard result, in equilibrium the optimizing household equates the marginal 
implicit price of    , as shown in the left-hand-side (LHS) of (3), with their marginal 
willingness-to-pay (MWTP) for    , which is the sum of the two bracketed terms in 
the right-hand-side of (3). The first bracket is the MWTP for a marginal change in the 
perceived probability of realizing the ―bad‖ state, and the second is the net MWTP for 




 In this model additional information regarding leaks and groundwater 
contamination is assumed to only affect expected utility through perceived risks. 
Taking the FOC of (2) with respect to I demonstrates that this marginal implicit price 












     
      
 .       (4) 
The term on the LHS of (4) is the implicit price of risk information, which equals the 
expected incremental option price between the ―good‖ and ―bad‖ state   
     
      
  
 , multiplied by the marginal change in subjective risk.  
The sign of the effect of leak information on prices depends on how this 




For example, if the discovery of leak increases risk perceptions then prices would 




   and property prices would remain unchanged. 
 The main point is that proximity to a pollution source does not cleanly 
identify the implicit price of pollution because it is confounded by other amenities 
and nuisances posed by the site and surrounding area.  In contrast, taking advantage 
of informational events such as leak discovery, cleanup, and well testing, identifies 
changes in home prices based solely on the pollution events. 
IV.B. The Ideal Econometric Experiment 
If the research objective is to study the benefits of the EPA‘s Federal UST 
program, then ideally, from an econometric standpoint, one would like to take a 




they were randomly assigned to these homes (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009). 
Unfortunately, this is not possible for two reasons. First, assembling a representative 
national dataset of property transactions, USTs, and LUSTs is unfeasible. Second, 
there is no reason to believe that leaks are random, and therefore if not properly 
controlled for, the estimated effect of a leak on home values may be biased.  
Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) circumvent these issues when estimating the 
national benefits of the Federal Superfund Program. They conduct a ―hedonic‖ 
analysis using median home prices at the census tract level for the entire US. They 
implement a quasi-experimental framework that exploits the initial selection rule for 
Superfund sites, which reduces omitted variable bias caused by the non-random 
distribution of sites. Specifically, they compare candidate NPL sites with hazard 
ranking scores just below and above the threshold for placement on the NPL. 
This approach would not work in the context of LUSTs because (i) there is no 
centralized Federal database of LUST sites, (ii) the unit of observation (the census 
tract) is too spatially coarse to pick up any effects from LUSTs, and (iii) the census is 
taken every 10 years, an interval that is too long for most leak investigations and 
cleanups, which only last a year or two.  
 Alternatively, one might obtain home transaction data for several housing 
markets, but gathering the necessary UST data would be difficult. Records are 
maintained by the States, and there is no centralized database with detailed LUST 
event documentation. The State of Maryland does maintain an electronic database, 
but much of the key information remains in hard copy files. I spent over 200 hours 




details are important because despite the fact that LUSTs involve a relatively 
homogeneous class of pollutants (petroleum by-products), I find substantial 
heterogeneity in pollution severity and investigation activities. For example, 
contamination plumes migrated to neighboring properties at about 20% of the LUST 
sites, active cleanup had been undertaken at half the sites, and leak investigations 
ranged from one day to over 10 years.   
IV.C. Empirical Framework and Study Design 
Given that nationwide or multiple-state approaches are not feasible, in this 
paper I focus on USTs and homes in selected housing markets in Maryland (see 
section V). I take several steps to minimize any omitted variable bias due to the non-
random spatial distribution of LUSTs, as described below.   
Consider a single housing market. The price of home i in neighborhood j at 
period t        is a function of structural characteristics of the home (e.g. interior 
square footage) and of its location, including UST facilities          and perceived 
environmental and health risks       .  Formally,                         , where 
     denotes home structure and neighborhood characteristics.   
Risk perceptions are formed from a given information set about the 
disamenity and location:                    . I posit that information has two 
components,                      .  The vector         denotes the presence of a 
LUST within a given distance of home i in each of the three stages of the 




Briefly, based on MDE practice, if a leak is (i) discovered then an 
investigation is undertaken by the environmental regulators to assess the situation and 
determine the appropriate actions.  MDE may require that (ii) cleanup be undertaken, 
which could include removal of the tank, excavation of contaminated soil, and the 
extraction and treatment of groundwater, among other things. Not all LUSTs undergo 
active cleanup efforts. Petroleum products naturally degrade over time, so if there is 
no public or environmental threat then ongoing monitoring and natural attenuation are 
sometimes deemed the best course of action (US EPA, 2004; Khan et al., 2004).  If 
cleanup is undertaken, it is usually complete by the time the leak investigation enters 
the third and final stage, (iii) closure of the case, which is reached when the 
regulatory agency no longer considers the LUST a threat. 
Interaction terms between distance to a pollution source and 
contamination/cleanup events is a common identification strategy in hedonic studies 
(Boyle and Kiel, 2001; Farber, 1998).  A unique aspect of my study is the inclusion of 
home-specific information regarding leaks and pollution in private groundwater 
wells, denoted       .  MDE staff will test a domestic well if they suspect that it is 
contaminated by petroleum from a LUST.  Residents of these homes receive letters 
explaining the situation, requesting to test their well, and the test results.  This is not 
common to all homes near a LUST, thus the households whose wells are tested are 
relatively well informed about actual or potential risks. 
I do not observe perceived risks directly and must therefore estimate a 
reduced-form hedonic model.  Assuming a log-linear functional form, the model is 




where    is a neighborhood specific fixed effect to control for all unobserved time-
invariant neighborhood influences,    denotes quarterly and annual fixed effects to 
capture overall market trends, and      is a disturbance term (that I later assume to be 
normally distributed).
22
  The coefficients to be estimated are  ,  ,  , and  .   
       includes all UST facilities, whether leaking or not. The coefficient   
captures the baseline effect of desirable and undesirable characteristics associated 
with these facilities and the surrounding area. This yields a clean quasi-experimental 
framework where the ―treatment‖ is the discovery of a leak (denoted by        ).  
Home sales around registered USTs that never leak serve as a control, sales around 
LUSTs before the leak is discovered are the treated group before the treatment, and 
sales after a leak is discovered are the treated group after the treatment. This is similar 
to what Horsch and Lewis (2009) refer to as a spatial difference-in-difference 
approach.   
Assuming that the unobserved characteristics captured by   do not change 
over time in a manner correlated with LUST events, then the elements of vector   are 
the causal effects of (i) a leak being discovered, (ii) contamination being cleaned up, 
and (iii) a leak case being closed, on home values. The coefficient   is the effect of 
groundwater well testing and contamination on the value of a home.  
In addition to (5), I estimate several variants of it. The first entails a two-stage 
control function or propensity score type of approach (Wooldridge, 2002, Chp. 18). 
This framework effectively compares the price of homes around leaking UST 
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 In the specifications I allow the disturbances to be correlated at different levels of spatial 
aggregation, including clustering at the census block group or tract level, or more formal spatial 




facilities to a control group of homes around non-leaking facilities that have similar 
propensities for a leak to be discovered. This approach may better control for 
confounding influences associated with a UST facility that are correlated with the 
discovery of a LUST. For example, if larger UST facilities are more likely to leak, 
and larger facilities are more of a nuisance to residents, then we must properly control 
for such heterogeneity in the baseline price effects in order to identify  .  
The ―propensity score‖ approach is done in two steps. In the first step I 
estimate the probability that a leak is discovered at each individual UST facility. 
Formally: 
                                (6) 
where       is a dummy variable equal to one if a leak is discovered at UST facility 
k, and       is a vector of characteristics of the facility (e.g., age, number of USTs, 
site use) and its location (e.g., hydrogeology, exposure pathway and receptors, 
neighborhood socio-demographics).   is a vector of unknown coefficients. I posit 
that the propensity that a leak is discovered follows a normal distribution, so      is a 
standard normal cumulative density function. I estimate   in the probit model shown 
in (6) via the method of maximum likelihood.  I then form the predicted propensity of 
a leak at each UST facility                 .   
 The expected number of leaks around a home is then calculated by summing 
    for all tank facilities within the vicinity of each home,  
                       (7) 
where    denotes the set of all UST facilities in close proximity to home i (e.g., 500 




                                       
                     . (8) 
Similar to a propensity score model, in (8) I estimate the average treatment effect   
(i.e., the effect of a LUST on home values) conditional on the propensity for 
―treatment.‖ In theory, the estimated coefficient   further accounts for the non-
random discovery of a leak, or ―treatment‖ assignment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983).  
The second variant of (5) I estimate is a repeat sales model, where unobserved 
time invariant characteristics associated with a home and its specific location are 
differenced out.  Suppose home i was sold in some earlier period    , then the 
repeat sales model is 
                                      
 
                          (9)
  
where   denotes the change in the value from period s to t. Both the repeat sales and 
neighborhood fixed effect models account for unobserved time invariant influences 
associated with a home and its location, but do not control for time-varying 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
The third variant of (5) is a spatial autoregressive model (LeSage and Pace, 
2009), where a spatiotemporal lag of neighboring home sales is included in the right-
hand side of the hedonic equation to soak up any time-varying confounders.  This lag 
is basically a weighted average of home prices within some predefined neighborhood.  
The model is presented below in matrix notation,   




where P is a n×1 matrix containing the natural log of the price for all sales, W is a 
row-standardized n×n spatial weight matrix defining the neighbor relations, and   is 
the spatial lag coefficient which is meant to absorb all unobserved and potentially 
confounding characteristics associated with the location of a home. 
 
V. The Data 
The empirical analysis focuses on single-family home sales from 1996-2007 
in three Maryland Counties: Baltimore, Frederick, and Baltimore City (see figure 1).
23
  
I focus on Maryland because a comprehensive dataset of home transactions was 
available, and I could physically access the leak investigation files at the Maryland 
Department of Environment (MDE). I selected these counties because they have a 
good mix of urban and rural areas, and homes served by public water versus private 
wells.
24
 This dataset contains four main components: (i) registered UST facilities, (ii) 
leak investigation and remediation cases, (iii) single family home sales, and (iv) well 
contamination test results.     
V.A. Underground Storage Tanks 
The State of Maryland requires all tanks meeting certain criteria be registered 
with its Department of Environment (COMAR 26.10.02).  MDE‘s Oil Control 
Program provided data on all registered USTs in Maryland.  Attention is restricted to 
the 3,516 registered UST facilities in Baltimore (1495), Baltimore City (1562), and 
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 Baltimore County does not include the City of Baltimore, which is considered a separate county 
(FIPS 24510).   
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 According to the 1990 census, virtually all homes in Baltimore City are served by the public water 
system. In Frederick and Baltimore Counties 43% and 8% of the homes use private wells, respectively, 






  Table 1 shows that the majority of UST facilities are in 
areas served by public water, but there are 426 USTs in areas where households rely 
on private groundwater wells.  Among the 1,300 UST facilities where the use is 
listed, 574 (44.2%) are gas stations, 305 (23.5%) are classified as commercial, and 
421 (32.4%) as industrial (table 2).  The average UST facility has three tanks and a 
total capacity of 17,363 gallons.  Just over half (53.9%) of the facilities had no active 
tanks at the beginning of the study period.  During 1996-2007 leaks were discovered 
at 138 (3.92%) of these registered UST facilities. 
V.B. Leaking Underground Storage Tanks 
MDE‘s Oil Control Program provided data on 42,100 oil ―cases‖ in Maryland, 
which includes routine compliance, opening and closing of USTs, and leak 
investigation and remediation cases.  Out of these cases, 284 pertain to leak 
investigations for vapor intrusion, or soil and groundwater contamination in the study 
area, and were first opened during 1996-2007.   
Case documentation is available only at the MDE office in Baltimore, where I 
spent over 200 hours reviewing individual case files.  Lesser cases where 
contamination was not found or was minimal and could not conceivably affect 
property prices were disregarded, leaving 255 cases.  I disregard investigations that 
were not linked to a UST facility with a valid address, leaving 219 cases. To ensure a 
relatively homogeneous set of LUSTs and better control for pre-leak conditions I 
focus only on the 138 leak investigations that were undertaken at a registered UST 
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 I disregard UST facilities that are i) classified as farms, residences, and government facilities, ii) 




facility (see table 3).
26
 These facilities are continually regulated by the UST program, 
and face ongoing monitoring, and procedural and system compliance requirements. 
Therefore, this subset of LUST sites is particularly relevant for studying the benefits 
of the program.  
Of these 138 cases, 34 (24.6%) LUSTs are in a private well area, and at 27 of 
them (19.6%) there was evidence confirming that contamination migrated to 
neighboring properties. As of the end of 2007, active cleanup efforts had been 
undertaken at 61 LUSTs (44.2%). Remediation technologies included soil excavation, 
pump-and-treat, vacuum extraction, soil vapor extraction, recovery sumps, 
containment walls, concrete caps, and bioremediation (e.g. oxygen and enzyme 
injections).   Considering the 84 leak cases that were closed by the end of 2008, the 
average was open for 1.79 years (median 1.24 years), the shortest was a day, and the 
longest was 10.48 years. 
V.C. Home Sales 
Data on single family homes come from Maryland Property View (MDPV) 
1996-2007, which compiles the tax assessment databases maintained by the tax 
assessor‘s office in each county of the state.  There are a total of 244,169 single-
family homes with valid geographic coordinates: 59,671 in Frederick County, 
152,488 in Baltimore County, and 32,015 in Baltimore City.
27
  The hedonic analysis 
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 Leaks at non-registered facilities are the result of past land uses. These sites could currently be used 
for a variety of activities, and so there is no clear counterfactual.  In contrast, the obvious 
counterfactual to leaks at registered tanks is non-leaking registered tanks. In an earlier hedonic study 
we examine leaks at both registered and non-registered USTs (Zabel and Guignet, 2010). 
27
 By home I mean a unique tax identification number that existed at least one year during the study 




focuses on the 132,840 sales from 1996-2007 for this set of homes.
28
  The average 
transaction rate per year is thus 4.53%. The median price over that period is $215,063 




 Descriptive statistics of the home characteristics are shown in table 4.  MDPV 
contains geographic coordinates and several structural characteristics for each home 
(e.g., interior square footage, lot size, the number of bathrooms, etc.).  I derived 
several locational variables using a Geographic Information System (GIS) and data 
from various sources.
30
  I define neighborhoods according to the 2000 Census block 
groups for Baltimore and Frederick counties, and by census tracts for Baltimore 
City.
31
  This produces 498, 127, and 200 ―neighborhoods,‖ respectively. Other spatial 
attributes are included to control for local variation within a neighborhood (e.g., 
distances to major roads and open space areas).   
Distance from a home to surrounding USTs was calculated using GIS.  The 
average sale is 718 meters from the nearest registered UST, and 2.2 km from the 
nearest LUST. There are 17,963 sales (13.5%) within 200m of a UST and 65,367 
(49.2%) within 0-500m. Considering only these sales, there were 3.58 USTs within 
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 I restrict attention to arms‘ length sales, and exclude home sales with a sale price less than $15,000 
(2007$) or greater than $2 million, a lot size greater than 5 acres or listed as zero, more than 10 full 
baths or 10 half baths, no full baths listed, and  interior square footage listed as zero.   
29
 All prices were converted to 2007 dollars using the National Consumer Price Index developed by the 
US Dept of Labor‘s Bureau of Labor Statistics (ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt, 
accessed Nov. 12, 2010). 
30
 Data sources included the Baltimore County Department of Public Works, Frederick County 
Division of Planning, the Maryland Department of Planning, Maryland Department of Natural 
Resources, Federal Highway Administration, United States Geological Survey, and Maryland 
Geological Survey. 
31
 Block groups in Baltimore City are relatively small and there are not enough single family-home 




500m of the average home sold. Almost half (48.2%) of all single-family homes (not 
just sales) are within 500m of a UST, confirming that USTs truly are ubiquitous. 
 Identification of the effect of LUSTs on property values requires that 
transactions occur during the various stages of the leak investigation/cleanup process.  
Table 5 shows the number of sales during each of these stages that are within 0-200 
and 200-500 meters of the LUST.  Notice there are relatively few sales in the more 
rural private well areas, which is where households are potentially exposed to 
contaminated groundwater. 
V.D. Potable Well Contamination Tests 
If MDE suspects a household‘s well has been contaminated by a leak, a letter 
is sent notifying the residents of the situation and requesting to test their well.  MDE 
then sends the test results to the residents.  If warranted, regularly scheduled testing 
and correspondence will continue.  
During 1996-2007 there were over 7,700 potable well tests conducted at 670 
different homes and businesses (633 of which were single-family homes).  Only 50 
single-family home transactions took place after the well had been tested (18 in 
Baltimore and 32 in Frederick counties) corresponding to 11 different LUST cases (3 
in Baltimore and 8 in Frederick counties). Often MDE found no, or minimal, 
contamination, and it was therefore not necessary to continue testing.  Figure 4 shows 
how many well tests took place prior to the sale of each home, 16 homes had only one 
well test prior to the sale, but 33 homes were tested multiple times.
32
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 Six homes had 2 tests prior the sale, seven homes had 3-5 tests, 11 homes had 6-20 tests, and 10 




If contamination is found at a residence to be sold, the prospective seller is 
required by law to disclose such information.  Contamination was found at 23 of the 
50 sales where testing occurred.  BTEX was found in 11 domestic wells and MTBE 
in 19 (see table 6).
33
 Granulated active carbon (GAC) filters, which essentially 
eliminate all pollutants, were installed and maintained by MDE at nine of the 10 
home sales where pollution levels exceeded the regulatory standards. 
 Under Maryland Real Estate Disclosure laws, the sale of any home on a 
private well is conditional on a satisfactory well test.
34
 These are separate tests that 
are not associated with Maryland‘s Oil Control Program. Nevertheless, since LUST 
contamination was previously found or suspected by MDE, these routine tests may 
find contamination, or bring the LUST to the attention of the prospective buyer, 
especially if the leak and well tests by MDE were relatively recent events.  On 
average, the most recent MDE-conducted test relative to the sale date was 1.55 years 
prior to the sale date (the median is 124 days).  At 32 (64%) of the MDE-tested 
homes, testing occurred both before and after the transaction, implying sellers and 
buyers were likely aware of the LUST and groundwater contamination. 
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 BTEX is the summation of four commonly cited petroleum contaminants, all of which are 
individually regulated by the EPA under the Safe Drinking Water Act.  The Maximum Contaminant 
Levels (MCL) are 5 parts per billion (ppb) for benzene, 100 ppb for toluene, 700 ppb for ethyl 
benzene, and 10,000 ppb for xylenes.  MTBE is a former gasoline additive and suspected carcinogen.  
The regulatory threshold for MTBE in Maryland is 20 ppb, which is based on the EPA‘s taste and odor 
health advisory of 20-40 ppb in drinking water.   
34
 Unfortunately I do not observe these well tests; I only have access to the tests undertaken by MDE as 




VI. Hedonic Regression Results 
VI.A. Base Hedonic Model Results 
In the first set of hedonic price regressions I estimate several variants of 
equation (5). The dependent variable is the natural log of the sale price (2007$). In 
table 7, I estimate a single hedonic price function for all three counties.
35
 The 
estimated coefficients associated with attributes of the home and its location, as well 
as the year and quarter time effects, are allowed to vary across the counties. For now, 
however, I constrain the estimated effects of a UST and leak and cleanup events on 
home values to be the same across all counties. 
Perceived pollution risks are measured by three dummy variables denoting 
that a LUST is within 500 meters, and is in one of the three stages: i) leak discovered, 
ii) cleanup, iii) post-closure.
36
 The corresponding regression coefficients can be 
interpreted as a percent change in price relative to the pre-leak values.  To absorb any 
unobserved confounding influences on prices, I include a dummy variable denoting 
whether a non-leaking UST, or a LUST that has not yet leaked, are within 500 meters. 
In a difference-in-difference framework, these dummies denote the ―control‖ group of 
homes, and the ―treated‖ group prior to treatment, respectively. 
In model 7.A I do not include neighborhood fixed effects or other variables to 
control for unobserved effects on prices. This model serves as a baseline to compare 
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 Values for a few attributes are missing from some observations, in which case these are coded to 
zero and a companion missing value dummy is included. More specifically, 29,675 (22%) sales were 
missing the number of fireplaces, 9,428 (7%) sales were missing porch square footage, and 376 (less 
than 0.5%) were missing a construction quality classification. Instead of a log-linear relationship, I 
enter the natural log of interior square footage and lot size as explanatory variables in the hedonic 
regressions.  A quadratic term for age is also included.  
36
 Other distances including 100, 200, 500, and 1,000 meters were estimated, but not reported here. 




with models where I better control for confounding influences and heterogeneity. 
Only the coefficient estimates of particular interest are shown, but the sign and 
significance of those not shown are as expected.
37
 The -0.0201 coefficient on non-
leaking UST within 0-500m suggests that homes near a UST sell for about 2% less, 
and homes near a UST that will eventually leak tend to sell for 7% less (as seen by 
LUST within 500m).   
The 0.1126 coefficient on leak discovered suggests an 11% increase in 
property values when a leak is found and an investigation opened, which is against 
initial expectations. It is possible that the public is unaware of the discovery of a 
LUST, or does not perceive it as a threat, but this would imply no change in prices. It 
is possible that this counterintuitive appreciation is due to omitted variables 
associated with a home and its location, which I better account for in later 
regressions. As seen by cleanup and post-closure, model 7.A suggests a small and 
statistically insignificant price effect when cleanup is undertaken, and the 
investigation subsequently completed. 
Model 7.B includes neighborhood fixed effects. Accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity in this fashion does reduce the counterintuitive effect of leak discovery 
by more than 50% relative to model 7.A, suggesting that the neighborhood fixed 
effects may be absorbing some of the omitted variable bias. However, the discovery 
of a leak still seems to lead to an unexpected 4.77% increase in property values.  
Leak discovery is well distributed both spatially and temporally (see figures 2 
and 3), so the coefficient on leak discovered is unlikely to pick up unobserved effects 
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 The full results are available upon request. The full results for the hedonic models estimated 




due to a particular location or time period. This coefficient could, however, absorb 
unobserved effects that are systematically occurring at LUSTs in different locations 
and time periods in a manner correlated with leak discovery.   
Anecdotally, at least eight of the leak investigations were open because 
contamination was found during redevelopment. This is one potential explanation as 
to why leak discovery is associated with an increase in home values.
38
 It is also 
possible that when there is pollution, only the most attractive homes are sold, 
implying an upward bias if there is unobserved ―self-selection‖ into the sample, an 
effect I examine in section VII.   
To better control for unobserved heterogeneity that may vary over time or 
within a neighborhood, in model 7.C I add the natural log of the median price of prior 
sales within 500 meters of a home.
39
 Clearly this variable is endogenous, but I do not 
wish to make any inference about the resulting coefficient. It is included solely to 
absorb potentially confounding local influences on home prices. This adds 
explanatory power, but does not change the LUST related coefficients. 
Model 7.D is a repeat sales model. Following equation (9), the home and 
location specific time invariant characteristics are differenced out, and the median 
neighbor price is included to help control for unobserved local trends. The coefficient 
on leak discovered is much smaller, suggesting only a 1.6% appreciation, which is not 
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 I attempted to instrument for leak discovery, which in theory would eliminate confounding effects 
such as redevelopment.  An instrument was constructed by estimating the probability that a leak is 
discovered at a UST in a given year as a function of characteristics of the facility, tank system, 
geology, and the 2005 adoption of stricter UST regulations in groundwater sensitive areas in Maryland 
(COMAR, 26.10.02.03).  This constructed instrument was then used in a two stage least squares 
procedure. Unfortunately this approach did not prove fruitful, possibly because the predicted 
probability that a leak is discovered in a given time period is extremely low, and due to the lack of 
time-varying instruments. 
39




statistically different from zero.  Cleanup seems to have a small and insignificant 
effect on prices, but closure of a leak investigation leads to a marginally significant 
4.4% depreciation, suggesting a possible residual perception of risk or public stigma 
even after the environmental threat is eliminated. However, unless the residential 
housing market is simply slow to capitalize this stigma, one would also expect lower 
home values during the discovery and cleanup of a leak. 
In tables 8-10, I repeat the above regressions for each county individually. 
There are too few sales to estimate a repeat sales model for each county. Instead, 
spatial autoregressive and autocorrelation models are estimated following equation 
(10).
40
 Again, only the coefficients of interest are displayed, but the full results are 
provided in the appendix to this chapter. Focusing first on Baltimore City (table 8), in 
the specifications controlling for unobserved neighborhood effects (models 8.B-8.C) 
we see no significant effect of LUSTs on home prices. This holds even in model 8.D, 
which includes a spatial lag and allows for spatial autocorrelation.  
The Baltimore County results (table 9) suggest that although the prices of 
homes within 500 meters of a UST and future LUST site tend to be lower, the 
discovery of a LUST, cleanup, and closure of a leak investigation have no negative 
effect on prices. Models 9.B through 9.D again suggest a counterintuitive 5% 
appreciation in home prices upon the discovery of a leak. There is some evidence that 
home values appreciate 2.68-5.41% upon closure of a leak investigation, in models 
9.C and 9.D, respectively.  
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 Spatial autoregressive models were estimated in R using the ―spdep‖ package (Bivand, 2010; R 




In Frederick County (table 10), the results suggest that the discovery of a 
LUST leads to a 2.53-4.68% increase in home prices (although this is only marginally 
significant in some specifications).  We see some evidence that prices are slightly 
lower during the cleanup of a LUST site, but this is only marginally significant at 
best. 
I next examine whether the baseline effects of USTs on home values vary 
according to the type of UST facility, and if so, if this affects the impacts of a LUST. 
For example, are home values affected differently by the mere presence of a gas 
station versus an industrial facility? As shown in table 2, in the state of Maryland‘s 
database of registered USTs, facilities are classified as gas stations, commercial, 
industrial, or as ―unknown,‖ which means that the use of the site was not specified on 
MDE‘s UST inspection report.  
In table 11, for Baltimore City (model 11.A) we see some evidence that the 
baseline effect of proximity to a UST on home prices depends on the type of facility. 
For example, being within 500 meters of a gas station is associated with 6% lower 
home prices, all else the same, although this effect is not statistically significant at the 
conventional levels (p-value = 0.11). When the use of the UST facility is not 
specified, the prices of homes within 500 meters tend to be 4% higher. Based on a 
Wald test, for Baltimore City I reject the null that the baseline price effects are equal 
across different types of UST facilities (p-value=0.0316). In contrast, for Baltimore 
(model 11.B) and Frederick (model 11.C) counties, I fail to reject this null hypothesis, 
suggesting that different types of UST facilities are associated with similar effects on 




In general, the estimated impacts of the discovery of a leak, cleanup, and 
closure of a leak investigation (as displayed in table 11) are not affected by allowing 
the baseline UST effects to vary. One exception, however, is that model 11.A 
suggests that in Baltimore City, home prices decrease by 9.97% upon closure of a 
leak investigation. 
 In table 12, I focus on Baltimore and Frederick Counties, and examine 
whether the presence of an exposure pathway matters by estimating separate 
regressions for homes in private well areas versus those in areas served by the public 
water system. Again we see that leaks, on average, have a small and often 
insignificant effect on home prices.  Leak discovery is still associated with a 2.95% 
appreciation in value for homes that rely on private wells, but this is not significantly 
different from zero. In contrast, in areas connected to the public water system, and 
hence the primary exposure pathway to contamination is not present, the discovery of 
a LUST is associated with a 4.21% increase in home prices. 
VI.B. Hedonic Results from a Refined Quasi Experiment 
The estimation results in table 13 focus only on homes within 500 meters of a 
registered UST, and as such, this hedonic model is a refined quasi experiment that 
only compares homes near USTs where a leak did and did not occur.  Model 13.A 
focuses on all three counties. This is a spatial difference-in-difference model 
comparing home sales around registered non-leaking USTs (the control group), to 
sales near LUST sites (treated group), both before and after the leak.  The LUST 
within 500m dummy is included to account for any ―pre-treatment‖ price differences 




Even in this refined model, the only significant result is the unexpected 4.64% 
appreciation upon the discovery of a leak. A similar result holds even when focusing 
on homes with private wells (model 13.C). 
 An alternative two-step ―propensity score‖ type of model, as shown in 
equations (6)-(8), is estimated for models 13.B and 13.D. Since the treatment (i.e., the 
discovery of a leak) is technically ―assigned‖ to USTs, and not homes per se, I 
estimate the discovery of a leak at a UST facility (eq. 6). The binary dependent 
variable equals one if a leak is discovered at a UST facility from 1996-2007 (n=138), 
and zero otherwise (n=3,378).  
The estimated average marginal effects from the probit models are displayed 
in Table 14. Model 14.A includes characteristics of the UST system and facility, 
county dummies, and a dummy denoting the presence of the primary exposure 
pathway (Private Well Area). The results suggest that a leak is 7.9% more likely to 
occur (and be discovered) at a gas station. Leaks are discovered more often among 
larger facilities with more USTs (as seen by # tanks at facility). A leak is 2.86% more 
likely to be discovered among UST facilities in the private well area, where an 
exposure pathway is present and USTs are more extensively regulated and monitored. 
In Model 14.B, the positive coefficient on # homes in 500m w/ Pvt Well suggests that 
in the presence of an exposure pathway, the larger the potentially exposed population, 
the more likely a leak will be discovered (although this effect is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels). Finally, I find that leaks are less likely to be 




14.C and 14.B I include census block group characteristics, which have statistically 
insignificant effects on the probability of a leak. 
I use the estimated coefficients from the first step to estimate the probability 
(or propensity) of leak discovery at each UST facility. Focusing on model 14.B, the 
mean predicted probability of a leak among non-leaking USTs is 3.49% 
(median=1.28%), compared to 14.39% (median=12.9%) among the 138 LUSTs.
41
 
Figure 6 displays the distribution of predicted propensities, and shows that the 
common support is fairly wide.  
I next calculate the ―propensity score‖ or predicted number of leaks for each 
home by summing up the predicted leak probability for all USTs within 500 meters 
(see eq. 7), and estimate the hedonic model (eq. 8).  In table 13, model 13.B focuses 
on all homes within 500 meters of a UST. As seen by the coefficient on the 
Propensity Score variable, each additional predicted LUST site is associated with a 
5.3% decline in home prices. The inclusion of the ―propensity score‖ does not 
significantly change the estimated effects of a LUST on home prices. We still see 
small and statistically insignificant effects of a LUST on home prices, except for the 
4.03% appreciation upon the discovery of a LUST. The results are similar when 
focusing just on homes that rely on private wells (model 13.D).
 42
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 The predicted propensities, and subsequent hedonic results, do not change significantly when the 
other models in table 15 are used. 
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 Typically, in a propensity score regression framework the second stage standard errors are biased 
downward because they do not account for the sampling variation in the first stage parameter 
estimates. Although the standard errors can be adjusted via asymptotic formulas or by bootstrapping 
the first stage (Wooldridge, 2002, pg 614; Petrin and Train, 2003), such adjustments in this application 
are complicated by the fact that several UST facilities can be linked to a single home sale. Since the 
coefficient estimate corresponding to the predicted number of leaks is generally statistically 
insignificant, and its inclusion does not significantly change the estimated implicit price of the 




VI.C. Hedonic Results with Well Tests 
The regressions in table 15 focus only on homes in private well areas, and 
include a dummy denoting whether the well water at individual homes was tested 
prior to a sale (Well Tested).  Model 15.A considers all homes that rely on private 
wells. The significant coefficient on Well Tested suggests that the price of tested 
homes decreases by 11.36%.  Models 15.B and 15.C focuses only on the sale of 
homes that are most at risk (i.e., rely on private wells and are within 500 meters of a 
UST); both models suggest a 10.85% and a 11.37% depreciation, respectively.   
There are only 50 sales where MDE tested the well prior to the transaction, 
but despite this low number there is a fairly large and statistically significant 
depreciation. To make sure these dummies are not just picking up unobserved 
heterogeneity, in table 16 I add a dummy denoting observations where a transaction 
took place before the well was tested (Sold before Well Test).  All else constant, if 
sales where well testing occurred prior to the sale are similar to those where testing 
occurred later, then this dummy controls for any unobserved heterogeneity associated 
with homes where the well is tested. There is little change in the Well Tested 
coefficient. In fact, this strengthens the result. I calculate the impact as:  
                                                                    (11) 
and find an 11-12% depreciation. These households are relatively well-informed 
about the LUST and groundwater pollution, and face actual (or potential) risks. 
Regressions not reported in this dissertation show that there is a significant 
depreciation even when a test reveals no contamination. If a test shows pollution 




statistically different from the 10% depreciation among homes where the tests 
revealed contamination below the standard. 
 
VII. Do LUSTs Deter Home Sales? 
VII.A. Sale Probability Model 
There are three reasons why it is important to understand whether LUSTs 
deter sales.   First, hedonics may not capture welfare losses associated with a seller‘s 
inability, or reduced ability, to sell their home. Second, hedonic methods assume that 
the occurrence of a sale does not depend on unobserved characteristics that also affect 
price (or that are at least not correlated with the variables of interest). However, if in 
the presence of pollution only the most desirable homes are sold, and the 
characteristics making such homes attractive are not observed, then such ―self-
selection‖ into the sample of sales implies that hedonics underestimates the effect of 
pollution on home values. Third, statistical identification in the hedonic regressions is 
more difficult if the disamenity of interest further deters sales.  LUSTs are a very 
localized pollution event and the primary exposure pathway (private wells) exists 
mainly in less dense rural areas, thus there are already relatively few sales available 
for identifying the implicit price of LUSTs.   
 Suppose a home is sold in year t if the maximum bid is greater than or equal 
to the current owner‘s reservation value of not selling and continuing to live in the 
home.  In equilibrium the hedonic price surface is the upper envelope of buyers‘ bid 




market value of the home is greater than or equal to the seller‘s reservation value. I do 
not observe the seller‘s reservation value, and so I must estimate a reduced form 
model, 
                                      (12) 
where       is a given cumulative distribution function.43 Recall that xit denotes a 
vector of home structure and location characteristics, Mit is a vector of year dummies 
to account for overall housing market trends, and USTit and LUSTit are vectors 
denoting proximity to UST facilities and LUST discovery and cleanup activities, 
respectively. 
VII.B. Data for Sale Probability Model 
I construct a panel of 212,068 single family homes each year from 2000-2007 
(including homes that did not sell).
44
  Observing these parcels over 8 years yields a 
total of n=1,696,544 observations. Table 17 displays the number of parcels in each 
county and whether they are connected to the public water system or use a private 
well.  Among these parcels, the number of sales in each county by year is displayed in 
table 18.  As seen in figure 5, there is a higher sale rate in Baltimore City than the 
other more suburban/rural counties of Baltimore and Frederick, and there is a similar 
time trend across the counties. 
                                                 
43
 I model annual sale occurrence using probit and fixed effect logit models, and thus, depending on the 
model, assume   {.} is either a Normal or Type II Extreme Value cumulative distribution function.   
44
 This is not all single family homes, I restrict attention to the subset where the same tax identification 
number remained from 2000-2007, and a new house was not built.  This is a relatively constant stock 
of homes.  It is not always clear why a parcel‘s tax identification number changes, but sometimes this 
occurs because a parcel is put into a new land use, a new structure is built, or it is split into several lots 




VII.C. Sale Probability Results 
I estimate several variants of equation (12). Only the coefficients of interest 
are displayed in tables 19-21, but all attributes in table 4 are included in the right-
hand side of the model. In table 19, I estimate a separate probit model for each county 
and display the average marginal effects. Comparing models 19.A-19.C, only the 
signs on the coefficients associated with cleanup and post-closure are the same across 
all counties. I am particularly interested in the negative effect of cleanup on 
transactions, an effect that is particularly strong in Baltimore City. Among the 
Baltimore City homes analyzed, the probability a home is sold in a given year is 
7.5%, but this is reduced by 3.57% when a LUST is undergoing active cleanup (e.g., 
excavation of soil). Therefore, the home is almost half as likely to sell! In contrast, 
Howland (2004) finds that transaction rates of industrial parcels in Baltimore City 
were not affected by contamination. 
Visual cues associated with cleanup may make buyers and sellers aware of the 
LUST site for the first time, or cause them to perceive the risks as more severe (Dale 
et al., 1999; Messer et al, 2006). Residents may also find cleanup efforts bothersome 
and aesthetically displeasing (Weber et al., 2001). These visual cues may lead to 
public stigma (Gregory and Scatterfield, 2002), thus deterring buyers from looking at 
homes in the neighborhood, and/or discouraging sellers from entering the market until 
the situation is resolved.  
 In table 20, I estimate the probability of a sale separately for homes in private 
well and public water areas in Frederick and Baltimore Counties. Comparing the 




sales in private well areas. The average home in a private well area has a 3.2% 
probability of being sold in a given year, but this decreases by 1.45 during the 
cleanup of a LUST, a 45% decrease in the probability of a sale.  
The finding that cleanup activities are a stronger deterrent of transactions 
among homes with private wells is confirmed using a fixed effect logit, which 
conditions out all time invariant home specific characteristics (Chamberlain, 1980), 
thus reducing omitted variable bias.
45
  Homes in both private well and public water 
areas are used in estimating model 20.C, and interaction terms are included to allow 
the effects of LUSTs to differ.
46
 Note that the marginal effects could not be calculated 
due to the unobserved home-specific intercepts, so the estimated coefficients are 
displayed. The positive and occasionally significant coefficients corresponding to 
closure of a leak investigation suggest that sales activity rebounds back to at least the 
pre-leak levels once the perceptual reminders associated with cleanup cease, and the 
LUST is deemed safe by MDE. Thus there appears to be no post-cleanup stigma in 
terms of quantity of sales. 
Table 21 examines whether ―high-‖ versus ―lower-end‖ homes are more or 
less likely to sell during LUST events.  I focus on the homes where health risks are 
highest, those in private well areas that are within 500m of a UST.  I define ―higher-‖ 
and ―lower–end‖ homes based on observed characteristics, namely construction 
quality and the distribution of assessed values.  Interaction terms are included in 
                                                 
45
 Estimation of the fixed effect logit model requires variation in the dependent variable, and therefore 
only accounts for homes that were sold at least once during the study period. 
46
 A likelihood ratio test confirms that this is the correct specification, the null that the probability of a 
sale is affected the same way by LUSTs in private well and public water areas is rejected at the 10% 
level (chi-sq=6.56, p-value=0.0873).  The null hypothesis that transactions are affected by cleanup the 








The negative and statistically significant coefficients corresponding to the 
interaction term cleanup × low, relative to the coefficients on cleanup × high, suggest 
that lower-end homes are far less likely to sell during cleanup activities. For example, 
the average home in Model 21.A has a 2.76% probability of being sold in a year, but 
when a LUST is undergoing cleanup this is cut in half! In contrast, the average high-
end home has a 3.77% probability of being sold, and this is reduced to 3.56% during 
cleanup (a statistically insignificant change). This difference in the point estimates is 
robust to fixed effect logit estimations and various definitions of low and high quality 
homes (models 21.B-21.C). However, in all the models in table 20 I fail to reject the 
null that these effects are statistically different. 
More research is needed, but this provides some evidence reflecting Simons et 
al.‘s (1999) sentiment that hedonics may underestimate the effects of LUSTs because 
more desirable homes are more likely to sell in the face of pollution.  If similar 
unobserved characteristics are affecting whether a sale takes place, then such ―self-
selection,‖ would bias the hedonic results. It might be possible to control for such 
selection bias with a Heckman (1979) two-step or a propensity score matching 
approach (Wooldridge, 2002), but in practice it is difficult to find an exogenous 
variable that influences the occurrence of a sale but does not influence price, as is 
recommended for identification purposes.
48
 
                                                 
47
 Likelihood ratio tests across all four models fail to reject the null that higher and lower-end homes 
are affected differently across all LUST events. 
48
 Under standard hedonic assumptions characteristics of the selling household would be the ideal 





 VIII. Conclusion and Future Research 
The goal of this study was to investigate how property values respond to 
potential and actual petroleum contamination from leaking underground storage tanks 
(LUSTs), and ultimately determine the feasibility of using hedonic methods to 
estimate the broader benefits of the national Underground Storage Tank (UST) 
program. The hedonic property value model is an attractive valuation technique 
because it relies on actual market behavior. However, disentangling the implicit price 
of LUSTs is challenging because they are relatively unpublicized pollution events, 
and the spatial distribution of UST facilities, and therefore leaks, may be correlated 
with other confounding influences on property values.  
Focusing on three Maryland counties (Baltimore, Frederick, and Baltimore 
City) from 1996-2007, I conduct a detailed study on home prices and transactions. I 
control for a large set of home and neighborhood attributes in the hedonic regressions, 
including neighborhood fixed effects.  To further reduce omitted variable bias, I 
implement spatial difference-in-difference and ―propensity score‖ approaches by 
accounting for leaking and non-leaking tanks, and exploiting the temporal and spatial 
variation in the discovery of leaks.  As a robustness check, repeat sales and spatial 
autoregressive models are estimated.   
In general, I conclude that homes simply near a LUST (e.g., 500 meters) do 
not typically decline in value upon the discovery of a leak, even when an obvious 
exposure pathway is present (private groundwater wells). Similarly, there is no clear 




unclear whether residents who are merely living near a LUST always perceive it as a 
threat, or are even aware of it. 
A unique aspect of this paper is that I account for home-specific variation in 
information and pollution, namely domestic groundwater well test results from the 
Maryland Department of Environment (MDE). Households whose wells were tested 
are relatively well-informed since they receive correspondence from MDE. The mere 
testing of a private well by MDE signals to a household that there is suspected 
contamination, and perhaps even health risks, from a nearby LUST. Furthermore, the 
test results may reveal that the private well is in fact contaminated. This information 
may lead to changes in a household‘s perceptions of current risks, as well as potential 
risks in the future.   
Among these tested homes I find a 9-12% decline in value, which reflects a 
real welfare loss to these well-informed households. This result may also be partially 
capturing heterogeneity in pollution severity across LUST sites, because testing is 
more likely to take place at more severe sites.  
 I find that home transactions are half as likely to occur when a nearby LUST 
is undergoing ―active‖ cleanup. Visual cues associated with cleanup (e.g., tank 
removal, soil excavation, and pump-and-treat devices) may lead to changes in risk 
perceptions, and given the unpublicized nature of most LUSTs, this may be the first 
event making people aware of the pollution problem. Sales activity rebounds once 
cleanup is complete and the leak investigation is closed, suggesting that once 
perceptual reminders cease and the risks are eliminated, there is no residual stigma 




An important issue to consider in expanding this analysis to a nationwide or 
multi-state hedonic study, and ultimately to estimate the benefits of the national UST 
program, is that details specific to individual LUSTs are extremely important, and add 
to the already daunting data collection task. There is no Federal LUST database, as in 
the case of other Federal programs, such as Superfund. Each State maintains its own 
records, and the quality and comparability may vary substantially.  
An alternative approach is a nationwide stated preference study, where the 
researcher can directly address health risks, control for what information and risks are 
presented, and better understand how people perceive these risks. A stated preference 
approach also allows for a more valid counterfactual (i.e., what pollution levels would 
be in the absence of the UST program). Such a counterfactual is difficult in a hedonic 
study because the UST program has been in place since the mid-1980s, and is very 





Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Three Maryland Counties in Study Area and Public Water Service Area. 
 










Figure 4. Number of Potable Well Tests (among 50 sales where testing occurred 
































































Figure 6. Kernel Density Estimate of the Probability that a Leak is Discovered at a 
UST Facility (from Model 13.B in Table 13). 
 
Note: Gray dashed lines denote common support. 
 
 





Private  Well Area Total 
Baltimore City 1,562 - 1,562 
Baltimore  1,228 267 1,495 
Frederick 300 159 459 






Table 2. Number of Registered Underground Storage Tank Facilities by Type of 
Facility.† 
 
Baltimore City Baltimore Frederick Total 
Commercial 113 144 48 305 
Gas Station 206 279 89 574 
Industrial 240 135 46 421 
Unknown 1003 937 276 2216 
Total 1562 1495 459 3516 
†The UST facilities classification listed here comes from the Maryland Department of 





Table 3. Number of Leak Cases at Registered UST Facilities by Water Area. 
 Public Water 
Area 
Private  Well 
Area 
Total 
Baltimore City 32 - 32 
Baltimore  58 18 76 
Frederick 14 16 30 









Table 4. Attributes of Single Family Home Sales in Baltimore City, Frederick, and 
Baltimore Counties. 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
price of home (2007$) 132840 263877 174084 15000 1979828 
interior square footage 132840 1816.56 811.37 104 7976 
lot size (acres) 132840 0.4424 0.6260 0.002 5 
number full baths 132840 1.7445 0.7319 1 10 
number half baths 132840 0.5279 0.5473 0 10 
porch size (sqft) 123402 256.11 226.88 0 4260 
number of fireplaces 103165 0.7489 0.6377 0 40 
basement (dummy) 132840 0.8168 0.3868 0 1 
number of stories 132840 1.6479 0.4630 1 4 
attached garage (dummy) 132840 0.3602 0.4801 0 1 
low quality construction
a
 132840 0.0043 0.0654 0 1 
average quality construction
a
 132840 0.8016 0.3988 0 1 
good quality construction
a
 132840 0.1871 0.3900 0 1 
high quality construction
a
 132840 0.0042 0.0647 0 1 
age of home (years) 132840 39.5311 30.1462 1 207 
in private groundwater well area (dummy) 132840 0.1799 0.3841 0 1 
distance to central business district (kilometers)
b
 132840 13.37 6.88 0.178 49.79 
median home price in neighborhood (2007$)
c
 129688 235472 141029 1 6401731 
meters to nearest public open space (meters) 132840 817 1086 0 10744 
distance to nearest commercial zone (meters) 132840 671 723 0 9697 
distance to nearest major road (meters) 132840 989 1089 0 10496 
Note: 
a. Dummy variables based on classification by tax assessors. 
b. Central business district defined as Baltimore‘s inner harbor for Baltimore County and City, and the City  
of Frederick for Frederick County. 






Table 5. Number of Sales During LUST Investigation and Cleanup Events. 
LUST Stage Entire Area 
Entire Area 






0 - 200 meters 
Leak Discovery 216 63 111 59 46 33 
Cleanup 98 18 53 41 4 7 
Post-Closure 381 63 226 21 134 11 
 
200 - 500 meters 
Leak Discovery 1097 327 567 260 270 103 
Cleanup 518 94 326 175 17 19 












Last Test Mean Level 
(ppb) 
Max Mean Level (ppb) 
 
Contaminated Mean Median Mean Median 
      
BTEX 11 22.53 0 748 45 
MTBE







Table 7. Base Hedonic Price Regression Results for Entire Study Area (Baltimore 
City, Frederick, and Baltimore County). 
 
Model 7.A Model 7.B Model 7.C Model 7.D
a 
VARIABLES ln(price) ln(price) ln(price) ∆ ln(price) 
        
 Non-leaking UST within 
500m (dummy) -0.0201** -0.0067* -0.0033 
 
 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) 
 LUST within 500m (dummy) -0.0724*** -0.0234** -0.0186* 
 
 
(0.026) (0.011) (0.010) 
       ×   leak discovered  
            (dummy) 0.1126*** 0.0477*** 0.0488*** 0.0162 
 
(0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) 
       ×   cleanup (dummy) -0.0061 -0.0051 -0.0035 -0.0140 
 
(0.030) (0.017) (0.016) (0.029) 
       ×   post-closure (dummy) 0.0136 0.0046 0.0063 -0.0439* 
 
(0.038) (0.014) (0.013) (0.025) 
Neighborhood 
Characteristics: 
    ln(Median Neighbor Price)  
  
0.1762*** 0.1475*** 
   
(0.013) (0.017) 
Neighborhood Fixed Effects  No Yes Yes No 
(Number of Fixed Effects) 
 
(729) (729) 
 Repeat Sales Model No No No Yes 
Home Characteristics: 
    Home Structure × County Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Home Location × County Yes Yes Yes No 
Year and Quarter Dummies  
       × County Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Observations 132,831 132,831 132,831 27,128 
R-squared 0.770 0.628 0.635 0.224 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Std errors are in parentheses. Errors are clustered by neighborhood group. (Neighborhoods are 
defined by census block groups for Baltimore and Frederick County, and census tract for Baltimore City). 






Table 8. Base Hedonic Price Regression Results for Baltimore City. 
  Model 8.A Model 8.B Model 8.C Model 8.D 
VARIABLES ln(price) ln(price) ln(price) ln(price) 
        
 Non-leaking UST within 
500m  
(dummy) 0.0337 0.0168 0.0091 0.0374** 
 
(0.029) (0.017) (0.014) (0.019) 
LUST within 500m (dummy) 0.4682*** 0.0738* 0.0726* 0.0397 
 
(0.097) (0.041) (0.040) (0.053) 
      ×   leak discovered  
            (dummy) -0.2110* 0.0169 0.0120 0.0270 
 
(0.119) (0.045) (0.047) (0.056) 
       ×   cleanup (dummy) 0.0076 -0.0075 -0.0012 0.0407 
 
(0.159) (0.094) (0.096) (0.182) 
       ×   post-closure (dummy) -0.5053*** -0.0641 -0.0666 -0.0585 
 
(0.105) (0.044) (0.043) (0.061) 
Neighborhood 
Characteristics: 




   
(0.032) 
 Spatial Lag 
   
0.0198*** 
    
(0.003) 
Spatial Autocorrelation 
   
0.7915*** 
    
(0.008) 
Census Tract Fixed Effects  No Yes Yes No 
(Number of Tracts Effects) 
 
(127) (127) 
 Home Characteristics: 
    Home Structure Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Home Location Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Observations 22,508 22,508 22,508 22,508 
R-squared 0.539 0.338 0.347 
 Log Likelihood 
   
-13,788.01 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Std errors are in parentheses. Errors are clustered by census tract, except in model 8.D, where a 






Table 9. Base Hedonic Price Regression Results for Baltimore County. 
  Model 9.A Model 9.B Model 9.C Model 9.D 
VARIABLES ln(price) ln(price) ln(price) ln(price) 
        
 Non-leaking UST within 
500m  
(dummy) -0.0269*** -0.0125*** -0.0076* -0.0152*** 
 
(0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0003) 
LUST within 500m (dummy) -0.1413*** -0.0552*** -0.0495*** -0.0911*** 
 
(0.029) (0.017) (0.015) (0.011) 
      ×   leak discovered       
            (dummy) 0.1095*** 0.0565*** 0.0577*** 0.0546*** 
 
(0.024) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) 
       ×   cleanup (dummy) 0.0419 0.0092 0.0082 0.0334** 
 
(0.043) (0.024) (0.022) (0.015) 
       ×   post-closure (dummy) 0.0650* 0.0248 0.0268* 0.0541*** 
 
(0.037) (0.017) (0.015) (0.011) 
Neighborhood 
Characteristics: 




   
(0.012) 
 Spatial Lag  
   
0.0025*** 
    
(0.000) 
Spatial Autocorrelation 
   
0.6821*** 
    
(0.004) 
Block Group Fixed Effects  No Yes Yes No 
(Number of Fixed Effects) 
 
(479) (479) 
 Home Characteristics: 
    Home Structure Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Home Location Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Observations 75,881 75,881 75,881 75,881 
R-squared 0.792 0.693 0.701 
 Log Likelihood 
   
-6,686.333 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Std errors are in parentheses. Errors are clustered by census block group, except in model 9.D, 













10.C Model 10.D 
VARIABLES ln(price) ln(price) ln(price) ln(price) 
        
 Non-leaking UST within 
500m  
(dummy) -0.0050 -0.0033 0.0023 -0.0013*** 
 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) 
LUST within 500m (dummy) 0.0011 -0.0021 0.0031 0.0019 
 
(0.024) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) 
      ×   leak discovered  
            (dummy) 0.0545** 0.0253* 0.0274* 0.0468*** 
 
(0.027) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) 
       ×   cleanup (dummy) -0.0686** -0.0140 -0.0101 -0.0323* 
 
(0.031) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) 
       ×   post-closure (dummy) 0.0372 -0.0134 -0.0076 -0.0048 
 
(0.045) (0.025) (0.022) (0.019) 
Neighborhood 
Characteristics: 




   
(0.013) 
 Spatial Lag  
   
0.0013*** 
    
(0.000) 
Spatial Autocorrelation  
   
0.7604*** 
    
(0.007) 
Block Group Fixed Effects  No Yes Yes No 
(Number of Fixed Effects) 
 
(123) (123) 
 Home Characteristics: 
    Home Structure Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Home Location Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Observations 34,442 34,442 34,442 34,451 
R-squared  0.878 0.863 0.867 
 Log Likelihood 
   
-18,568.87 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Std errors are in parentheses. Errors are clustered by census block group, except in model 10.D, 














VARIABLES Model 11.A Model 11.B Model 11.C 
    UST within 500m (dummy) 
          ×   gas station -0.0626 -0.0141 -0.0026 
 
(0.039) (0.009) (0.008) 
       ×   commercial 0.0328 -0.0183 0.0029 
 
(0.025) (0.014) (0.013) 
       ×   industrial -0.0221 -0.0212** -0.0088 
 
(0.081) (0.011) (0.009) 
       ×   unknown 0.0434** -0.0001 0.0042 
 
(0.019) (0.006) (0.005) 
LUST within 500m (dummy) 0.1111*** -0.0353** 0.0018 
 
(0.038) (0.015) (0.012) 
       ×   leak discovered (dummy) -0.0158 0.0549*** 0.0295* 
 
(0.054) (0.014) (0.016) 
       ×   cleanup (dummy) -0.0045 0.0077 -0.0055 
 
(0.102) (0.021) (0.020) 
       ×   post-closure (dummy) -0.0997** 0.0199 -0.0088 
 
(0.040) (0.016) (0.022) 
Neighborhood Characteristics: 
   ln(Median Neighbor Price)  0.1766*** 0.2023*** 0.1363*** 
 
(0.032) (0.012) (0.013) 
Neighborhood Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
(Number of Fixed Effects) (127) (479) (123) 
Home Characteristics: 
   Home Structure Yes Yes Yes 
Home Location  Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    Observations 22,508 75,881 34,442 
R-squared 0.348 0.701 0.867 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Std errors are in parentheses. Errors are clustered by neighborhood group. (Neighborhoods are 






Table 12. Hedonic Price Results for Private Well v. Public Water Areas (Baltimore 






VARIABLES  Model 12.A Model 12.B 
      
Non-leaking UST within 500m  
(dummy) 0.0048 -0.0040 
 
(0.006) (0.004) 
LUST within 500m (dummy) 0.0102 -0.0317*** 
 
(0.016) (0.012) 
       ×   leak discovered (dummy) 0.0295 0.0421*** 
 
(0.020) (0.012) 
       ×   cleanup (dummy) 0.0271 0.0096 
 
(0.038) (0.016) 




  ln(Median Neighbor Price)  0.1180*** 0.2450*** 
 
(0.009) (0.014) 
Neighborhood Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
(Number of Fixed Effects) (227) (527) 
Home Characteristics: 
  Home Structure × County Yes Yes 
Home Location × County Yes Yes 
Year and Quarter Dummies × 
County Yes Yes 
   Observations 23,890 86,433 
R-squared 0.786 0.722 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table 13. Quasi-Experimental Hedonic Results for Homes within 500 meters of 
UST. 
  All Counties Private Well Area 
VARIABLES Model 13.A Model 13.B Model 13.C Model 13.D 
          
# of USTs within 0-500 m -0.0010 -0.0005 0.0070 0.0079 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) 
“Propensity Score” 




















       ×   leak discovered  
            (dummy) 0.0464*** 0.0403*** 0.0398** 0.0549*** 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.019) (0.020) 
       ×   cleanup (dummy) 0.0001 -0.0074 -0.0238 -0.0043 
 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.054) (0.056) 
      ×   post-closure       
            (dummy) -0.0005 -0.0105 -0.0422 -0.0154 
 
(0.013) (0.009) (0.027) (0.019) 
Neighborhood  
Characteristics: 
    ln(Median Neighbor Price)  0.1972*** 0.1967*** 0.1003*** 0.1009*** 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Neighborhood Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Number of Fixed Effects) (670) (670) (176) (176) 
Home Characteristics: 
    Home Structure Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       ×   County Yes Yes No No 
Home Location Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       ×   County Yes Yes No No 
Year and Quarter 
Dummies 
 × County Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Observations 65,367 65,367 5,252 5,252 
R-squared 0.547 0.547 0.786 0.786 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Std errors are in parentheses. Errors are clustered by neighborhood. (Neighborhoods are defined by 
census block groups for Baltimore and Frederick County, and census tract for Baltimore City). 






Table 14. Probit of Leak Discovery at UST Facility, Estimated Average Marginal 
Effects (all 3,516 registered facilities in study area). 
 VARIABLES Model 14.A Model 14.B Model 14.C Model 14.D 
Facility Characteristics: 
           Industrial Facility (dummy) -0.003288 -0.003745 -0.003613 -0.004006 
 
(0.0080) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0074) 
       Gas Station (dummy) 0.079332*** 0.079571*** 0.079326*** 0.078071*** 
 
(0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0156) 
       Facility Age  -0.000188 -0.000211 -0.000217 -0.000218 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
       age missing (dummy) -0.009141 -0.009566 -0.009705 -0.009827 
 
(0.0066) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0061) 
       Facility built after 1996 0.001162 -0.000250 -0.000281 -0.000061 
 
(0.0132) (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0120) 
       Active USTs  (dummy) -0.001801 -0.001738 -0.001765 -0.001777 
 
(0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
       # tanks at facility (dummy) 0.003096*** 0.002949*** 0.002960*** 0.002945*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
       # previous leaks w/in 500m 0.002641 0.002228 0.002208 0.002349 
 
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0026) 
Location Characteristics: 
           Baltimore County (dummy) 0.017067*** 0.015266*** 0.014088** 0.014514** 
 
(0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0063) (0.0077) 
       Frederick County (dummy) 0.024674*** 0.024656*** 0.022970** 0.023189** 
 
-0.0111 (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0135) 
       Private Well Area (dummy) 0.028553*** 0.018831** 0.016669** 0.013952* 
 
(0.0101) (0.0098) (0.0100) (0.0092) 
       # homes in 500m w/ Pvt Well 
 
0.000097 0.000100* 0.000106* 
  
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       Depth to groundwater (meters) 
 
-0.000364** -0.000372** -0.000335* 
  
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Block Group Characteristics: 
           % pop in poverty 
   
-0.006715 
    
(0.0324) 
       % housing vacant 
   
0.026298 
    
(0.0378) 
       % housing own occupied 
   
0.013834 
    
(0.0136) 




   
(0.0000) 
 Log Likelihood -463.366110 -459.292861 -459.196168 -458.358468 




Table 15. Hedonic Price Results with Private Well Testing (only homes in private 
well areas). 
  All Homes Within 500m of UST  
VARIABLES (dep variable = 
ln(price)) 
Model 
15.A Model 15.B Model 15.C 
        
# of USTs within 0-500 m 0.0088** 0.0074 0.0082* 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
“Propensity Score”  





   
(0.055) 
Non-leaking UST within 500m  








        ×   leak discovered (dummy) 0.0449** 0.0617*** 0.0754*** 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) 
       ×   cleanup (dummy) 0.0389 0.0018 0.0193 
 
(0.041) (0.054) (0.053) 
       ×   post-closure (dummy) -0.0191 -0.0280 -0.0050 
 
(0.023) (0.027) (0.017) 
Well Tested -0.1136*** -0.1085** -0.1137*** 
 
(0.031) (0.042) (0.041) 
Neighborhood Characteristics: 
   ln(Median Neighbor Price)  0.1180*** 0.0998*** 0.1003*** 
 
(0.009) (0.022) (0.022) 
Neighborhood Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
(Number of Fixed Effects) (227) (176) (176) 
Home Characteristics: 
   Home Structure Yes Yes Yes 
       ×   County Yes No No 
Home Location Yes Yes Yes 
       ×   County Yes No No 
Year and Quarter Dummies 
      × County Yes Yes Yes 
    Observations 23,890 5,252 5,252 
R-squared 0.786 0.787 0.787 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Std errors are in parentheses. Errors are clustered by census block group. 
† Standard Errors for predicted number of leaks are not adjusted to account for two-step procedure 




Table 16. Hedonic Price Results with Private Well Tests: A Robustness Check (only 
homes in private well areas). 
  All Homes Within 500m of UST 
VARIABLES  Model 16.A Model 16.B Model 16.C 
# of USTs within 0-500 m 0.0084* 0.0064 0.0072 
 









Non-leaking UST within 500m  -0.0059 
          (dummy) (0.008) 




        ×   leak discovered (dummy) 0.0453** 0.0624*** 0.0753*** 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) 
       ×   cleanup (dummy) 0.0410 0.0052 0.0189 
 
(0.041) (0.053) (0.052) 
       ×   post-closure (dummy) -0.0163 -0.0231 -0.0034 
 
(0.025) (0.029) (0.017) 
Sold before Well Test 0.0112 0.0287 0.0354 
 
(0.019) (0.025) (0.025) 
Well Tested -0.1112*** -0.0963** -0.0974** 
 
(0.031) (0.041) (0.041) 
Neighborhood Characteristics: 
   ln(Median Neighbor Price)  0.1179*** 0.0998*** 0.1003*** 
 
(0.009) (0.022) (0.022) 
Neighborhood Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
(Number of Fixed Effects) (227) (176) (176) 
Home Characteristics: 
   Home Structure Yes Yes Yes 
       ×   County Yes No No 
Home Location Yes Yes Yes 
       ×   County Yes No No 
Year and Quarter Dummies 
       × County Yes Yes Yes 
Well Testing Impact -0.1152*** -0.1175*** -0.1244*** 
 
(0.033) (0.043) (0.041) 
Observations 23,890 5,252 5,252 
R-squared 0.786 0.787 0.787 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Std errors are in parentheses. Errors are clustered by census block group. 
† Standard Errors for predicted number of leaks are not adjusted to account for two-step procedure 




Table 17. Single Family Home Parcels by County and Water Source. 
 
Baltimore City Baltimore Frederick Total 
Public Water 29,990 113,956 20,930 164,876 
Private Wells - 25,776 21,416 47,192 
Total 29,990 139,732 42,346 212,068 









Table 18. Number of Parcels and Sales by County and Year. 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
 
Baltimore City County 
 
Not Sold 27,748 27,629 27,879 27,837 27,620 27,493 27,563 28,141 221,910 




Not Sold 134,691 134,631 134,065 134,126 133,383 133,507 134,382 135,246 1,074,031 




Not Sold 40,546 40,387 40,443 40,609 40,257 40,208 40,682 41,350 324,482 
Sold 1,800 1,959 1,903 1,737 2,089 2,138 1,664 996 14,286 






Table 19. Probit Results of Annual Probability of a Home Sale by County.  Estimated 









VARIABLES  Model 19.A Model 19.B Model 19.C 
        
# of USTs within 0-500 m 0.0003** -0.0002 -0.0004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Non-leaking UST within 500m 
     (dummy) -0.0003 -0.0009 0.0021 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
LUST within 500m  
     (dummy) -0.0023** 0.0037 0.0042 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
       ×   leak discovered (dummy) 0.0071*** -0.0010 -0.0008 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
       ×   cleanup (dummy) -0.0026 -0.0095*** -0.0357*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013) 
       ×   post-closure (dummy) 0.0028* 0.0014 0.0084** 
 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
Home Characteristics: 
   Home Structure Yes Yes Yes 
Home Location Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    Observations 1,117,856 338,768 239,920 
Log Likelihood -183828.2091 -58077.5181 -63592.6930 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table 20. Probability of a Sale Results by Public Water v. Private Well Areas, 
Estimated Average Marginal Effects
†
 (Baltimore and Frederick Counties; dep 
variable sold=1 if home sold that year, 0 otherwise). 
 
Probit: Probit: FE Logit
†
: 
  Private Well Public Water Public & Well Water 
VARIABLES Model 20.A Model 20.B Model 20.C 
# of USTs within 0-500 m 












Non-leaking UST within 500m 






























































   Home Structure Yes Yes Yes 
       ×   County Yes Yes No 
Home Location Yes Yes No 
       ×   County Yes Yes No 
Year Dummies ×   County Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 377,536 1,079,088 394,496 (49,312 homes) 
Log Likelihood -52980.2680 -188739.6612 -111489.0706 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Std errors are in parentheses. Errors are clustered for same parcel 
over all years. 





Table 21. Probability of a Sale Results: ―Low-‖ v. ―High-End‖ Homes (only homes 
in private well area and within 500 meters of UST; dep variable sold=1 if home sold 
that year, 0 otherwise).  









    
   # of USTs within 0-500 m 0.0005 0.3893 0.3916 0.3853 
 
(0.001) (0.474) (0.475) (0.475) 
LUST within 500m 
(dummies) 0.0003 -1.7519 -1.8435 -1.6161 
 
(0.003) (1.519) (1.553) (1.447) 
       ×   leak discovered  × low  -0.0011 -0.0984 -0.1188 -0.0729 
 
(0.004) (0.197) (0.198) (0.224) 
       ×   cleanup × low  -0.0164*** -1.2857** -1.1552* -1.3564** 
 
(0.006) (0.545) (0.628) (0.690) 
       ×   post-closure × low  -0.0019 0.1175 0.0913 0.1461 
 
(0.004) (0.240) (0.242) (0.254) 
       ×   leak discovered  × high  -0.0125 -0.0696 0.0641 -0.1327 
 
(0.008) (0.519) (0.411) (0.254) 
       ×   cleanup × high  -0.0021 -0.2330 -0.8536 -0.7160 
 
(0.018) (0.738) (0.616) (0.501) 
       ×   post-closure × high  0.0045 0.5084 0.7061 -0.0168 
 
(0.022) (1.099) (0.783) (0.564) 
Home Characteristics: 
    Home Structure Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       ×   County Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Home Location Yes No No No 
       ×   County Yes No No No 
Year Dummies ×   County Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Observations 76,616 17,590 17,590 17,590 
Log Likelihood -10968.2326 -4877.4668 -4877.7228 -4877.8393 
Number of homes   2,199 2,199 2,199 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Std errors are in parentheses. Errors are clustered for same parcel over all years. 
† Average marginal effects displayed for Probit model, but raw coefficients are presented for the 
Fixed Effect Logit models. 
a. Low end homes defined by home quality rated as "low" or "average" by tax assessors, and 
higher end homes are those rated "good" or "high." 
b. Low end homes defined as lower 75% assessed values for that year, and high end homes 
defined as highest 25% assessed values. 
c. Low end homes defined as lower 50% assessed values for that year, and high end homes 





Table A1. Base Hedonic Price Regression Results for Baltimore City: Full Results. 
(from models presented in table 8). 
  Model 8.A Model 8.B Model 8.C Model 8.D 
VARIABLES ln(price) ln(price) ln(price) ln(price) 
Home Characteristics: 
    logsqft 0.2534*** 0.2900*** 0.2801*** 0.2525*** 
 
(0.048) (0.029) (0.027) (0.016) 
ln(lot acreage) 0.1011*** 0.1144*** 0.1112*** 0.1279*** 
 
(0.021) (0.014) (0.013) (0.009) 
number of full baths 0.0315** 0.0341*** 0.0324*** 0.0339*** 
 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) 
number of half baths 0.1235*** 0.0793*** 0.0747*** 0.0615*** 
 
(0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
basement (dummy) 0.0400 0.0769*** 0.0764*** 0.0550*** 
 
(0.034) (0.024) (0.021) (0.017) 
number of stories -0.0558** -0.0332** -0.0326** -0.0215* 
 
(0.026) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) 
number of fireplaces 0.1450*** 0.0691*** 0.0692*** 0.0467*** 
 
(0.021) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) 
number of fireplaces missing 
(dummy) -0.0411 -0.0395** -0.0234 -0.0251** 
 
(0.028) (0.018) (0.016) (0.012) 
porch size (square feet) 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
porch size missing (dummy) 0.0576*** 0.0296** 0.0303** 0.0320** 
 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
attached garage (dummy) 0.0889*** 0.0442*** 0.0358** 0.0240* 
 
(0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
low quality construction (dummy) -0.0868 -0.3808*** -0.3692*** -0.3157*** 
 
(0.150) (0.121) (0.114) (0.117) 
good quality construction (dummy) 0.8046*** 0.2606*** 0.2336*** 0.2812*** 
 
(0.073) (0.063) (0.056) (0.021) 
high quality construction (dummy) 1.1128*** 0.5042*** 0.4403*** 0.5061*** 
 
(0.096) (0.072) (0.067) (0.089) 
construction quality missing 
(dummy) 1.0951*** 0.4702*** 0.4270*** 0.4910*** 
 
(0.089) (0.086) (0.083) (0.056) 
age of home -0.0092*** -0.0056*** -0.0053*** -0.0059*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
age of home^2 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000*** 
 




Time of Sale Dummies: 
         1997 -0.0378* -0.0446*** -0.0337* 0.0523** 
 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023) 
     1998 -0.0261 -0.0050 0.0206 0.0150 
 
(0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.026) 
     1999 0.0082 0.0262 0.0497*** 0.0125 
 
(0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.026) 
     2000 0.0322 0.0450** 0.0580*** 0.0332 
 
(0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
     2001 -0.0016 0.0216 0.0310 0.0062 
 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.028) 
     2002 0.0655 0.0869** 0.0858** 0.0702*** 
 
(0.040) (0.037) (0.033) (0.025) 
     2003 0.1241*** 0.1554*** 0.1399*** 0.1327*** 
 
(0.044) (0.039) (0.034) (0.027) 
     2004 0.2475*** 0.2917*** 0.2534*** 0.2684*** 
 
(0.047) (0.040) (0.035) (0.026) 
     2005 0.4340*** 0.4967*** 0.4245*** 0.4695*** 
 
(0.036) (0.031) (0.026) (0.026) 
     2006 0.5438*** 0.6351*** 0.5306*** 0.6045*** 
 
(0.034) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026) 
     2007 0.5755*** 0.6626*** 0.5311*** 0.6329*** 
 
(0.039) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) 
     2nd quarter 0.0323*** 0.0273*** 0.0230*** 0.0281*** 
 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
     3rd quarter 0.1117*** 0.0885*** 0.0793*** 0.0839*** 
 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
     4th quarter 0.0984*** 0.0947*** 0.0806*** 0.0915*** 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) ('0.009) 
Neighborhood Characteristics: 
    nearest open space (km) 0.0407 0.0808** 0.0667** 0.1217*** 
 
(0.050) (0.040) (0.033) (0.047) 
nearest commercial zone (km) 0.0457 0.0958** 0.0784** 0.2311*** 
 
(0.052) (0.040) (0.032) (0.055) 
nearest major road (km) 0.0741 0.0925** 0.0800** 0.0342 
 
(0.052) (0.041) (0.035) (0.052) 







inverse distance to Washington, DC 
(1/km) -95.8779*** 
   
 
(19.476) 
   Census Tract Fixed Effects  No Yes Yes No 











   
(0.032) 





   
(0.370) 
 Spatial Lag  
   
0.0198*** 
    
(0.003) 
Spatial Autocorrelation  
   
0.7915*** 
    
(0.008) 
UST and Leak Variables: 
    Non-leaking UST within 500m 
(dummy) 0.0337 0.0168 0.0091 0.0374** 
 
(0.029) (0.017) (0.014) (0.019) 
LUST within 500m (dummy) 0.4682*** 0.0738* 0.0726* 0.0397 
 
(0.097) (0.041) (0.040) (0.053) 
       ×   leak discovered (dummy) -0.2110* 0.0169 0.0120 0.0270 
 
(0.119) (0.045) (0.047) (0.056) 
       ×   cleanup (dummy) 0.0076 -0.0075 -0.0012 0.407 
 
(0.159) (0.094) (0.096) (0.182) 
       ×   post-closure (dummy) -0.5053*** -0.0641 -0.0666 -0.0585 
 
(0.105) (0.044) (0.043) (0.061) 
     Constant 11.4500*** 9.5523*** 7.5943*** 9.4861*** 
 
(0.476) (0.268) (0.520) (0.129) 
     Observations 22,508 22,508 22,508 22,508 
R-squared 0.539 0.338 0.347 
 Log Likelihood       -13,788.01 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Std errors are in parentheses. Errors are clustered by census tract, except in model 8.D, where a 






Table A2. Base Hedonic Price Regression Results for Baltimore County: Full Results 
(from models presented in table 9). 
  Model 9.A Model 9.B Model 9.C 
Model 
9.D† 
VARIABLES ln(price) ln(price) ln(price) ln(price) 
     Home Characteristics: 
    ln(interior square footage) 0.3957*** 0.3651*** 0.3475*** 0.3433*** 
 
(0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) 
ln(lot acreage) 0.0779*** 0.0746*** 0.0714*** 0.0909*** 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) 
number of full baths 0.0714*** 0.0516*** 0.0485*** 0.0499*** 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
number of half baths 0.0601*** 0.0412*** 0.0404*** 0.0412*** 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
basement (dummy) 0.0506*** 0.0458*** 0.0426*** 0.0364*** 
 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
number of stories -0.0341*** -0.0442*** -0.0405*** -0.0355*** 
 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
number of fireplaces 0.0781*** 0.0412*** 0.0419*** 0.0368*** 
 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) 
number of fireplaces missing 
(dummy) -0.0028 0.0001 0.0082 -0.0004 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (NA) 
porch size (square feet) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
porch size missing (dummy) -0.0138* -0.0015 -0.0053 0.0017*** 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) 
attached garage (dummy) 0.0646*** 0.0352*** 0.0315*** 0.0356*** 
 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
low quality construction (dummy) -0.1667*** -0.1602*** -0.1698*** -0.1708*** 
 
(0.053) (0.049) (0.049) (0.012) 
good quality construction (dummy) 0.2714*** 0.1497*** 0.1163*** 0.1898*** 
 
(0.023) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) 
high quality construction (dummy) 0.4275*** 0.3168*** 0.2648*** 0.3389*** 
 
(0.037) (0.029) (0.027) (0.013) 
construction quality missing 
(dummy) -0.0617 -0.1393** -0.1441** -0.1082*** 
 
(0.073) (0.055) (0.056) (0.030) 
age of home -0.0050*** -0.0068*** -0.0063*** -0.0059*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
age of home^2 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 




Time of Sale Dummies: 
         1997 -0.0238*** -0.0225*** -0.0157*** -0.0304*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
     1998 -0.0115* -0.0100* -0.0017 -0.0173*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
     1999 0.0009 0.0055 0.0129*** -0.0002 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (NA) 
     2000 0.0239*** 0.0302*** 0.0361*** 0.0215*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) 
     2001 0.0793*** 0.0843*** 0.0849*** 0.0748*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
     2002 0.1180*** 0.1302*** 0.1232*** 0.1203*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
     2003 0.2169*** 0.2332*** 0.2117*** 0.2237*** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) 
     2004 0.3339*** 0.3584*** 0.3213*** 0.3505*** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) 
     2005 0.4980*** 0.5257*** 0.4658*** 0.5214*** 
 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) 
     2006 0.5644*** 0.6045*** 0.5183*** 0.6001*** 
 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) 
     2007 0.5499*** 0.5821*** 0.4725*** 0.5777*** 
 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.004) 
     2nd quarter 0.0393*** 0.0329*** 0.0317*** 0.0344*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     3rd quarter 0.0826*** 0.0716*** 0.0676*** 0.0711*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
     4th quarter 0.0767*** 0.0723*** 0.0655*** 0.0737*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Neighborhood Characteristics: 
    private groundwater well area 
(dummy) -0.0404** 0.0350** 0.0128 0.0033*** 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.001) 
nearest open space (km) 0.0053 0.0007 0.0027 0.0076*** 
 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) 
nearest commercial zone (km) 0.0045 0.0193*** 0.0090* 0.0335*** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
nearest major road (km) 0.0080 0.0148** 0.0146*** 0.0057*** 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) 







inverse distance to Washington, DC  -7.4203** 
   (1/km) (3.677) 




Block Group Fixed Effects  No Yes Yes No 
     (# of Fixed Effects) 
 
(479) (479) 




   
(0.012) 





   
(0.149) 
 Spatial Lag  
   
0.0025*** 
    
(0.000) 
Spatial Autocorrelation  
   
0.6821*** 
    
(0.004) 
UST and Leak Variables: 
    Non-leaking UST within 500m 
(dummy) -0.0269*** -0.0125*** -0.0076* -0.0152*** 
 
(0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) 
LUST within 500m (dummy) -0.1413*** -0.0552*** -0.0495*** -0.0911*** 
 
(0.029) (0.017) (0.015) (0.011) 
       ×   leak discovered (dummy) 0.1095*** 0.0565*** 0.0577*** 0.0546*** 
 
(0.024) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) 
       ×   cleanup (dummy) 0.0419 0.0092 0.0082 0.0334** 
 
(0.043) (0.024) (0.022) (0.015) 
       ×   post-closure (dummy) 0.0650* 0.0248 0.0268* 0.0541*** 
 
(0.037) (0.017) (0.015) (0.011) 
     Constant 9.2892*** 9.4737*** 7.1537*** 9.6890*** 
 
(0.112) (0.077) (0.161) (0.035) 
     Observations 75,881 75,881 75,881 75,881 
R-squared 0.792 0.693 0.701 
 Log Likelihood       -6,686.333 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Std errors are in parentheses. Errors are clustered by census block group, except in model 9.D, where 
a nonzero correlation is allowed for the 7 nearest neighbors. 
†When estimating the spatial autoregressive model for Baltimore County  (model 9.D), the maximum 
likelihood routine occasionally had difficulty numerically estimate the standard errors, hence missing 
standard errors are reported for some coefficients. I believe this may be a multicollinearity issue. The 
problem does not persist when some variables are excluded. This exclusion does not significantly change 






Table A3. Base Hedonic Price Regression Results for Frederick County: Full Results 
(from models presented in table 10). 
  Model 10.A Model 10.B Model 10.C Model 10.D 
VARIABLES ln(price) ln(price) ln(price) ln(price) 
        
 Home Characteristics: 
    ln(interior square footage) 0.4345*** 0.3940*** 0.3765*** 0.3782*** 
 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.004) 
ln(lot acreage) 0.0775*** 0.0815*** 0.0812*** 0.0851*** 
 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
number of full baths 0.0637*** 0.0561*** 0.0551*** 0.0522*** 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
number of half baths 0.0548*** 0.0430*** 0.0416*** 0.0391*** 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
basement (dummy) 0.0255*** 0.0242*** 0.0217*** 0.0242*** 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
number of stories -0.0727*** -0.0680*** -0.0641*** -0.0636*** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) 
number of fireplaces 0.0502*** 0.0388*** 0.0376*** 0.0359*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
number of fireplaces missing 
(dummy) 0.0194*** 0.0233*** 0.0261*** 0.0201*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
porch size (square feet) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
porch size missing (dummy) -0.0320*** -0.0192*** -0.0235*** -0.0131* 
 
(0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
attached garage (dummy) 0.0107** 0.0105*** 0.0091*** 0.0076*** 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
low quality construction (dummy) -0.2431*** -0.2234*** -0.2260*** -0.2261*** 
 
(0.033) (0.029) (0.029) (0.011) 
good quality construction (dummy) 0.1361*** 0.1071*** 0.0878*** 0.1189*** 
 
(0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.003) 
high quality construction (dummy) 0.2591*** 0.2208*** 0.1726*** 0.2162*** 
 
(0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.055) 
construction quality missing 
(dummy) 0.2674*** 0.1817*** 0.1645*** 0.2143*** 
 
(0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.011) 
age of home -0.0045*** -0.0057*** -0.0053*** -0.0053*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
age of home^2 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.000*** 
 




Time of Sale Dummies: 
         1997 -0.0075 -0.0081* -0.0086* 0.0095 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
     1998 -0.0070 -0.0078* -0.0069 -0.0084** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
     1999 0.0173*** 0.0204*** 0.0198*** 0.0206*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
     2000 0.0246*** 0.0316*** 0.0303*** 0.0307*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
     2001 0.0909*** 0.0957*** 0.0900*** 0.0951*** 
 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
     2002 0.1785*** 0.1847*** 0.1714*** 0.1838*** 
 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
     2003 0.2936*** 0.3026*** 0.2794*** 0.3041*** 
 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
     2004 0.4391*** 0.4544*** 0.4153*** 0.4542*** 
 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
     2005 0.5900*** 0.6046*** 0.5451*** 0.6062*** 
 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) 
     2006 0.6309*** 0.6474*** 0.5709*** 0.6492*** 
 
(0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) 
     2007 0.5801*** 0.5962*** 0.5114*** 0.5976*** 
 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) 
     2nd quarter 0.0269*** 0.0282*** 0.0264*** 0.0281*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
     3rd quarter 0.0498*** 0.0506*** 0.0466*** 0.0493*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
     4th quarter 0.0583*** 0.0609*** 0.0551*** 0.0624*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Neighborhood Characteristics: 
    private groundwater well area 
(dummy) -0.0267** -0.0391*** -0.0400*** -0.0429*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) 
nearest open space (km) 0.0022 0.0027 0.0007 0.0013 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
nearest commercial zone (km) 0.0040 0.0048 0.0024 -0.0113 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) 
nearest major road (km) 0.0070 -0.0024 -0.0000 0.0077 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 







inverse distance to Washington, DC  0.0002*** 
   (1/km) (0.000) 




Block Group Fixed Effects  No Yes Yes No 
     (# of Fixed Effects) 
 
(127) (127) 




   
(0.013) 





   
(0.154) 
 Spatial Lag  
   
0.0013*** 
    
(0.000) 
Spatial Autocorrelation  
   
0.7604*** 
    
(0.007) 
UST and Leak Variables: 
    Non-leaking UST within 500m 
(dummy) -0.0050 -0.0033 0.0023 -0.0013*** 
 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) 
LUST within 500m (dummy) 0.0011 -0.0021 0.0031 0.0019 
 
(0.024) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) 
       ×   leak discovered (dummy) 0.0545** 0.0253* 0.0274* 0.0468*** 
 
(0.027) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) 
       ×   cleanup (dummy) -0.0686** -0.0140 -0.0101 -0.0323* 
 
(0.031) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) 
       ×   post-closure (dummy) 0.0372 -0.0134 -0.0076 -0.0048 
 
(0.045) (0.025) (0.022) (0.019) 
     Constant 9.0084*** 9.3805*** 7.8362*** 9.4684*** 
 
(0.107) (0.078) (0.166) (0.030) 
     Observations 34,442 34,442 34,442 34,451 
R-squared 0.878 0.863 0.867 
 Log Likelihood       -18,568.870 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Std errors are in parentheses. Errors are clustered by census block group, except in model 10.D, where a 





Chapter 3: The Impacts of Pollution, Exposure Pathways, 
and Health Risks on Home Values: A Stated Preference 
Analysis 
 By: Dennis Guignet 
 
I. Introduction 
Hedonic property value methods are an attractive non-market valuation 
technique because welfare estimates are inferred from revealed behavior, and in 
theory, all components of a welfare change are capitalized in home prices, as long as 
the amenity or disamenity of interest is sufficiently local.
49
 In practice, however, 
hedonic models are susceptible to omitted variable bias and multicollinearity issues 
(Bockstael and McConnell, 2006). Even more important, in hedonic studies 
researchers are often forced to make assumptions regarding the public‘s awareness 
and perceptions of the health and environmental risks being studied, and how the 
buyers and sellers in the housing market measure these risks. Such assumptions are 
often necessary, but rarely tested; if proven invalid, we may in fact be incorrectly 
inferring welfare effects from changes in property values. 
Stated preference approaches provide a viable way to get around 
multicollinearity and omitted variable issues. Furthermore, respondents in stated 
preference studies are supplied with information and specific scenarios, based on the 
same measure of environmental quality used by the researcher. At least in theory, 
well-executed stated preference methods provide an opportunity to examine how 
home values are affected when we know exactly what is being valued, and are not 
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 An amenity or disamenity is considered sufficiently local when it only affects a small number of 
homes in the housing market, and so there is no shift in the equilibrium hedonic price surface 




forced to make such assumptions as in hedonic models. These advantages stem from 
the fact that stated preference questions are framed within hypothetical scenarios, 
which is a potential disadvantage of the approach (see Freeman, 1999, pg. 176).  
Only a handful of analyses, however, have attempted to compare hedonics and 
analogous stated preference studies in the context of home values and environmental 
disamenities (Jenkins-Smith, 2002; Chattopadhyay et al., 2005; Simons and Winson-
Geideman, 2005; Phaneuf et al., 2010). These studies all convey the environmental 
good by qualitatively outlining a scenario.
50
 Alternatively, one could convey the 
severity of an environmental disamenity using quantitative measures, such as 
presenting respondents with the objective risks (e.g., an X% probability of some 
adverse health or environmental outcome), or by providing an actual concentration or 
level of pollution (e.g., X parts-per-billion), which is the approach I undertake in this 
analysis. 
The goal of this study is to examine how people believe home values adjust to 
reflect pollution levels at the home or other homes in the neighborhood. To my 
knowledge this paper is the first stated preference analysis examining changes in 
property values using a quantitative measure of pollution. I wish to answer three 
research questions. First, do people believe home values will decrease due to a local 
environmental disamenity even if the home itself is not polluted, or if an exposure 
pathway is not present? Second, is this decline more pronounced when the home itself 
is actually polluted, and is the loss in value greater for higher levels of pollution? 
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 Earnhart (2001, 2002) combined a hedonic and conjoint choice study to examine how property 
values are affected by various land and water based amenities. He took a slightly different approach in 





Third, is this response in home values to contamination levels symmetric just above 
and below the regulatory standard?  
To answer these questions I use a survey-based approach, and incorporate 
several experimental treatments into a questionnaire on leaking underground storage 
tanks (LUSTs) and groundwater pollution.
51
 Respondents are asked to assess the price 
of several homes, each of which are randomly assigned a hypothetical level of 
benzene contamination in the groundwater. Benzene is a petroleum by-product and 
proven carcinogen.  
Participants are also assigned at random to one of three scenarios, where the 
homes (i) rely on private groundwater wells for potable water; (ii) are connected to 
the public water system; or (iii) rely on private groundwater wells for drinking, and a 
filter is installed that eliminates all pollution, making the water safe for consumption. 
The information provided to the respondents is the same as the Maryland Department 
of Environment‘s Oil Control Program provides to households whose groundwater 
wells are tested for petroleum pollution.  
The questionnaire was self-administered by a convenience sample of 
Maryland residents in April and October, 2010. I care for the relative effect of the 
survey treatments, and not the absolute magnitude of the effects on housing values. 
I find that even if a home‘s groundwater is not contaminated, and even if there 
is no exposure pathway, respondents believe home prices will decline by 18% to 24% 
just because the home is close to a LUST. Prices decline more if higher levels of 
groundwater pollution are found at the home. This effect is not symmetric just below 
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and above the 5 parts-per-billion (ppb) regulatory standard: the decline in home prices 
is much more pronounced at contamination levels above the standard. Individuals 
likely use the regulatory standard as a ceiling for what is considered ―safe‖ (Smith et 
al., 1990; Johnson and Chess, 2003; Johnson, 2008), and so when this was exceeded 
they reported much more of a decline in home prices.  
The decline in reported home prices is more pronounced when homes rely on 
private groundwater wells (and thus a clear exposure pathway is present), but this 
effect is not statistically different from responses under the scenario where the homes 
are connected to the public water system (and thus an exposure pathway is not 
present). However, if a filter is installed and the respondents are explicitly told that it 
eliminates all the pollution and health risks, then groundwater contamination 
generally has a small and statistically insignificant effect on home prices. 
Nonetheless, the initial 18% depreciation just because a LUST site is in the 
neighborhood remains.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, I review 
past stated preference studies that are of particular relevance to this analysis. I then 
outline the study design and empirical model in section III, and provide an overview 
of the survey data in section IV. The results are presented in section V. Section VI 
concludes and discusses future research directions.  
 
II. Literature Review: Stated Preference Methods 
Stated preference methods are a possible approach for estimating the value of 




circumstances and asked questions in order to elicit their value for an environmental 
good. Stated preference methods have been applied to a variety of environmental 
contexts, including air quality (e.g., Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2000; Wang et 
al., 2006), water quality (e.g., Hanley et al., 2006; Machado and Mourato, 2002; 
Lipton, 2004), contaminated sites (e.g., Chattopadhyay et al., 2005; Tonin et al., 
2009), and health risks (e.g., Alberini et al., 2006a; Alberini and Šcasný, 2011).   
II.A. Groundwater Contamination 
However, relatively few stated preference studies have focused on 
groundwater quality.
52
 Boyle et al. (1994) conduct a meta-analysis, identifying eight 
contingent valuation studies. This was later revisited by Poe et al. (2001), who 
identify 13 studies, all of which report a positive mean willingness-to-pay (WTP) for 
improved groundwater quality, but the magnitude of the WTP estimates varies 
substantially. Despite the wide range of WTP estimates, definitions of groundwater 
contamination, and valuation approaches, the meta-analyses suggest that WTP values 
do systematically vary in ways consistent with economic theory.  
Stevens et al. (1997) estimate the public‘s WTP for groundwater protection 
via an aquifer protection district, a public water treatment plant, a private in-home 
water filter, and bottled water. In their survey they ask residents in 56 western 
Massachusetts towns to rate several water protection programs with varying 
attributes. WTP is estimated using a traditional ratings model, a ratings difference 
specification, and a dichotomous choice model. Depending on the model they find the 
average households‘ WTP for an in-home water filter is $33 to $431 (2010$) per 
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year, for 10 years.
53
  In comparison, they find the average household is willing to pay 
$22 to $260 for a water treatment plant, $48 to $463 for an aquifer protection district, 
and only $4 to $103 for a program that simply provides them with bottled water. The 
dichotomous choice specification yielded the lowest WTP estimates. Stevens et al. 
conclude (as is implicit in the wide range of values reported above) that WTP 
estimates are very sensitive to model specification. 
II.B. Contaminated Sites and Health Risks 
Reduced health risks are likely one of the largest components of the benefits 
from cleaning up soil and groundwater pollution from a contaminated site, such as a 
LUST. There have been many stated preference studies that explicitly estimate the 
value of reduced mortality and morbidity risks associated with different diseases, 
sources, and risk reduction vehicles.
54
  
To my knowledge there are only two stated preference studies valuing health 
risk reductions from the cleanup of contaminated sites. Alberini et al. (2007) conduct 
a choice experiment, where respondents choose between variants of a hypothetical 
public program to clean up severely contaminated sites in Italy. The attributes of the 
alternative programs are (i) the number of lives saved (i.e., the annual risk reduction), 
(ii) the size of the potentially affected population, (iii) how soon the risk reduction 
would be experienced (latency), (iv) the number of years over which the risk 
reduction would be experienced (permanence), and (v) the cost. They find that people 
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 I converted Stevens et al.‘s (1997) estimates to 2010 dollars using the US City average consumer 
price index (US Dept of Labor, ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt, accessed March 14, 
2010). 
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are willing to pay more for more permanent cleanup technologies, but respondents 
also consider the cost when making this decision. People are also willing to pay more 
for immediate risk reductions, and WTP systematically varies based on characteristics 
of the respondent, and their familiarity and concerns about contaminated sites, 
pollutants, and the perceived effectiveness of government remediation programs. 
Tonin et al. (2009) survey residents living near a highly contaminated 
industrial complex in Marghera, Italy. Respondents were asked to choose between 
hypothetical remediation and reuse programs targeted at other contaminated sites, not 
the Marghera site itself. The alternative programs varied in terms of the (i) initial 
contamination level at the targeted sites, (ii) number of cancer cases avoided due to 
cleanup (i.e., reduction in cancer risks), (iii) proposed reuse of the site (e.g., remain 
idle, industrial, residential, and recreational), and (iv) a one-time cost to the 
respondent. The sample was selected from residents at specified distances from the 
Marghera site to examine whether people living closest to the site have a higher or 
lower WTP for a cancer risk reduction from cleanup.   
Despite the possibility that people who opt to live near the Marghera site may 
be more risk-tolerant, Tonin et al. (2009) find that they have a higher WTP for a 
reduction in cancer risks, even if the reduction is experienced by people living near a 
different contaminated site. Respondents‘ WTP also varies based on their opinions of 
cleanup priorities, and is higher among higher income households. 
II.C. Contaminated Sites and Home Values 
Both Alberini et al. (2007) and Tonin et al. (2009) infer the benefits of 




good, specifically a regulatory cleanup program. A related strand of stated preference 
literature estimates the welfare effects of contaminated sites by focusing on the choice 
of a private good, namely one‘s home. This is done largely for comparison to the 




Chattopadhyay et al. (2005) estimate a hedonic property value model of 
homes near Waukegan Harbor, a Superfund site on Lake Michigan that is 
contaminated by polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). In the hedonic model the 
environmental disamenity is measured by distance to the harbor. They also conduct a 
survey asking respondents to choose between hypothetical variations of their home 
that differ in terms of lot and house size, school quality, amount of public space 
devoted to nature and recreation, cost of the home, and the environmental condition 
of the harbor. The latter is described qualitatively to the respondent in very general 
terms.  
Four different pollution levels or scenarios are presented (additional pollution, 
no change, partial clean-up, and full clean-up). Each is briefly described in terms of 
more or less pollution relative to the status quo, whether full or partial cleanup takes 
place, whether regulatory cleanup goals are met, and whether the conditions are 
considered safe to the health of recreationists and wildlife. Even though the measure 
of the disamenity used in the hedonic models (distance to harbor) is not directly 
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 See Boyle and Kiel (2001) for a review of hedonic studies organized by environmental disamenity. 
Farber (1998) and Jackson (2001) review the hedonic literature on undesirable land uses, especially 
Superfund sites. As discussed in chapter 2, there are relatively few revealed preference studies on 
house prices and groundwater contamination (Malone and Barrows, 1990; Page and Rabinowitz, 1993; 
Dotzour, 1997; Boyle et al., 2010), and specifically on leaking USTs (Simons et al., 1997, 1999; Zabel 




comparable to the qualitative measure in the stated preference counterpart, 
Chattopadhyay et al. conclude that the aggregate benefit estimates of cleanup are 
similar across the two methods.  
Focusing on the benefits of cleaning up pollution in the Buffalo River, in 
Buffalo, NY, Phaneuf et al. (2010) take a similar approach to Chattopadhyay et al. 
(2005). In their survey design Phaneuf et al. also vary distance of a home to the river, 
which is directly comparable to a parallel hedonic study. They pursue a general 
method of moments (GMM) procedure to simultaneously estimate welfare effects 
using both stated preference data and actual housing transactions. 
 Jenkins-Smith et al. (2002) examine how real estate disclosure requirements 
about lead, cadmium, and zinc contamination from an actual lead smelter in Corpus 
Christi, Texas, affect home sale prices. The survey was implemented on a sample of 
residents within one mile of the smelter. Respondents were asked whether they would 
buy (or sell) a hypothetical home, where the price of each home was varied as part of 
the study design. Respondents were assigned to a treatment or control group, where 
the former received additional disclosure information stating that homes in the 
neighborhood were previously contaminated but have since been cleaned up, and 
pollution levels no longer exceed the regulatory safety standards.  
The study suggests a significant discount in buyers‘ bids (30.5%) when 
information about past contamination is disclosed. Individuals were also willing to 
sell these hypothetical homes at a similar discount. Moreover, about half of the 




at any price, even though the pollution was cleaned up and levels were below the 
regulatory safety standards.  
Simons and Winson-Geideman (2005) conducted a contingent valuation 
survey in eight States (Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Alabama, Illinois, South 
Carolina, West Virginia, and Texas).  To my knowledge, this is the only other stated 
preference study specifically on LUSTs. Respondents were asked to bid on a 
hypothetical home near a gas station, where a leak had previously occurred. They 
were told that the leaking tanks were to be fixed, but no cleanup was undertaken. 
Respondents were assigned at random to scenarios that qualitatively described 
different degrees of contamination at the home. Overall, Simons and Winson-
Geideman find that (i) LUST activity reduces the likelihood that a respondent will bid 
on a home, (ii) bids are on average 31% lower when the groundwater is contaminated, 
and (iii) this depreciation was consistent across states, ranging from 25-33%.    
All four of the above stated preference studies examining the effects of 
pollution on home values convey the severity of the disamenity using qualitative 
measures or scenarios (Chattopadhyay et al., 2005; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2002; and 
Simons and Winson-Geideman, 2005).  Although it may be easier for respondents to 
relate to such measures, these scenarios are subjective, and are not always comparable 
to hedonic studies of similar types of environmental disamenities. In contrast, in this 
paper I utilize a quantitative measure of pollution, namely pollutant concentrations 
(e.g., parts-per-billion) in residential groundwater wells. The information provided to 




households in the same study area who are actually affected by LUSTs (see section 
II.C in chapter 2).  
 
III. Study Design and Empirical Model 
III.A Study Design 
The objective of this study is to examine how people believe home values will 
respond to information regarding groundwater pollution levels beneath the home. I set 
out to investigate three main research questions. First, do people believe that a 
localized environmental disamenity affects home values, even when there is no 
pollution at the home itself, or when an exposure pathway to the contaminants is not 
present? Second, is this decline more pronounced at higher levels of groundwater 
pollution? Third, is this response in home values symmetric around the regulatory 
standard?  
 To examine these questions I devise a study design with several experimental 
treatments. I chose to frame the study around groundwater pollution from leaking 
underground storage tanks (LUSTs) because (i) they are a localized disamenity, (ii) 
residents are often the primary party whose welfare is affected, and (iii) in theory 
these welfare changes should be capitalized in house prices. Focusing on LUSTs also 
provides a natural and realistic context to invoke the experimental treatments for 
answering my research questions, while at the same time mimicking information 
provided to homeowners who are actually affected by leaking tanks in Maryland (the 




I posit that a leak at a nearby gas station and the subsequent groundwater 
pollution will change individuals‘ perceptions of health and environmental risks, and 
in turn, cause nearby home values to decrease. I first show respondents the aerial 
photo of a generic suburban neighborhood in Maryland with a gas station. The 
respondents are then shown a second aerial photo of the same neighborhood, with 
annotations identifying a gas station with a LUST (figure 1). In earlier focus groups 
we found that people responded well to these aerial photos and were immediately 
capable of telling if this neighborhood was similar to their own (Alberini and 
Guignet, 2010), 
As shown in figure 1, three homes (home A, B, and C) are presented to the 
respondent with varying levels of groundwater pollution. I chose these homes because 
they are roughly the same distance from the LUST site. Although the neighborhood 
and gas station are real, the leak and groundwater pollution levels are hypothetical. 
The groundwater pollution at Home A is always specified as 0 parts-per-billion (ppb). 
This serves as a baseline for comparison to home price responses to homes B and C, 
which I randomly assign benzene pollution levels of 0, 1, 4, 6, or 9 ppb. These values 
were chosen because the regulatory standard for benzene is 5 ppb, and I want to 
examine if people believe prices are affected differently at levels above and below 
this standard. 
I create three variants of this scenario to investigate whether respondents 
believe house prices will be impacted differently by pollution when health risks are 
present. The first is the Private Well scenario, which posits that a clear exposure 




to this scenario are shown the text presented in table 1, along with a variant of the 
aerial photo (figure 1). The second variant is the Public Water scenario, where 
respondents are told that the homes are ―served by the public water system, which 
gets its water from a distant reservoir.‖ Since the water supply to the home does not 
come from the groundwater directly beneath it, there is no exposure pathway to the 
contaminated groundwater. In this case respondents should infer that there are no 
health risks, despite the benzene pollution.   
The third version is the Well with Filter scenario, where respondents are told 
that the homes rely on private groundwater wells, but a filter is installed that removes 
the pollution before the water is consumed, thus eliminating any health risks. The 
specific text is displayed in table 1. As shown in figure 2, the aerial photo further 
conveys that all pollution is eliminated in the Well with Filter scenario.  
The respondents are then asked the open-ended valuation question, ―How 
much do you think each of these homes will sell for after this leak?‖  In other words, I 
simply ask respondents for their third-party assessment of the post-leak sale price of 
homes A, B, and C.  This is a unique approach compared to previous stated 
preference studies on home values and environmental disamenities, which put 
respondents in the role of the home buyer or seller (Chattopadhyay et al., 2005; 
Jenkins-Smith et al., 2002; and Simons and Winson-Geideman, 2005). I take this 
third party assessment approach in order to minimize hypothetical biases that may 
arise due to respondents taking an unrealistic moral or socially ―correct‖ stance 




III.B. Is this the Appropriate Valuation Scenario? 
The development of this questionnaire benefited from a series of four focus 
groups (consisting of 8 to 9 people) and four 3-on-1 interviews in Fall 2009 and 
Spring 2010 (Alberini and Guignet, 2010). Participants were recruited from residents 
of urban and suburban Maryland, and mirrored the population in terms of gender, 
education, and income. We examined the feasibility of a stated preference instrument 
to estimate the benefits of cleaning up and preventing leaks from underground storage 
tanks.  
We found that when participants are asked questions from the perspective of a 
homebuyer/seller, they often took a firm moral stance, deeming a property unsellable, 
or stating they would not purchase the property for any price, even if the home itself 
is not contaminated. However, in chapter 2 of this dissertation and in a parallel 
hedonic study we find that homes near LUST sites are sold on the market (Zabel and 
Guignet, 2010). I believe that focus group participants in these hypothetical exercises 
were adopting stances to reflect what they consider morally or socially ―correct.‖  
Alberini and Guignet (2010) found that when questions are framed in a more generic 
fashion (i.e., not putting participants explicitly in the role of a homebuyer or seller) 
respondents are more willing to make tradeoffs between the price of a home and 
pollution levels.  
This type of response is well documented in the psychology and sociology 
literature. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) find that when people predict behavior in 
situations where they are intensely involved they over-weigh certain types of 




tend to make unrealistic predictions about their own behavior in situations with a 
moral or socially normative component (e.g., Fisher, 1983; Epley and Dunning, 
2000).  Instead of asking survey respondents to answer questions predicting their own 
behavior in a hypothetical situation, framing the question in terms of forecasting 
others‘ behavior (or in my case, the overall housing market‘s behavior) will reduce 
such biases and more accurately reflect actual behavior (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Fisher, 1983; Epley and Dunning, 2000). 
Framing valuation questions in terms of predicting others‘ behavior has only 
recently emerged in the economics literature, and has been referred to as inferred 
valuation. Lusk and Norwood (2009a, 2009b) and Yadav et al. (2010) find evidence 
supporting the intuition behind the inferred valuation approach, which is that in 
stating how much someone else values a good, the respondent is in fact projecting 
their own valuation while at the same time reducing hypothetical biases arising from 
social pressures or inner-moral conflicts associated with the normative nature of the 
good.  
In this dissertation chapter I take an approach similar to inferred valuation, 
and simply ask respondents how much a home would sell for after contamination. I 
posit that this third-party assessment of the sale price reflects respondents‘ WTP to 
prevent or cleanup the pollution, while at the same time reducing any hypothetical 





III.C. Survey Structure 
The survey consists of five sections.
56
 I briefly describe each section here. 
Section A asks respondents about their current home, county of residence, how long 
they lived there, the type of neighborhood they live in (rural, suburban, or urban), and 
whether they own or rent their home. Section B inquires about the source of drinking 
water at their home, and experience with water quality testing and issues. The 
information gathered in these two sections will allow me to examine whether the 
effect of pollution on reported housing prices depends on the respondent‘s home and 
neighborhood, and experience with private groundwater wells and water quality.  
Section C poses several questions regarding respondents‘ familiarity with 
common water pollutants, the units of measurement (parts-per-billion), and leaking 
underground storage tanks. This allows me to examine whether the effects of 
pollution on announced home prices varies with familiarity of benzene and the 
pollution source. After these inquiries respondents are told that underground storage 
tanks store petroleum, are commonly found at gas stations, occasionally leak due to 
rusting and cracks, and that benzene is a common pollutant from such leaks. I provide 
some basic background information, including that 1) water pollution concentrations 
are measured in parts-per-billion (ppb), 2) the regulatory standard for benzene is set at 
five parts-per-billion (ppb) in order to ―to protect human health with a wide margin of 
safety,‖ and that 3) benzene is a carcinogen. Similar information is provided by the 
Maryland Department of Environment (MDE) to residents who are actually affected 
by LUSTs and whose groundwater is tested for petroleum pollution. Providing the 
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regulatory standard allows me to examine whether the effects of pollution on house 
prices is symmetric around the standard.  
Section D of the questionnaire presents respondents with the original 
unaltered aerial photo of the neighborhood shown in figure 1. Respondents are asked 
to rate how similar this neighborhood is to their own on a 1 to 5 scale (where 1 = very 
different from my neighborhood, 5 = very similar to my neighborhood). They are told 
that each of the homes in the neighborhood is worth $400,000, on average. I then 
pose that a leak has occurred at a nearby gas station, and respondents are asked how 
much each of the three homes would sell for (see section III.A). 
Section E concludes the questionnaire with socio-demographic questions. I 
inquire about family status, annual household income, age, education, and whether 
the respondent has bought or sold a home, or has been actively looking to do so, 
within the last 5 years. The latter question is to examine whether peoples‘ beliefs in 
how house prices respond to pollution differ depending on recent experience in the 
housing market. 
III.D. The Model 
Each respondent is asked to evaluate the post-leak sale price, denoted    
 , for 
three different homes, h=A,B,C.  I posit that their assessment of the price after the 
leak depends on the environmental and risk conditions imposed in the survey, the 
respondent‘s prior knowledge and preferences, and their belief of the pre-leak price 
   
 . Formally, 
   
     




where i denotes the respondent, D(·) is the damage or loss in price due to the LUST 
and groundwater pollution.
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 This loss is a function of the benzene pollution in the 
groundwater beneath the home (ppbhi), and the exposure pathway, which is specified 
by the experimental treatment (Ti): (i) Public Water, (ii) Private Well, or (iii) Well 
with Filter. The loss in price may also depend on the respondent‘s prior knowledge 
and experience with LUSTs, groundwater, and water pollution, denoted ki, as well as 
their preferences, which I proxy with a vector of socio-economic characteristics (xi).  
 I do not observe respondents‘ beliefs regarding the pre-leak price of these 
homes     
  , but they are told that prior to the leak the homes are worth $400,000 on 
average.
58
 I posit that respondents‘ perceived pre-leak home prices depend on the pre-
leak conditions specified in the survey, as well as their preferences and past 
experiences. Let              denote the average neighborhood home price. 
Assuming a linear form for    
 , equation (1) can be re-written as:  
    
      
                                      .  (2) 
where  0,  1,  2, and  3 are unknown parameters, and     is an assumed normally 
distributed disturbance, which is allowed to be correlated for each of respondent i's 
responses for homes h=A,B, and C.  
I then assume a linear form for D(·) and estimate the reduced-form 
econometric equation: 
    
                                     (3) 
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 This notation is sufficiently general to allow for the damage to be negative (i.e., for the home to 
appreciate with pollution). 
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 To account for unobserved deviations in pre-leak prices from this $400,000 average, in my 




where Ti is a 1×3 vector of indicator variables equal to one if the respondent received 
a variant of the survey corresponding to that experimental treatment, and zero 
otherwise. The 1×4 vector of indicator variables ppbhi denotes the randomly assigned 
pollution level at home h (1, 4, 6, or 9 ppb).
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 The dummy variables corresponding to 
these four pollution levels equal one if that is the assigned concentration, and zero 
otherwise. The vector    represents the respondent‘s prior knowledge and familiarity, 
which may affect their perceptions of the environmental and health risks posed by 
LUSTs, and therefore how they believe home prices will change.  
The coefficients to be estimated are β0, β1, β2, and β3. The 3×1 vector β0 
captures the expected post-leak price of a home with no benzene pollution. Notice 
this baseline effect is allowed to vary across the three experimental treatments. The 
coefficient β1 captures the additional decrease in price due to groundwater 
contamination. In the most flexible model β1 is a 12×1 vector, as shown in equation 
(3).  
I estimate the effect of each of the four pollution levels on the price of home h 
in order to investigate how people believe prices respond to higher pollution levels, 
without making any parametric assumptions on the relationship. Comparing estimates 
of β0 and β1 across the three experimental treatments allows me to examine whether 
the presence of pollution affects home prices differently depending on whether there 
are potential health risks.  
Coefficients β2 capture any differences in the post-leak price assessments 
based on respondents‘ prior familiarity and knowledge of the pollutant, its source, and 
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the exposure pathway. Finally, β3 allows me to control for any systematic differences 
in responses across different types of respondents and households.  
IV. Data 
IV.A. Data Collection 
The questionnaire was self-administered by a convenience sample (n=303) at 
two University of Maryland events held in April and October 2010.
60
 These were 
family events open to the public and meant for people of all ages. The main objective 
of these events was to get people familiar with the University and its research. 
Neither event was in any way related to housing, housing values, or environmental 
issues, such as LUSTs and groundwater pollution. 
 The first event was ―Maryland Day‖ an annual university-wide affair held at 
the University of Maryland‘s main campus College Park (Prince George‘s County). 
Prior to the actual data collection, I was uncertain about how many responses I would 
be able to obtain. Therefore, at this event only the first two survey treatments, (i) 
Public Water and (ii) Private Well, were randomly assigned to participants. The 
second event is an annual open house sponsored by the College of Agriculture and 
Natural Resources at a research facility in Howard County (just north of and adjacent 
to Prince George‘s County). Again, due to uncertainty as to how many responses 
could be collected, only the third treatment, (iii) Well with Filter, was assigned to 
participants at the second event.  
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At both events I had a booth where event attendees were invited to take the 
pen-and-paper questionnaire.
61
 People were not told the specific topic of the 
questionnaire ahead of time.  They were simply asked if they would like to participate 
in a research project, and that they would be asked questions about their home and 
neighborhood. As an additional incentive, I offered raffle tickets for the chance to win 
an iPod Shuffle. It took respondents about 10 minutes on average to complete the 
questionnaire. 
IV.B. Experimental Treatments and Price Responses  
Out of the 303 participants, 98 were randomly assigned to the Well Water 
scenario, 99 to Public Water, and 106 to the Well with Filter scenario. As discussed in 
section III.C, the dependent variable in the econometric models is the post-leak sale 
price     
  .   I am interested in how people believe home prices are affected by 
different levels of pollution, and how this effect may differ across the three exposure 
pathway scenarios. Each of the 303 respondents were asked to assess the sale price of 
three homes with varying levels of pollution, yielding n=909 observations. 
Individuals did not always respond to the valuation questions: there were 89 missing 
values (9.79%).  
The distribution of the remaining 820 home price responses is displayed in 
figure 3. This is a fairly wide distribution, ranging from $0 to $600,000. The majority 
of responses (n=628 or 76.6% of the valid responses) indicated that prices would be 
lower after the leak and subsequent groundwater contamination. The post-pollution 
prices were believed to remain at the average pre-leak price of $400,000 in 172 
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instances. In n=20 cases (2.4%) participants actually indicated an increase in price 
after the discovery of a LUST. In all these cases the homes were specified as having 
no groundwater pollution and/or an exposure pathway was not present (i.e., the 
assigned scenario was Public Water or Well with Filter). Such responses seem 
reasonable; respondents likely rationalized that uncontaminated homes are relatively 
more valuable when surrounded by contaminated homes.  On average respondents 
believe the home price after the leak is only $293,903, a 26.5% depreciation from the 
average pre-leak price of $400,000. 
The distribution of the price responses by experimental treatments are shown 
in figure 4. In the Well Water scenario there is a lower density of price responses 
around the average pre-leak price of $400,000, and a higher density among the lowest 
sale prices, relative to the other two experimental treatments. This suggests that when 
an exposure pathway is present, and the residents of the home face potential health 
risks, respondents do believe prices capitalize this additional risk premium.  
The mean price responses across the experimental treatments are shown in 
table 3. First looking at all homes, as expected we see that prices are lower when an 
exposure path is present (as specified in the Well Water scenario).
62
 Home prices are 
slightly higher, on average, in the Well with Filter scenario compared to Public 
Water, but this is not a statistically significant difference. Thus it appears responses 
are similar in the two situations where pollution is present but there are no health 
risks.  
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 Univariate t-tests comparing mean price response of the Well Water scenario to Public Water and 




Pollution levels at homes B and C are randomly assigned, but home A is 
always specified as having 0 ppb benzene in the groundwater. The mean post-leak 
price of home A across the entire sample is $311,411, suggesting that respondents 
believe home prices will decline by 22.1% just because a LUST is in the 
neighborhood.  Comparing the mean price responses for home A across the 
treatments, in table 3 we still see that prices decline most in the Well Water scenario, 
but this difference is not statistically significant. In section V, I conduct a more 
rigorous econometric analysis controlling for the experimental treatments and 
assigned contamination levels simultaneously.  
IV.C. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 displays descriptive statistics regarding the survey respondents‘ 
homes and neighborhoods. About 93.4% of respondents are Maryland residents. Most 
live in single family homes (71.3%), are homeowners (93.4%), and classify their 
neighborhood as suburban (75.3%). Only 17.5% of the sample currently lives in a 
home that relies on a private groundwater well, but 41.2% have at some point lived in 
a home with a well (as seen in table 5). 
In table 5 I present variables denoting the respondents‘ prior knowledge and 
experience with water contamination and LUSTs. Only about 8.0% of the 
respondents report having water quality issues at their current home, but most 
(81.5%) are familiar with the term ―parts-per-billion,‖ which is the units in which the 
concentration of a pollutant in groundwater is often reported. Slightly less than half of 




previously heard of leaking underground storage tanks before. Only 9.3% of 
participants report having a LUST in their neighborhood. 
Summary statistics of the individual respondents and their households are 
shown in table 6. The average respondent is 44 years old and has 1.2 children. About 
75.3% of the sample has obtained a bachelor‘s or higher level degree. The majority of 
respondents have no affiliation with the University of Maryland (i.e., they are not 
students, employees, or alumni). 
This is a convenience sample consisting mainly of Maryland residents (93%), 
and my main objective is to analyze within sample variation in response to the 
experimentally assigned scenarios. Nonetheless, in table 7 I provide a brief 
comparison to the broader population of Maryland. A higher proportion of people in 
the sample has at least a Bachelor‘s degree, and reports a higher household income 
relative to the rest of the state. Neither is surprising since the sample was drawn from 
attendees at University events, and the respondents are from relatively affluent 
counties.
63
 A higher percentage of households in my sample are homeowners and 
have children under 18. The age composition of my sample, relative to the state, is 
similar for some age groups, but my sample is more concentrated with respondents 
that are 45 to 54 years old, and contains a smaller percentage of respondents over 65. 
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 Out of the 303 participants that provided their county of residence 28% were from Howard, 26% 
from Prince George‘s, 14% from Montgomery, 6% from Baltimore, and 6% from Anne Arundel. With 
the exception of Baltimore County, these counties all report median household income levels higher 
than the State median. The remainder of the respondents were from other Maryland Counties (n=33), 





IV.D. Comparison of Sample across Venues 
About 36% of respondents from the first event are residents of Prince 
George‘s County, compared to only 7% at the second event. As one may expect, most 
of the participants at the second event (64%) are from Howard County compared to 
only 8% at the first event.  
The first two experimental treatments (Public Water and Private Well) were 
randomly assigned to respondents only at the first event, but the third treatment (Well 
with Filter) was assigned to respondents only at the second event. In order to have a 
clean comparison the sample of respondents from these two events must be 
comparable. In tables 8 through 10 I present several univariate t-tests comparing the 
mean values of respondent characteristics across these two samples. The means of the 
two samples are statistically different (at the 5% level) for only seven out of 26 
variables. The majority of participants in both samples live in suburban areas, but the 
second event sample has a higher proportion of people living in rural areas (22.6% v. 
11.2%). Rural areas are less likely to be connected to the public water system, and 
indeed, a higher proportion of the second event sample consists of people who have 
lived in a home served by a private well. Respondents are similar in terms of 
knowledge and experience with water contamination and LUSTs. On average, the 
respondents are also similar in education, age, and number of children.     
Overall, I believe respondents across these two samples are similar, and do not 
suspect that any differences will influence their valuations in response to the 
experimental treatments. For good measure I control for the individual characteristics 





V.A. Main Results 
The base regressions are presented in table 11.  In model A, I estimate a 
version of equation (2) where price is simply a linear function of the concentration of 
benzene pollution in the groundwater beneath the home. The intercept estimate of 
$309,150 implies that on average respondents believe that the mere presence of a 
LUST will lead to a $90,850 decrease in property values, a 22.7% depreciation 
(relative to the average pre-leak price of $400,000). The coefficient estimate on 
pollution suggests that a 1 ppb increase in benzene contamination leads to an 
additional $5,767 decrease in price.  
There is no particular reason to assume that the effect of contamination on 
price is linear. Respondents were told that the regulatory standard of 5 ppb was set ―to 
protect human health with a wide margin of safety.‖  Individuals may perceive 
contamination levels above this standard as more hazardous (Smith et al., 1990; 
Johnson and Chess, 2003; Johnson, 2008). Therefore, I expect an asymmetric effect 
of pollution on home prices, where prices decline at a faster rate as pollution levels 
exceed the standard.  
In model B I estimate a piece-wise linear relationship, allowing for a kink at 
the 5 ppb standard. When pollution levels are below the standard there is a small and 
statistically insignificant decrease in price for each additional part-per-billion of 




decrease in price for each additional parts-per-billion, a statistically significant 1.48% 
depreciation, relative to the average pre-leak price of $400,000.
64
  
Figure 5 clearly shows a more pronounced decline in price at pollution levels 
above the standard (5 ppb), suggesting that respondents used this regulatory standard 
as a reference point in forming their risk perceptions, and in turn, how home values 
would be affected. For good measure I estimate a more flexible form in model C by 
including a dummy variable for each of the contamination levels. At levels below the 
standard, the effect of pollution on price is negative, but relatively small and 
statistically insignificant, as seen by the coefficient estimates for 1 ppb and 4 ppb.  
However, the coefficients on 6 ppb and 9 ppb show that these levels of pollution 
result in decreases of $37,743 (9.44%) and $52,945 (13.24%), respectively. 
Comparing the coefficients on 4 ppb and 6 ppb shows that people view departures 
from the 5 ppb standard asymmetrically. 
In model D a separate intercept is included for each of the three exposure 
pathway scenarios.  In other words, the effect of the LUST on prices is allowed to 
vary depending on whether the hypothetical homes are on the public water system, 
rely on private wells, or rely on wells but have filters installed. Notice the increase in 
the adjusted R-square (0.032 to 0.884), implying that controlling for the scenarios 
helps explain how participants believe that prices respond to pollution. As expected, a 
LUST decreases prices most at homes relying on private wells, which is where the 
households are truly at risk. The private well coefficient suggests a $111,319 decrease 
in price relative to the initial $400,000 average pre-leak home value, a 27.8% decline. 
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 F-tests for joint significance of the pollution (ppb) variable and its interaction with the dummy 
denoting when the standard is exceeded yield an F-stat=13.30, thus I reject the null that the associated 




In contrast, among homes on the public water system and where a filter was installed 




Nevertheless, this is still a fairly sizable discount in home values considering 
that there is no exposure to the benzene contamination, and therefore no health risks 
(at least not via the drinking water). The respondents may believe house prices 
decline by this much because of uncertainties in future risks or potential health risks 
through other means of exposure.
66
  
In model E I examine how reported prices respond to the disamenity even if 
the groundwater beneath the home itself is not contaminated. I focus only on home A, 
which was always assigned 0 ppb contamination. The largest decrease in price is still 
among homes on private wells, but this is not statistically different from the other two 
experimental scenarios. Therefore, the assigned survey scenarios do not seem to 
matter when there is no contamination present, but respondents still believe there is a 
statistically significant 19.57% to 24.95% depreciation because these homes are 
merely near a LUST site.  
 Recall that participants were told that prior to the leak, homes in this 
neighborhood are worth $400,000, on average. It is possible that respondents may 
infer differences in the pre-leak prices based on the aerial photo (figures 1 and 2), as 
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 F-tests show that the larger decrease in price in the well water scenario is statistically different from 
the public water and well with filter scenarios (f-stat=6.00 and 13.61, respectively). There is no 
statistical difference between the public water and well with filter scenarios. 
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 For example, although it was not discussed in the survey, respondents may be aware of vapor 
intrusion, which is when pollutants evaporate into harmful vapors and migrate through the soil into 
basements and homes This poses short-term risks such as headaches, nausea, dizziness, and possible 
explosions (Toccalino, 2005; Béraud, 1997; and MDE, 
http://www.mde.state.md.us/assets/document/LRP%20Vapor%20Intrusion%20Guidance(6).pdf, 




shown by equation 2). To account for this possibility, in table 12 I re-estimate models 
A through D, but I now include fixed effects for each home. Models F through I show 
that the previous results are robust to the inclusion of these home fixed effects. 
Across all four models, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the home specific 
intercepts are statistically equivalent. 
In models J, K, and L in table 13, I compare whether prices are affected 
differently across the three survey scenarios by higher levels of contamination. Model 
F includes separate intercepts for each of the three scenarios, and interaction terms 
with each of the contamination level dummies. This allows the effect of 
contamination on price to vary across all pollution levels and the three experimental 
scenarios. Respondent characteristics are added in model G, including education, 
children, income, and age (which I discuss in subsection V.B). Additional 
characteristics are added in model L, namely whether the respondent is a student, 
university employee, alumnus, etc. (which are found to be statistically insignificant, 
both individually and jointly).
67
  
In table 13, the results across the three exposure pathway scenarios are robust 
across all three specifications. The intercept terms are below the initial pre-leak price 
of $400,000, suggesting people believe prices decline even if there is no groundwater 
pollution at the home itself. Based on the most complete specification, model H, this 
depreciation ranges from 18.66% to 20.97%, with the largest depreciation in the 
Private Well scenario. The scenario specific intercepts, however, are not statistically 
different from each other. Beyond this initial depreciation, groundwater pollution 
levels below the regulatory standard have a statistically insignificant effect on price.   
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However, once the regulatory limit is exceeded, announced home prices 
decline with higher pollution levels, as can be seen by the coefficient estimates 
associated with the 6 ppb and 9 ppb variables. This decline is strongest among 
respondents who were randomly assigned to the Private Well Scenario. For example, 
in model H, the price of a home that is simply near the LUST site will decline by 
20.97% (relative to the average pre-leak price of $400,000). If the groundwater well 
at this home is found to have 6 ppb of benzene then the home is worth 32.61% less, 
and at 9 ppb a 41.33% depreciation is reported.  
Statistical tests fail to reject the null that the effects of higher pollution levels 
on home values are different across the Private Well and Public Water scenarios.
68
 
Why might this be? Even though respondents were reminded that an exposure 
pathway is only present in the Private Well scenario, perhaps they remained 
concerned with other potential exposure pathways, future uncertainties, or simply did 
not keep this lack of exposure pathway in mind when answering the valuation 
questions, and thus thought that property values would decline in a similar fashion.  It 
could also be that the decline in price was motivated by non-health concerns about 
environmental quality, public stigma towards the homes (Messer et al, 2006; Gregory 
and Scatterfield, 2002), or belief that others would misunderstand the lack of health 
risks.     
Respondents may better comprehend that a filter reduces health risks. In fact, 
the Well with Filter scenario clearly specifies that all contamination is removed, and 
thus all health risks eliminated (see section III.A and figure 2). As seen in table 13 by 
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the coefficients on 6 ppb and 9 ppb, under the Well with filter scenario the additional 
decline in price at pollution levels above the standard is relatively weak.  Focusing on 
model H, statistical tests reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on each of the 
contamination levels are equal across the Private Well and Well with Filter scenarios 
(p=0.0527). This holds even when focusing on just benzene levels above the 5 ppb 
standard (p=0.0086), suggesting that the respondents do not believe prices decrease as 
much at higher contamination levels when a filter is installed. In fact, all the 
contamination level coefficients in the filter scenario are jointly insignificant. When a 
filter is installed people in this sample, on average, do not believe prices decline more 
at higher pollution levels. Of course the mere presence of the LUST still leads to a 
significant 18.66% depreciation. 
V.B. Results with Individual Characteristics 
Next I estimate several regressions to investigate whether respondents‘ socio-
economic status and familiarity with the pollution source, exposure pathway, and the 
pollutant itself has any bearing on how they believe home values are affected by 
groundwater pollution.  
The regressions in table 14 build off of model K (in table 13).
69
 Only the 
socio-demographic characteristics and variables describing experience with the 
pollutant and exposure pathway are presented in table 14.
70
 I find that a participant‘s 
age and income have no systematic effect on announced home prices. Education, 
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however, matters: the post-leak prices reported by respondents who have at least a 
bachelor‘s degree are not as low as those reported by others, all else constant. 
Respondents who have a child less than 5 years old also report higher post-leak home 
prices. This is contrary to my initial expectations. I initially expected that individuals 
with young children may be more concerned about the health risks to households. Of 
course the valuation exercise asked the respondents for their third party assessment of 
the sale price, and so in this hypothetical exercise their household itself would not be 
affected. The sign and statistical significance of these results is robust across the 
remaining specifications in table 14. 
In model M, the dummy variable Well Water is added, which denotes that the 
respondent currently or previously lived in a home that relied on a private 
groundwater well. This is meant to proxy familiarity with the primary exposure 
pathway. In earlier focus groups we found that people who have always lived in 
homes connected to the public water system sometimes had difficulties making the 
distinction between their tap water and the groundwater beneath their homes 
(Alberini and Guignet, 2010).  The results here, however, suggest that prior 
experience with the private wells (the primary exposure pathway) has no significant 
effect on announced post-leak prices. 
To investigate whether a respondent‘s familiarity with the contaminant and 
the unit of measurement have any bearing on announced post-leak prices, model N 
includes the dummy variables benzene and parts-per-billion. In general, people tend 
to over-perceive small risks, such as environmental health risks; however, people who 




1998). Both coefficient estimates are positive. This provides some weak evidence that 
respondents who are familiar with benzene and how pollution levels are measured do 
not perceive a LUST to be as much of a threat, and therefore do not believe prices 
will decline as much. However, the coefficient on parts-per-billion is only marginally 
significant, and a respondent‘s familiarity with benzene seems to have no significant 
affect on announced post-leak prices. 
Model O includes indicator variables denoting that the respondent is familiar 
with leaking underground storage tanks (LUSTs), and is aware of a LUST site in their 
neighborhood. The former has a relatively small and insignificant effect on price 
responses, but the 28 individuals who report having a LUST in their neighborhood 
(n=84 observations) believe home values will decline an additional $45,550 
(11.39%), all else constant. Model P includes the dummy variable recent_in_market, 
which equals one for the 104 participants (n=312 observations) who bought, sold, or 
have been actively looking for a home within the last 5 years. The small and 
statistically insignificant coefficient suggests that familiarity and recent activity in the 
housing market has little effect on reported post-leak home prices. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
To environmental economists, hedonic property value methods are an 
attractive non-market valuation technique because welfare estimates are inferred from 
actual behavior, and, at least in theory, all aspects of a welfare change are capitalized 
in prices. However, in conducting hedonic studies researchers are often forced to 




environmental disamenity of interest, and how they measure this disamenity. Stated 
preference methods, on the other hand, provide an opportunity to examine how home 
values might be affected when we know exactly what is being valued, and do not have 
to make restrictive assumptions.  
The goal of this stated preference study is to express an environmental good in 
terms of pollution levels, and investigate how people value environmental quality and 
health risks by measuring the impacts on home prices. I incorporate an experimental 
design to analyze how reported home prices are affected by the discovery of a leaking 
underground storage tank (LUST), the presence of an exposure pathway, the level of 
groundwater pollution (parts-per-billion of benzene), and when pollution levels 
exceed the regulatory standard. Respondents use this information to form their own 




Corresponding to the hedonic analysis in chapter 2, the information I provide 
to respondents is the same that the Maryland Department of Environment (MDE) 
provides to households in Maryland whose groundwater wells are tested for pollution 
from a LUST site. The questionnaire was self-administered by a convenience sample 
of Maryland residents in April and October, 2010. My interests are not in the 
magnitude of the estimated price declines from pollution, but rather the overall 
message and within sample comparisons of the experimental treatments. 
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with a second approach; respondents are explicitly presented with objective health risks. A third 
approach, which is the one taken in past stated preference studies (e.g., Jenkins-Smith et al., 2002; 
Chattopadhyay et al., 2005; Simons and Winson-Geideman, 2005), is to convey the environmental 




I find an 18% to 24% depreciation in announced post-leak home prices even if 
the groundwater at the home itself is not contaminated. The largest decline is found 
when the exposure pathway (i.e., a private groundwater well) is present. However, 
when the groundwater at the home itself is not contaminated, this effect is not 
statistically different from the other two experimental treatments, where a clear 
exposure pathway is not present.  
As expected, home prices decrease further at higher levels of groundwater 
pollution beneath the home, an effect that is more pronounced once the regulatory 
standard is exceeded. Respondents likely interpret pollution standards as a ceiling of 
what is considered ―safe‖ (Smith et al., 1990; Johnson and Chess, 2003; Johnson, 
2008). I find evidence that the effect of groundwater pollution on announced home 
prices is strongest when the homes use private wells, and thus when there is an 
increase in health risks. If a filter is installed at the home and the respondents are 
explicitly told that it eliminates all health risks, then higher pollution levels have a 
small and statistically insignificant effect on reported prices, but the mere presence of 
a LUST still leads to an initial 18% price depreciation. 
So, are stated preference techniques a viable alternative to hedonic property 
value models? The results from this study suggest that people are capable of 
interpreting pollution concentrations, and in turn, expressing how they think property 
values are impacted. The reported home prices capitalize the presence of pollution in 
ways that are consistent with economic theory, and are comparable to previous 




In a hedonic study of actual home sales in Maine, Boyle et al. (2010) find that 
an increase in arsenic pollution from 0.05 mg/L to 0.06 mg/L (a 20% increase above 
the standard) decreases home prices by 0.5-1.0%.  In this stated preference study I 
find that an increase in benzene pollution from 5 ppb to 6 ppb (a 20% increase above 
the standard) leads to a 1.48% decline in reported home prices.   
In chapter 2 of this dissertation, I presented a parallel hedonic property value 
study of single-family home sales in Maryland. There I find a 9-12% depreciation 
among homes where the private well was tested for petroleum contamination from a 
LUST. These households were subsequently informed of the regulatory standards and 
the contamination levels in their well. In this stated preference study, where 
respondents are given analogous information, the percent decrease in reported home 
prices is twice as much (18-24%). This is slightly below, but comparable to, the 25-
33% decline in home prices that Simons and Winson-Geideman (2005) found in their 
stated preference study on LUSTs. 
Simons and Winson-Geideman (2005) explicitly put respondents in the role of 
the buyer or seller of a home. We attempted this approach in earlier focus groups, but 
found that participants often took a firm moral stance, deeming a property unsellable, 
or stating they would not purchase the property for any price, even if the home itself 
was not contaminated (Alberini and Guignet, 2010). Based on this evidence, in the 
study presented in this dissertation chapter I asked respondents to assess changes in 





Psychologists and sociologists have found that this third-party or indirect 
valuation approach may reduce hypothetical biases that arise when respondents are 
asked questions about  emotionally or socially sensitive topics, such as environmental 
pollution and health risks (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Fisher, 1983; Epley and 
Dunning, 2000). Only a few studies have examined the potential of this approach in 
minimizing hypothetical biases in non-market valuation (Lusk and Norwood, 2009a, 
2009b; Yadav et al., 2010), and no one to my knowledge has done so in the context of 
housing. It may be helpful in future stated preference research to compare reported 
home prices from this third-party perspective to those when respondents are placed in 






Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Aerial Photo of Leak and Groundwater Pollution. 
 





Figure 3. Kernel Density Estimate of Post-pollution Price Responses. 
 










Note: Dashed lines denote 95% confidence interval. 






























Table 1. Experimental Survey Treatments: The Exposure Pathway Scenarios. 
 
Scenario 1: Private Well 
In this neighborhood the homes are worth $400,000 on average, and 
rely on private groundwater wells.   
 
Now suppose a leak occurs at one of the tanks at the gas station in the 
neighborhood.  The leak has been stopped, but no cleanup has been 
undertaken.  The groundwater around the site is tested for benzene and 
the test results for three of the homes are shown in the photo below.   
 
Scenario 2: Public Water 
 
In this neighborhood the homes are worth $400,000 on average, and 
served by the public water system, which gets its water from a distant 
reservoir. 
 
Now suppose a leak occurs at one of the tanks at the gas station in the 
neighborhood.  The leak has been stopped, but no cleanup has been 
undertaken.  The groundwater around the site is tested for benzene and 
the test results for three of the homes are shown in the photo below.   
 
Scenario 3: Well with Filter 
<Treatment 1: Private Well text> 
 
If any contamination is found in the groundwater beneath a home then 
a water filter is installed so that the water at the home is safe for 








Table 2. Summary of Study Design. 
 
# of Variants Levels/Variants 
   
Pollution Levels: 
         Home A 1 0 ppb 
       Home B 5 0, 1, 4, 6, 9 ppb 
       Home C 5 0, 1, 4, 6, 9 ppb 
   Exposure Pathway  
Scenario: 3 1) Private Well 
  
 
2) Public Water 
  
 
3) Well with filter 
    
Table 3. Mean Price Responses across Experimental Treatments. 
 
All Homes Just Home A (0 ppb) Just Homes B & C† 
Treatment: Mean* Mean* Mean* 
 
   
Well Water $  274,717 
(113,895) 
$  300,187 
(118,546) 
$  261,840 
(109,564) 
Public Water $  297,567 
(105,108) 
$  321,719 
(106,732) 
$  285,213 
(102,387) 
Well with Filter $  308,713 
(107,277) 
$  312,495 
(110,389) 
$  306,802 
(105,915) 
   
 
*Std Deviation in parentheses.  




Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Respondents‘ Home and Neighborhood. 
Variable* Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
    Homeowner - Owns Home  303 0.8086 0.3941 
LiveMD - Lives in Maryland  303 0.9340 0.2487 
Single - Lives in Single Family Home  303 0.7129 0.4532 
Rural - Live in rural neighborhood 303 0.1518 0.3594 
Suburb - Lives in suburban neighborhood  303 0.7525 0.4323 
Urban - Lives in Urban Area  303 0.0957 0.2947 
Pvt_Water - Current home uses private well  303 0.1749 0.3805 
Pub_Water - Current home connected to public 
water system 
303 0.7723 0.4201 





Table 5. Descriptive Statistics on Respondents‘ Prior Knowledge and Experience. 
Variable* Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
    
Well Water - has lived in home that used private 
well  
303 0.4191 0.4942 
Water_Issue - Has had water quality issue at 
home  
303 0.0792 0.2705 
Parts-per-billion - heard of the term "parts-per-
billion" before  
303 0.8152 0.3888 
Benzene - heard of benzene in drinking water  292 0.4589 0.4992 
LUSTs - heard of "leaking underground storage 
tanks" before 
300 0.7900 0.4080 
LUST in Neighborhood - Aware of LUST  in 
own neighborhood 
300 0.0933 0.2914 
*Note: All variables are binary indicator variables unless otherwise noted. 
 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics on Respondent and Household Attributes. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Age - age of respondent (years) 290 44.3138 12.6915 18 80 
Kids - Has child(ren) under 18 303 0.6568 0.4756 0 1 
Kids5 - Has child(ren) under 5 303 0.1749 0.3805 0 1 
Children - # of Children under 18 293 1.2253 1.1274 0 5 
Children5 - # of Children under 5 293 0.1741 0.4462 0 2 
Education - Level of education  
(1 to 6 scale)
b
 
303 4.9241 1.4909 0 6 
Bachelor's - completed a 
bachelor's or higher degree 
303 0.7525 0.4323 0 1 
Undergrad - respondent is 
undergraduate student 
303 0.0660 0.2487 0 1 
Grad - respondent is graduate 
student 
303 0.0627 0.2428 0 1 
Alumni - respondent is Univ. of 
Maryland alumni 
303 0.2112 0.4089 0 1 
Employee - respondent employee 
of the Univ. of Maryland 
303 0.1551 0.3626 0 1 
Income - Annual household 
income (1 to 9 scale)
c
 
278 5.6223 2.0546 1 9 
a.  All variables are binary indicator variables unless otherwise noted. 
b.  1= some high school, 2=high school diploma, 3=some college, 4=associate degree, 
5=bachelor's degree, 6= post graduate education 
c. 1=less than $35,000; 2=$35,000-44,999; 3=$45,000-54,999; 4=$55,000-74,999; 




9=more than $250,000 
 
Table 7. Comparison of Convenience Sample to Maryland 2000 Census Data. 
 
Study Sample State of Maryland 
   Bachelor's Degree or higher 75.25% 31.45% 
Children under 18 years 65.68% 37.31% 
Own home 80.86% 67.74% 
Median household income (2010$) $125,000 $69,197 
Age   
      18 to 19 years 3.79% 3.47% 
      20 to 24 years 7.24% 7.97% 
      25 to 34 years 10.34% 19.00% 
      35 to 44 years 24.48% 23.25% 
      45 to 54 years 34.48% 19.16% 
      55 to 64 years 13.79% 11.94% 
      65+ years 5.86% 15.21% 
    
 
 
Table 8. Comparison of Characteristics across Event Samples: Home and 
Neighborhood Attributes. 
 
Event 1 Event 2 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev t-stat 
        Homeowner 197 0.7919 0.407 106 0.8396 0.3687 1.04 
LiveMD 197 0.9086 0.2889 106 0.9811 0.1367 2.96*** 
Single 197 0.6904 0.4635 106 0.7547 0.4323 1.21 
Rural 197 0.1117 0.3158 106 0.2264 0.4205 2.46** 
Suburb 197 0.7716 0.4209 106 0.717 0.4526 -1.03 
Urban 197 0.1168 0.3219 106 0.0566 0.2322 -1.87* 
Pvt_Water 197 0.132 0.3393 106 0.2547 0.4378 2.51** 
Pub_Water 197 0.8173 0.3874 106 0.6887 0.4652 -2.43** 





Table 9. Comparison of Characteristics across Event Samples: Prior Experience with 
LUSTs, Pollution, and Groundwater. 
 
Event 1 Event 2 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev t-stat 
        Well Water 197 0.3553 0.4798 106 0.5377 0.5009 3.07*** 
Water_Issue 197 0.0792 0.2659 106 0.0849 0.2801 0.26 
Parts-per-billion 197 0.8071 0.3956 106 0.8302 0.3773 0.50 
Benzene 190 0.4632 0.5 102 0.451 0.5 -0.02 
LUSTs 194 0.7629 0.4264 106 0.8396 0.3687 1.63 
LUST in 
Neighborhood 194 0.1082 0.3115 106 0.066 0.2495 -1.28 





Table 10. Comparison of Characteristics across Event Samples: Respondent and 
Household Attributes. 
 
Event 1 Event 2 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev t-stat 
        Age 187 43.72 12.93 103 45.39 12.23 1.09 
Kids 197 0.6497 0.4783 106 0.6698 0.4725 0.35 
Kids5 197 0.1421 0.3501 106 0.2358 0.4265 1.94* 
Children 190 1.1894 1.123 103 1.2913 1.1257 0.74 
Children5 190 0.1421 0.4313 103 0.233 0.4687 1.63 
Education 197 4.88 1.55 106 5.01 1.37 0.76 
Bachelors 197 0.761 0.4446 106 0.7925 0.4075 1.21 
Undergrad 197 0.0812 0.2739 106 0.0377 0.1915 -1.61 
Grad 197 0.0812 0.2739 106 0.0283 0.1666 -2.09** 
Alumni 197 0.2386 0.4273 106 0.1604 0.3687 -1.66* 
Employee 197 0.1726 0.3789 106 0.1226 0.3296 -1.19 
Income 183 5.44 2.18 95 5.98 1.74 2.25** 






Table 11. Basic Regression Results  (dependent variable = pricehi) 
  
     VARIABLES
a
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
b 
            
Pollution (ppb) -5,767*** -2,402 
   
 
(1,128) (2,391) 




   
  
(2,417) 




   
(9,893) (10,983) 




   
(9,731) (11,102) 




   
(11,176) (11,451) 




   
(11,948) (11,926) 
 Public Water 
   
311,317*** 321,719*** 
    
(7,756) (11,311) 
Private Well 
   
288,681*** 300,187*** 
    
(8,196) (12,426) 
Well with Filter 
   
322,996*** 312,495*** 
    
(7,419) (11,269) 
Constant 309,150*** 307,290*** 307,922*** 
  
 
(6,902) (7,015) (7,310) 
  
      Observations 820 820 820 820 276 
R-squared 0.030 0.032 0.032 0.884 0.887 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. All variables are binary indicator variables unless otherwise noted. 







Table 12.  Basic Regression Results with Home Fixed Effects (dep variable = pricehi) 
  
    VARIABLES
a
 (F) (G) (H) (I) 
          











  1 ppb 
  
3,037 3,850 















   
(14,891) (14,474) 
Public Water 
   
314,830*** 
    
(10,230) 
Private Well 
   
326,483*** 
    
(10,718) 
Well with Filter 
   
292,169*** 
    
(11,521) 
Home Fixed Effects 
    Home A 311,411*** 311,411*** 311,411*** 
 
 
(6,750) (6,755) (6,763) 
     Home B 307,849*** 302,530*** 301,071*** -10,361 
 
(8,708) (9,351) (11,848) (9,500) 
    Home C 304,915*** 299,299*** 297,868*** -13,564 
 
(8,361) (9,172) (11,602) (9,349) 
     Wald Tests:   
Home Fixed Effects 
are equal (p-value) 0.78 1.65 1.28 0.82 
 
(p=0.4582) (p=0.1941) (p=0.2801) (p=0.3656) 
     Observations 820 820 820 820 
R-squared 0.882 0.882 0.882 0.884 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table 13. Regression Results Across Experimental Treatments (dep variable=pricehi). 
VARIABLES (J) (K) (L) 
Public Water  312,286*** 293,112*** 325,285*** 
 
(10,013) (54,271) (72,073) 
         × 1 ppb  12,244 3,125 1,064 
 
(18,470) (14,308) (14,663) 
         × 4 ppb -5,727 -5,977 -7,001 
 
(16,641) (16,740) (16,865) 
         × 6 ppb  -45,897** -45,554*** -44,924** 
 
(18,181) (16,997) (17,599) 
         × 9 ppb  -73,952*** -65,927*** -65,923*** 
 
(20,895) (17,542) (17,977) 
Private Well  294,367*** 280,206*** 316,103*** 
 
(10,755) (56,443) (75,857) 
         × 1 ppb  -17,746 -20,462 -24,955 
 
(21,101) (19,081) (18,531) 
         × 4 ppb -6,744 -16,483 -16,784 
 
(18,931) (15,834) (15,568) 
         × 6 ppb  -43,913** -44,896** -46,536** 
 
(21,303) (21,761) (21,248) 
         × 9 ppb  -78,512*** -83,278*** -81,427*** 
 
(18,836) (21,029) (19,967) 
Well with Filter  316,700*** 292,234*** 325,374*** 
 
(9,064) (56,240) (73,452) 
         × 1 ppb  -8,097 1,287 -716 
 
(16,863) (15,741) (15,709) 
         × 4 ppb -16,042 -21,367 -23,930 
 
(21,328) (16,585) (16,527) 
         × 6 ppb  -28,212 -34,490** -32,172** 
 
(19,951) (17,510) (16,310) 
         × 9 ppb  -5,172 -2,144 -2,505 
 
(20,875) (16,244) (16,346) 
Individual Characteristics: 
       Socio-economic No Yes Yes 
       Relationship  to Univ. No No Yes 
    Observations 820 820 820 
R-squared 0.886 0.898 0.899 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: All variables are binary indicator variables unless otherwise noted. 




Table 14. Effect of Individual Characteristics and Hazard Familiarity on Post-leak 





 (M) (N) (O) (P) 
            
Bachelor's degree or higher 56,448*** 55,744*** 52,507*** 48,586** 48,017** 
 
(18,961) (18,943) (18,582) (19,139) (19,182) 
Education Missing 7,083 5,831 8,628 3,276 3,658 
 
(57,655) (54,939) (54,780) (56,151) (57,046) 
Has Children  -6,945 -7,249 -5,264 -7,677 -8,689 
 
(15,869) (15,853) (15,861) (15,949) (15,867) 
Has Children under 5 yrs 38,679*** 37,599*** 38,265*** 38,568** 39,810** 
 
(14,480) (14,425) (14,605) (15,234) (15,437) 
Income (1 to 6 scale)  4,542 5,166 4,197 4,306 4,419 
 
(3,298) (3,299) (3,279) (3,292) (3,288) 
Income Missing -39,724 -39,763 -42,409 -41,555 -41,613 
 
(35,495) (35,786) (35,277) (36,139) (36,223) 
Age (years) -1,731 -1,866 -1,865 -1,860 -1,467 
 
(2,709) (2,695) (2,650) (2,613) (2,628) 
Age^2 15 18 16 15 10 
 
(31) (31) (30) (30) (30) 
Age missing -81,724 -79,838 -72,850 -80,245 -76,365 
 
(71,153) (70,558) (70,483) (70,829) (70,910) 
Well Water 
 
-14,987 -15,842 -13,807 -13,580 
  
(11,593) (11,636) (11,887) (11,857) 
Benzene 
  
452 425 1,288 
   
(11,911) (12,165) (12,617) 
Benzene Missing 
  
18,851 25,886 23,596 
   
(33,392) (35,551) (35,444) 
Parts-per-billion 
  
39,187* 35,415* 33,637* 
   
(20,382) (20,245) (20,317) 
LUSTs 
   
6,626 6,404 
    
(15,223) (15,199) 
LUST in Neighborhood 
   
-45,550** -46,528** 
    
(21,041) (21,304) 
recent_in_mkt 
    
-7,157 
     
(12,939) 
Treatment × ppb (dummies)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Observations 820 820 820 817 817 
R-squared 0.898 0.898 0.900 0.902 0.902 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note:  Full regression results are presented in table A2 of appendix. 
           a. All variables are binary indicator variables unless otherwise noted. 





Appendix A. Full Regression Results. 
Table A1. Full Regression Results Across Experimental Treatments  
(dep variable= pricehi). 
  
   VARIABLES
a 
(J) (K) (L) 
        
Public Water  312,286*** 293,112*** 325,285*** 
 
(10,013) (54,271) (72,073) 
    × 1 ppb  12,244 3,125 1,064 
 
(18,470) (14,308) (14,663) 
    × 4 ppb  -5,727 -5,977 -7,001 
 
(16,641) (16,740) (16,865) 
    × 6 ppb  -45,897** -45,554*** -44,924** 
 
(18,181) (16,997) (17,599) 
    × 9 ppb  -73,952*** -65,927*** -65,923*** 
 
(20,895) (17,542) (17,977) 
Private Well  294,367*** 280,206*** 316,103*** 
 
(10,755) (56,443) (75,857) 
    × 1 ppb  -17,746 -20,462 -24,955 
 
(21,101) (19,081) (18,531) 
    × 4 ppb  -6,744 -16,483 -16,784 
 
(18,931) (15,834) (15,568) 
    × 6 ppb  -43,913** -44,896** -46,536** 
 
(21,303) (21,761) (21,248) 
    × 9 ppb  -78,512*** -83,278*** -81,427*** 
 
(18,836) (21,029) (19,967) 
Well with Filter  316,700*** 292,234*** 325,374*** 
 
(9,064) (56,240) (73,452) 
    × 1 ppb  -8,097 1,287 -716 
 
(16,863) (15,741) (15,709) 
    × 4 ppb  -16,042 -21,367 -23,930 
 
(21,328) (16,585) (16,527) 
    × 6 ppb  -28,212 -34,490** -32,172** 
 
(19,951) (17,510) (16,310) 
    × 9 ppb  -5,172 -2,144 -2,505 
 
(20,875) (16,244) (16,346) 
--- Continued on following Page --- 




Table A1. Full Regression Results Across Experimental Treatments (continued). 
  
   VARIABLES
a 
(J) (K) (L) 
    --- Continued from Previous Page --- 





















































   
(29,312) 
University Alumni  
  
9,195 





   
(20,403) 
    Observations 820 820 820 
R-squared 0.886 0.898 0.899 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 










Table A2. Full Regression Results: Effects of Individual Characteristics and Hazard 
Familiarity on Post-leak Home Price Responses (dev variable-= pricehi).  
  
    VARIABLES (M) (N) (O) (P) 
          
Public Water  296,467*** 272,593*** 281,106*** 277,462*** 
 
(53,690) (55,382) (54,844) (54,593) 
    × 1 ppb  3,169 5,898 4,903 4,689 
 
(14,020) (14,003) (13,979) (14,024) 
    × 4 ppb  -6,475 -9,308 -14,229 -14,670 
 
(16,535) (16,402) (16,655) (16,688) 
    × 6 ppb  -45,586*** -43,869** -47,372*** -47,688*** 
 
(16,931) (17,632) (17,660) (17,675) 
    × 9 ppb  -65,227*** -61,301*** -61,775*** -61,831*** 
 
(17,257) (17,258) (17,283) (17,346) 
Private Well  283,055*** 259,143*** 268,169*** 264,222*** 
 
(55,947) (57,197) (56,122) (55,817) 
    × 1 ppb  -19,597 -16,651 -15,394 -15,275 
 
(19,367) (19,153) (18,878) (19,016) 
    × 4 ppb  -14,860 -13,741 -12,770 -13,242 
 
(16,189) (16,156) (15,521) (15,497) 
    × 6 ppb  -45,842** -46,537** -49,032** -48,764** 
 
(22,389) (21,996) (21,252) (21,339) 
    × 9 ppb  -83,996*** -84,612*** -85,535*** -85,598*** 
 
(21,020) (20,988) (20,820) (20,891) 
Well with Filter  297,903*** 275,862*** 281,295*** 278,626*** 
 
(55,547) (56,434) (56,073) (55,812) 
    × 1 ppb  2,683 -71 2,284 2,736 
 
(15,539) (15,560) (16,657) (16,775) 
    × 4 ppb  -23,993 -25,786 -26,351 -26,223 
 
(16,678) (16,493) (16,583) (16,432) 
    × 6 ppb  -35,352** -36,237** -36,349** -36,099** 
 
(17,334) (18,173) (18,297) (18,262) 
    × 9 ppb  -1,988 -2,788 -4,021 -4,422 
 
(16,193) (15,857) (15,905) (15,793) 
     --- Continued on following Page --- 








Table A2. Full Regression Results: Effect of Individual Characteristics and Hazard 
Familiarity on Post-leak Home Prices Responses (continued). 
  
    VARIABLES (M) (N) (O) (P) 
     --- Continued from Previous Page --- 
     Bachelor's degree or higher 55,744*** 52,507*** 48,586** 48,017** 
 
(18,943) (18,582) (19,139) (19,182) 
Education Missing 5,831 8,628 3,276 3,658 
 
(54,939) (54,780) (56,151) (57,046) 
Has Children  -7,249 -5,264 -7,677 -8,689 
 
(15,853) (15,861) (15,949) (15,867) 
Has Children under 5 yrs 37,599*** 38,265*** 38,568** 39,810** 
 
(14,425) (14,605) (15,234) (15,437) 
Income (1 to 6 scale)  5,166 4,197 4,306 4,419 
 
(3,299) (3,279) (3,292) (3,288) 
Income Missing -39,763 -42,409 -41,555 -41,613 
 
(35,786) (35,277) (36,139) (36,223) 
Age (years) -1,866 -1,865 -1,860 -1,467 
 
(2,695) (2,650) (2,613) (2,628) 
Age^2 18 16 15 10 
 
(31) (30) (30) (30) 
Age missing -79,838 -72,850 -80,245 -76,365 
 
(70,558) (70,483) (70,829) (70,910) 
Well Water -14,987 -15,842 -13,807 -13,580 
 
(11,593) (11,636) (11,887) (11,857) 
Benzene 
 
452 425 1,288 
  
(11,911) (12,165) (12,617) 
Benzene Missing 
 
18,851 25,886 23,596 
  
(33,392) (35,551) (35,444) 
Parts-per-billion 
 
39,187* 35,415* 33,637* 
  




   
(15,223) (15,199) 
LUST in Neighborhood 
  
-45,550** -46,528** 
   
(21,041) (21,304) 
recent_in_mkt 
   
-7,157 
    
(12,939) 
     Observations 820 820 817 817 
R-squared 0.898 0.900 0.902 0.902 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




Appendix B. Sample Questionnaire. 
Thank you for participating in this survey. By filling out this questionnaire, you are 
helping students get experience and training in survey research, and data collection 
and analysis. We appreciate your help. 
  
This research is part of a dissertation project focusing on housing and environmental 
quality.  We are interested in your opinions about and experience with these topics.  
There are no right or wrong answers to the questions in this questionnaire.   
 
Please fill out this questionnaire to the best of your knowledge. It is anonymous, and 
all answers will be kept confidential.   
 
You must be at least 18 years of age to participate in this survey. 
 
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact the Student Investigator, Dennis 
Guignet, at the University of Maryland, dguignet@arec.umd.edu.  
 
 
Section A. Your Current Home. 
 
A1. Do you currently live in Maryland? 
1. Yes 
2. No  
 
 If Yes, what County do you live in? ___________________________ 
 
 
 If No, what State do you live in? ___________________________ 
 
 
A2. Which of the following best describes your neighborhood? 
 
1.  Rural 
2.  Suburban  









A3. What best describes the type of home you live in? 
1.  Single family, detached 
2.  Townhouse, or duplex  
3.  Apartment or condominium in a multi-family building 
4.  Other: _____________________________ 
 
 
A4. Which of the following best describes your situation? 
1.  I, or someone in my family, own my home 
2.  I, or someone in my family, rent my home  
3.  Other rental or free housing situation, please 
explain:__________________ 
 













B1. Where does the water at your current home come from? 
 
1.  Public Water System 
2.  Private Groundwater Well  
3.  I don‘t know 
 
B2. Have you ever lived in a home where the water came from a private 
groundwater well? 
1.  Yes 
2.  No 






B3. Has the drinking water at your home ever been tested? 
 
1.  Yes 
2.  No 
 
 
B4. Did the test results indicate that there was a water quality problem? 
 
1.  Yes, and the problem was: 
_____________________________________ 
2.  Yes, but I do not remember the details of the problem 
3.  No problem was found 




Section C. Background Information.   
 
 
C1. Have you ever heard of any of these contaminants in groundwater or 
drinking water? 
 
1. Arsenic........................... Yes     No 
2. Coliforms........................ Yes     No 
3. Benzene......................... Yes     No 
4. Lead............................... Yes     No 
5. Trichloroethylene........... Yes     No 











C2. Have you ever heard of the term “parts per billion”? 
 
1.  Yes 
2.  No 
 
―Parts per billion‖ (or ppb) is a measure of the concentration (or amount) of a 
substance in water.   
 
For many pollutants, the law specifies a standard—a concentration level that 
must not be exceeded in drinking water.  
 •  Standards are set to protect human health with a wide margin of       
safety. 
  •  Standards are often reported in ppb.   
 





C3. Sometimes contaminants leak from underground tanks.  Have you ever 
heard of the term „Leaking Underground Storage Tank‟? 
 
1.  Yes 
2.  No 
 
Underground storage tanks are  
 •  Used to store petroleum products  
 •  Commonly found at gas stations.   
 
Occasionally these tanks can leak due to rusting and cracks and can contaminate 
the surrounding soil and groundwater.  
 




C4. Are you aware of any homes in your neighborhood or city/town that were 
contaminated because of a leak from an underground storage tank?   
 
1.  Yes 





Section D.  A Neighborhood in Maryland.  
 




D1. Based on this photo, how similar is this neighborhood to the one you live 
in?    Please rate this neighborhood on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = very 






Very different from 
my neighborhood 
   Very similar to my 
neighborhood 




In this neighborhood the homes are worth $400,000 on average, and are served by the 
public water supply system, which gets its water from a distant reservoir.   
 
Now suppose a leak occurs at one of the tanks at the gas station in the neighborhood.  
The leak has been stopped, but no cleanup has been undertaken.  The groundwater 
around the site is tested for benzene and the test results for three of the homes are 
shown in the photo below.   
 
D2. How much do you think each of these homes will sell for after this leak?  
Please enter your best guess if you are unsure. 
 
Home A:  $__________________________ 
 
 
Home B:  $__________________________ 
 
 





Section E. Socio-demographic Questions 
 
E1. Which of the following best describes your relationship with the 
University of Maryland? 
1.  Undergraduate Student  
2.  Graduate student  
3.  Alumnus/a 
4.  Employee  
5.  Friend of the University  
6.  Other: _____________________________ 
 
 
E2. How many children/teenagers aged 0-18 live in your home? 
 
 
 _____________________ children/teenagers 
 
 
 How many of these children are less than 5 years old?  
 
 
 _____________________ children 
 
 
E3. What is the total annual income for your household before taxes? Please 
include all sources of income. 
 
1.  Less than $35,000 
2.  $35,000-44,999 
3.  $45,000-54,999 
4.  $55,000-74,999 
5.  $75,000-99,999 
6.  $100,000-149,999 
7.  $150,000-199,999 
8.  $200,000-250,000 






E4. What is your age? 
 
 





E5. What is the highest level of schooling you have completed? 
 
1.  Some high school  
2.  High school diploma 
3.  Some college 
4.  Associate degree  
5.  Bachelor‘s degree 





E6. Before we finish this questionnaire, we would like to know if you have 
bought a home, sold a home, or have been seriously looking to buy or sell 
a home in the last 5 years. Please check all that apply. 
 
1.  Yes, I bought a home 
2.  Yes, I sold a home 
3.  Yes, I have been seriously looking to buy/sell but did not buy/sell 





You have reached the end of the questionnaire. 




Chapter 4: Can Property Values Capture Changes in 
Environmental Quality? Evidence from a Stated 
Preference Study in Italy and the UK 
By: Dennis Guignet and Anna Alberini 
 
I. Introduction 
Hedonic property value models are a popular method for placing a value on 
environmental quality and other localized amenities and disamenities. This approach 
assumes that changes in environmental quality are captured into property prices if the 
flow of housing services is affected by such changes. Rosen (1974) demonstrates that 
at equilibrium one can infer marginal welfare effects from changes in property values, 
and in some cases we can even estimate non-marginal welfare effects solely from the 
hedonic price surface (Palmquist, 2005).   
Given well-behaved housing markets with sufficiently frequent transactions it 
is, in theory, relatively straightforward to estimate the extent to which the changes in 
environmental quality are capitalized in real estate prices. One simply estimates 
regressions where home prices (or some monotonic transformation of prices, such as 
the log of price) are regressed on structural characteristics of the dwelling (e.g., 
square footage, number of floors, variables capturing construction quality and style), 
neighborhood characteristics (e.g., distance from the city center, crime), and measures 
of environmental quality at the time the home was sold. Depending on the specifics of 
the study, the latter set of variables is often replaced with distance to a localized 
amenity or disamenity (Boyle and Kiel, 2001; Farber, 1998).  After controlling for 
everything else, the coefficient(s) on the environmental quality measure(s) is used to 




Elegant and appealing as this approach might be, in practice it is fraught with 
difficulties. For starters, if the environmental quality measure is correlated with other 
omitted characteristics of a home or neighborhood, then the estimated marginal 
implicit prices may end up capturing the latter‘s effects on property values. Therefore 
an analyst could falsely attribute changes in property values to shifts in environmental 
quality. This omitted variable concern has led some researchers to rely on exogenous 
shocks for identification (e.g., Chay and Greenstone, 2005; Greenstone and 
Gallagher, 2005; Hallstrom and Smith, 2005; Pope, 2008; Horsch and Lewis, 2009).  
Second, researchers typically assume, without testing, that markets respond to 
objective measures of environmental quality (e.g., the readings from air quality 
monitors, as in Chattopadhyay, 1999, or risk assessments, as in Gayer et al., 2000, 
2002), when in reality people—and hence housing markets—are either unaware of 
these measures, or respond to something else entirely. In principle, this problem can 
be circumvented if it is possible to ask people what their perceived environmental 
quality level was when they bought or sold their home, but to our knowledge this has 
not been attempted in the literature.
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Alternatively, one might ask homebuyers or sellers what the price of their 
home would be if environmental quality changed to an extent that is clearly specified 
to them. There have been only a few applications of this stated preference approach. 
Earnhart (2001, 2002) used it in conjunction with actual housing transactions to infer 
the value of proximity to open space. Chattopadhyay et al. (2005) deployed it to 
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aggregated neighborhood risk belief measures were included in the hedonic model, and found to be 





estimate the effect of reducing pollution at one of the Great Lakes, and Phaneuf et al. 
(2010) combine stated preference and actual housing sale data in a GMM framework 
to assess cleanup of the Buffalo River in Buffalo, NY. Jenkins-Smith et al. (2002) 
examine information disclosure about contaminants from a smelter in Corpus Christi, 
TX, and elicit respondents‘ willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept 
(WTA) for a hypothetical home. Simons and Winson-Geideman (2005) did a 
contingent valuation study asking people how much they would buy a hypothetical 
home for under three alternative scenarios regarding knowledge and severity of 
groundwater and soil contamination.  
In all of these earlier studies environmental quality was defined qualitatively, 
and we believe that it remains unclear how respondents interpret such subjective 
measures. For example, Chattopadhyay et al. mention ―reducing pollution‖ in a more 
or less complete way, and even envision hypothetical scenarios where pollution 
would be made worse, but there are no rigorous measures of pollution used in their 
survey, and respondents are simply asked to think that their house is closer to or 
farther from a more or less heavily polluted lake. A similar approach is followed in 
Phaneuf et al. (2010).  
In this paper we report the results of a stated preference study where we asked 
people to choose between homes that differ from each other in two attributes—the 
health risks associated with air pollution levels at a home‘s location and its price. The 
health risks were couched as reductions in the risk of dying from specified causes 




dying). To our knowledge, this is the first stated preference study in the housing 
context with clearly specified mortality risks.  
We wish to investigate four research questions. First, are people willing to 
trade off mortality risk reductions for a change in the cost of their home? Second, if 
so, what is the value of a statistical life (VSL) we can infer from their responses? 
Some notable hedonic studies (Gayer et al., 2000, 2002; Davis, 2004) examine how 
home values are affected by environmental health risks, and under the necessary (but 
untested) assumption that home buyers and sellers are explicitly aware of these risks, 
the researchers infer the value of a statistical case of cancer avoided. In our stated 
preference study we need not assume respondents are aware of the health risks, we 
know they are aware since risks are explicitly presented.  
Our third question examines how respondents‘ perceptions of air pollution 
where they live, its effects on their health, and their perceived ability to personally 
reduce health risks, influence their WTP.  Fourth, we examine whether there is any 
systematic heterogeneity in respondents‘ WTP for reduced mortality risks based on 
socio-economic characteristics, the city in which they live, and recent experience in 
buying a home. 
To answer these questions we administered an on-line questionnaire to a 
representative sample of persons aged 40-60 in 16 cities across Italy and the United 
Kingdom (UK) in August and September 2010. We find that the stated choices made 
by our Italy survey respondents are consistent with VSL figures of €1.313-5.775 
million, depending on whether they rent or own their home, and the cause of death. In 




whereas the VSL for homeowners was €1.828 million (2010 PPP euro). These figures 
are reasonable and well within the typical VSL range judged acceptable in the risk 
and safety literature (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). They are also consistent with our own 
previous work in these countries (Alberini et al., 2006; Alberini and Chiabai, 2007a, 
2007b; Alberini et al., 2007; Alberini and Šcasný, 2011a).  
The differences between the Italy and the UK VSL figures are due in part to 
differing perceptions of the local air quality: While the Italy respondents expressed 
concern about air pollution where they live and its effects on their health, the UK 
respondents did not seem as concerned. Our econometric results confirm that people 
who perceive air pollution in their city to be more threatening tend to value a 
mortality risk reduction much more. We also find heterogeneity in homeowners‘ 
WTP for a risk reduction based on some socio-economic characteristics, beliefs 
regarding government responsibility for mortality risk reductions, the value of their 
home, and at least in the UK, the city in which they live. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We provide a review of 
the literature in section II to motivate our analysis. We then describe the study design 
and housing choice questions in section III. Section IV presents the econometric 
model. Section V describes the data. Section VI presents the estimation results. 







II. Literature Review 
II.A. The Value of A Statistical Life 
 The Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) is a summary measure of people‘s 
Willingness to Pay (WTP) for a reduction in mortality risks, and is commonly used in 
benefit-cost analyses of public programs (Appelbaum, 2011). The VSL is basically 
the marginal rate of substitution between income and the probability of dying, 
holding utility constant, and can therefore be interpreted as the marginal value of a 
reduction in mortality risks (see section IV.B for the formal definition). Alternatively, 
one can interpret the VSL as the amount society is willing to pay to save the life of a 
generic person (Freeman, 1999, pg. 321).  
 Since there is no explicit markets for health risks, researchers have developed 
several revealed and stated preference approaches to estimate the VSL. In revealed 
preference methods researchers infer the VSL from peoples‘ behavior in markets for 
goods that are at least partially characterized by changes in mortality risks. For 
example, in the labor market researchers examine the compensation required for 
workers to accept riskier jobs, all else constant (e.g., Viscusi, 1993; Viscusi and Aldy, 
2003; and Aldy and Viscusi, 2007). Similar methods have been used in automobile 
markets to analyze the premium for vehicles with additional safety features 
(Andersson, 2005), and in housing markets for homes in neighborhoods with 
decreased cancer risks from pollution (Gayer et al., 2000, 2002; Davis, 2004).   
 A key assumption in these revealed preference studies, which is one of the 
underlying concerns discussed throughout this dissertation, is whether buyers and 




health risks specified in the econometric models. Stated preference methods provide 
an opportunity to elicit preferences for a risk reduction when we know respondents 
are aware of the objective risks, because they are explicitly given to them as part of 
the study design. Stated preference methods have been used to elicit people‘s WTP 
for risk reductions in a variety of contexts, including transportation and road safety 
(e.g., Perrson et al., 2001, Bhattacharya et al., 2007), contaminated site cleanup 
(Alberini et al., 2007), and risks from power generators (Itaoka et al., 2006), amongst 
others. 
Conjoint choice experiments are one stated preference approach for estimating 
the VSL. In these exercises respondents choose among hypothetical goods or public 
programs that are defined by several attributes, including cost and health risks. In 
choosing a product respondents inherently trade off money and mortality risks, and so 
from these responses researchers can infer the VSL.
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In this dissertation chapter, I use a conjoint choice framework where 
respondents choose between hypothetical variants of their home, with varying costs 
and mortality risks associated with local air pollution levels (see section III). We 
chose the conjoint choice framework because it simulates the discrete home choices 
people make in the actual market. While there has been several revealed preference 
studies analyzing how home values are affected by air pollution and health risks, I 
argue that (i) omitted variable bias and (ii) peoples‘ awareness of the assumed 
environmental quality measures, are of particular concern in these contexts. 
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II.B. Hedonic Property Value Models: Health Risks and Air Pollution 
Boyle and Kiel (2001) review 12 hedonic studies of the effects of air pollution 
on home values, starting with Ridker and Henning‘s (1967) seminal piece. Nine of 
the studies reviewed suggest a negative correlation between home prices and air 
pollution levels, but the results are in general mixed across studies and depend greatly 
on how air pollution is measured. Boyle and Kiel believe that one reason for the 
mixed results is that the air quality measures may be correlated with unobserved 
variables.  
One way to get around this problem is to find a location with exogenous 
shocks in air pollution that are sustained long enough for the housing market to react 
to them. Chay and Greenstone (2005) devise a quasi experiment that exploits the 
discrete relationship between compliance and non-compliance status under the Clean 
Air Act, and air pollution regulations. They implement instrumental variables, 
regression discontinuity, and matching techniques, and conclude that improved air 
quality does lead to an increase in home values, at least as reflected by median 
county-level home prices. 
The second practical difficulty in implementing hedonic property value 
methods is that researchers typically assume that markets respond to objective 
measures of environmental quality. Although such assumptions are often necessary, 
analysts rarely (if ever) test how buyers and sellers in the housing market perceive 
these measures, or if they are even aware of them at all. ―It is possible that measures 
of air quality generally included in these [hedonic] studies may not be the measures 




Chattopadhyay (1999) studies how home prices in Chicago are affected by particulate 
matter and sulphur dioxide pollution. He uses pollutant level readings from air quality 
monitoring stations. However, it is unlikely that residents are aware of these readings, 
and it is unclear whether these readings are a good proxy for the pollution measure 
that matters to homeowners.  
Gayer et al. (2000, 2002) analyze home values around a Superfund site in 
Grand Rapids, MI. Using a dilution and dose-response model they estimate the 
household specific excess cancer risk posed by the site.  Under the assumption that 
home buyers and sellers are explicitly aware of these risks, they infer a value per 
statistical cancer case (VSCC) avoided of $3.9-8.3 million. Similarly, Davis (2004) 
examines how home prices are affected by an unexplained cancer cluster in Churchill 
County, NV. Using various measures of the cancer risk, he infers a value to avoid a 
statistical case of pediatric leukemia of $3.0-9.2 million. Although these studies 
provide unique and novel contributions to the non-market valuation literature, they 
inherently assume that home buyers and sellers are aware of these health risks and 
perceive them correctly. This is an assumption that is untested and may be 
unwarranted, especially for low probability events such as morbidity and mortality 
(see Viscusi, 1998). 
II.C. Stated Preference Studies on Property Values 
An alternative non-market valuation approach is to design a stated preference 
study where one might ask homebuyers or sellers what the price of their home would 
be if environmental quality changed to an extent that is clearly specified to them. 




experimental design, where there are no confounders, in order to properly identify the 
effects of an environmental good on home values.
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There are only a few stated preference studies that focus on home values in 
order to estimate the value of an environmental good. Earnhart (2001, 2002) used it in 
conjunction with actual housing transactions to infer the aesthetic value residents 
place on different types of environmental amenities near their home (e.g., a backyard, 
open field, lake, forests). Respondents were asked to choose between hypothetical 
homes which varied in terms of the environmental amenity, number of bedrooms and 
bathrooms, interior space, age of the home, lot size, flooding frequency, construction 
style, and price. The environmental amenity was conveyed to survey respondents 
using actual photos of these natural features.  Chattopadhyay et al. (2005), Jenkins-
Smith et al. (2002), Phaneuf et al. (2010), and Simons and Winson-Geideman (2005) 
conduct stated preference studies analyzing how home values are affected by 
environmental disamenities (see section II.D in chapter 3 for details).  
In all of these earlier stated preference studies environmental quality was 
defined qualitatively. It is our judgement that the change in environmental quality 
was not clearly defined to the respondent, and it remains unclear how respondents 
interpret such subjective measures. For example, Chattopadhyay et al. (2005) mention 
―reducing pollution‖ to a more or less complete extent, and even envision 
hypothetical scenarios where pollution would be made worse, but there are no 
rigorous measures of pollution used in their survey, and respondents are simply asked 
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to think that their house is closer to or farther from a more or less heavily polluted 
lake.  
In this paper, we report the results of a stated preference study where we asked 
people to make choices between homes that differ from each other in two attributes—
the health risks posed by air pollution in the area where the home is located, and 
price. The health risks were couched as reductions in the risk of dying from specified 
causes linked with air pollution exposures. 
To our knowledge, this is the first stated preference study in the housing 
context with clearly specified mortality risks. Our approach is different from that used 
by Chanel and Luchini (2008), where respondents are asked to indicate which of two 
cities they would move to (together with their household), the cities being identical in 
all aspects (size, housing, weather, public services, etc.), except for the cost of living 
and air pollution. These authors expressed health risks as follows: ―One person out of 
100 randomly chosen in the street is likely to die before 80 due to poor health related 
to air pollution exposure. This person will have lost around 10 years of life.‖  
Although Chanel and Luchini‘s wording is consistent with epidemiological 
evidence about air pollution (where results are typically expressed in loss of life 
expectancy) and introduces uncertainty by mentioning a random person, it is unclear 
how the respondents interpreted this statement, and it takes an extremely complicated 
model to infer the Value of a Statistical Life Year.  
Van Houtven et al. (2008) examine how individuals trade off different types 
of mortality risks. They ask respondents to choose between two locations that are 




to our study, cost is not an attribute of the locations. Van Houtven et al. do not 
estimate a VSL per se; instead their interest lies in estimating how to adjust existing 
VSL estimates by investigating peoples‘ willingness to trade off different types of 
mortality risks, namely automobile accidents versus different types of cancers. They 
conclude that people value reductions in the risk of dying from cancer up to three 
times more than that of dying in an automobile accident, but this effect declines as the 
cancer death latency period increases.  
 
III. Questionnaire and Study Design 
III.A. Questionnaire Structure 
To investigate how much people value mortality risk reductions in the air 
pollution-housing context, we developed a number of questions about the 
respondent‘s home and neighborhood, perceptions of air quality where he or she 
lives, and housing choices under hypothetical but clearly specified conditions. We 
placed them in the middle (section K) of the broader EXIOPOL mortality risk 
valuation questionnaire (see Alberini and Šcasný, 2011b), Since the housing choice 
section came right after the probability tutorial, education about mortality risks and 
conjoint choice questions about mortality risks reductions, we argue that by the time 
respondents started the home choice valuation questions, they were well informed 
about mortality risks and risk-reducing measures, and that they understood that risk 
reductions usually come at a cost. 
We begin the section by asking the respondents to indicate the type of home 




rooms), whether they own or rent it, how long they have lived at that home, and how 
much longer they plan to continue living there.
75
  We also elicit the monthly rent for 
those that rent their home, and the value of the home in today‘s housing market for 
those who own their home.  
Because in our choice questions respondents will face tradeoffs between 
money and health risks due to air pollution, we next inquire about the respondent‘s 
perception of the level of air pollution in his or her neighborhood. We offer five 
response categories ranging from very low to very high. We also ask respondents to 
indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement with four statements about air 
pollution: (i) ―The air pollution where I live could eventually have harmful effects on 
my health,‖ (ii) ―I am aware of my local air pollution levels,‖ (iii) ―People can 
personally do things to lower the health risks from air pollution,‖ and (iv) ―I am 
physically sensitive to air pollution.‖ 
Finally, we present our hypothetical choice scenario, which is accompanied 
with a brief explanation that (i) air pollution is an environmental risk to human health, 
(ii)  even low concentrations may have adverse health effects (such as cardiovascular 
and respiratory diseases), and (iii) air pollution may reduce lung function, make 
individuals more susceptible to respiratory infections and even cause cancer. 
III.B. Study Design. 
Each respondent answers two housing choice questions. Our respondents are 
asked to imagine that they are looking for a new home, and that they have identified 
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two homes that are almost identical for the feel of the neighborhood, size, number of 
bedrooms and bathrooms, and all other characteristics. The only differences between 
the two homes are (i) the risk of dying attributable to air pollution, relative to that of 
the current home, and (ii) the price or rent of the home.  
In the first choice question, the respondent must choose between home A, 
where risk and price are the same as their current home, and home B, which is in an 
area with better air quality, and hence lower mortality risks, but is more expensive. In 
the second choice question, the respondent must choose between two different 
homes—both are located in neighborhoods with lower levels of air pollution, and thus 
the health risks are lower than the current home, but both are also more expensive 
than the current home. It is clear that both choice questions ask respondents to trade 
off mortality risk reductions for income. The risk reductions were expressed as X in 
1000 over 10 years.  Costs were presented as an increase relative to one‘s current 
home (e.g., X euro more than your current home). Respondents who currently rent 
their home faced tradeoffs between risk reductions and rent. We expressed rent on a 
per month basis, but respondents could also view this cost in annual terms. For 
homeowners, we provided a premium on the price of the new home relative to the 
value of their current home, and then showed its annual equivalent (based on 10 
years). 
To create our experimental design, we began with specifying a vector of four 
possible risk reductions, namely 2, 3, 4 and 5 in 1000 over 10 years (equivalent to 2, 




levels (250, 500, 1000, 1800 and 3000 euro per year, for a total of 10 years).
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Mirroring the rest of the questionnaire, the risk reductions would apply to the 
respondent but not to any other family members or any other person. 
In the first housing choice questions, home A was the same as the 
respondent‘s current home, and so the risk reduction and price differential with 
respect to it were zero. Home B was selected at random from the 20 possible 
combinations of risk reductions and price differentials mentioned above.  For the 
second housing choice questions, we created a total of 120 pairs. One of the homes in 
these pairs was selected at random from the 20 possible combinations listed above. 
The other home for each pair was selected from the remaining, non-dominated 
combinations. Respondents were assigned at random to one of these 120 pairs.   The 
responses to these questions are then used to estimate the model outlined in the next 
section. 
 
IV. The Model. 
IV.A. Theoretical Motivation. 
Suppose an individual is considering moving to a new house (home j) that 
consists of the bundle of attributes        , where xj denotes all characteristics of the 
home (e.g., number of bathrooms, interior square footage, lot size) and neighborhood 
(e.g., public parks, school quality, crime), and Rj, which is an individual‘s risk of 
dying.  Mortality risk is part of the housing bundle because environmental factors at 
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the location of home j, such as air quality, may affect one‘s health, and in turn their 
risk of dying. The expected indirect utility of home j to individual i is: 
                                                 (1) 
where Cj is the cost of home j, y denotes an exogenous level of income,      is the 
level of utility experienced if the individual does not die and      is the utility level 
realized if an individual does die. The housing attributes and cost of home j can be 
expressed in terms of the difference relative to one‘s current home        , and, 
assuming      is linear, we can re-write equation (1) as: 
                                     (2) 
where C0 denotes the cost of the current home, and    ,    , and     are the 
differences between the home and neighborhood characteristics, mortality risk, and 
costs, respectively, between home j  and the current home. Parameters  ,  , and β are 
unknown coefficients. 
IV.B. Empirical Model. 
We posit that the responses to the choice questions in this survey are driven by 
an underlying random utility model (RUM). Therefore individual i will choose home 
alternative k at choice occasion t if  
                                       (3) 
where J is the number of alternative homes (including home k) in the choice set.  The 
error term      captures aspects of the utility that are known to the respondent but not 
to the researcher. This random component is assumed to be an i.i.d. draw from a type 




 Plugging the deterministic aspect of utility from equation (2), and cancelling 
out common terms, the inequality in (3) can be rewritten as 
                                                      (4) 
In this study we do not vary characteristics of the home and neighborhood across 
alternatives, therefore      =0 and drops out of equation (4). The scalar       is the 
mortality risk reduction made possible by living in home k relative to one‘s current 
home, and       is the price premium that must be paid relative to the value of the 
current home. The coefficients to be estimated are the marginal utility of a unit risk 
reduction ( ) and the marginal utility of income (-β).  
We present respondents with two different choice questions or occasions (t=1, 
2). Each choice question contains two alternative homes (J=2), home A and home B. 
In the first choice question home A is the same as the respondent‘s current home, so 
R and C are both zero for home A, and are different from zero for home B. In the 
second choice question, R and C are different from zero for both home A and 
home B.  
Since we assume that the random component of utility follows a type I 
standard extreme value distribution, the probability of choosing home k is: 
                                           
 
    .  (5) 
Assuming that the error terms are independent within and across respondents, the log 
likelihood of the sample is: 
             
 
   
 
   
 
          (6) 




 Coefficients   and  are estimated by maximum likelihood. We expect the 
marginal utility from a reduction in mortality risk (α) and the marginal utility of 
income (-) to be positive. The Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) is estimated as 
               . Multiplication by 1000 is necessary because we express risk 
reductions as X (per 1000) rather than 0.00X.  
We estimate model (5) separately for Italy and the UK, and for owners and 
renters within each country.  Equations (2)-(5) assume that the marginal utilities are 
constant across all individuals. We relax this assumption by including in the indirect 
utility and the econometric model interactions between the risk reduction and price 
premium with individual characteristics of the respondent, such as gender, age and 
income. We also enter interactions with the perceived seriousness of the air pollution 
problem at the locale where the respondent lives.   
 
V. The Data 
The survey questionnaire was administered over the internet to persons aged 
40-60 in Italy and the UK in August and September 2010.
77
  We collected a total of 
2426 completed questionnaires in the UK and 2369 in Italy. The samples were 
comprised of an even number of men and women, and were nationally representative 
for education and income of the Italy and UK populations in that age group.  
In both countries, the respondents were drawn from the residents of cities 
selected to ensure geographical and air quality representativeness. The number of 
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 These persons belong to a panel of consumers assembled and maintained by IPSOS, a large survey 




respondents from each city is shown in table 1. Based on our sampling scheme the 
majority of UK respondents were from London (40.5%). Most of the Italian sample 
consisted of individuals from Milan (26.6%) and Rome (21.7%).
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Descriptive statistics of the samples are reported in table 2. As per our 
sampling plan, the two samples are similar in terms of gender and age. They are also 
remarkably similar in terms of perceived health status. Homeownership, on the other 
hand, is slightly more prevalent in the Italy than the UK sample (78% v. 69%). The 
Italy respondents are also slightly more likely to have a college degree (26% v. 22%), 
but annual household income is higher in the UK (mean= €39,377 euro, median= 
€34,178) than in Italy (mean= €32,392, median= €27,500) (all income figures are in 
2010 PPP euro).  
Regarding marital and family status, about three quarters of the Italian 
respondents are married v. two-thirds in the UK. Seventy-four percent of the Italian 
respondents and 67% of the British respondents have children.   
In table 3, we compare homeowners and renters in each of the two countries.  
Univariate t-tests reveal that in both samples, homeowners are wealthier, more highly 
educated, and more likely to be married and have families.   
In figure 1 we compare the perceptions of air pollution and associated health 
risks across the two countries. Clearly, the Italy respondents report the air quality in 
their city or neighborhood to be much worse than their UK counterparts. The Italians 
are also more likely to agree with the statement that air pollution can be harmful to 
one‘s health, they are more aware of their local air quality, are more likely to agree 
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that ―people can do things to protect themselves from air pollution,‖ and report being 
more physically sensitive to air pollution 
As shown in tables 4.a and 4.b, virtually everyone answered the housing 
choice questions. Only one respondent in the UK and one in Italy failed to answer. In 
Italy, 49.56% of the respondents chose home A (the one that is identical for risks and 
cost to the respondent‘s current home) in the first housing choice question, and 
52.43% chose home A in the second housing choice question. In the UK, home A was 
chosen by 59.52% of the subjects in the first housing choice question and by 52.47% 
of the respondents in the second housing choice question. Taken together, these 
statistics suggest that the UK respondents place a lower value on risk reductions than 
their Italian counterparts. The variation in responses suggests that in this stated 
preference context people are willing to make tradeoffs between mortality risks and 
the cost of their home.   
 
VI. Estimation Results 
Estimation results for the base models are reported in table 5 for Italian 
homeowners and renters, and in table 6 for their UK counterparts. In table 5, model A 
shows that homeowners in the Italy sample trade off risks for income at a rate 
consistent with a VSL of €5.775 million euro. The corresponding figure for renters is 
€1.313 million (model B). In both groups, the marginal utility of a risk reduction and 
that of income are positive and significant, implying that the responses to these 




economic theory, the larger the risk reduction, the more people are willing to pay for 
it.  
As shown in table 6,the UK homeowners‘ VSL is only one third of the 
Italians--€1.828 million (PPP euro). Unlike the Italians, British renters, on average, 
are insensitive to the size of the risk reductions shown to them, and in fact they do not 
seem to place a positive value on mortality risk reductions.
79, 80
 
Our descriptive statistics show that the UK sample is certainly no less wealthy 
than the Italy sample, so we suspect that such differences in the valuation of risk 
reduction is due to either differences in perceptions of air pollution, and/or 
differences in beliefs about opportunities for reducing exposures. Figure 1 indeed 
suggests that the Italy and the UK samples were very different with respect to 
pollution perceptions.   
In tables 7 and 8, we report the results of models where the risk reduction is 
interacted with dummies representing risk perceptions. For example, drisk_high is the 
risk reduction interacted with a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if the respondent 
believes air pollution levels in the city where he or she lives are high or very high. 
The variable drisk_harm is constructed in a similar fashion with the responses to the 
statement that ―Air pollution can be harmful to my health,‖ drisk_aware is an 
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 When focusing on the 205 (out of 752) renters in the UK who perceive air pollution levels in the city 
where they live as high or very high, we estimate a VSL of  €2.191 million.   
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 As a robustness check we ran variants of models (A) and (B) in tables 5 and 6 that include an 
indicator variable denoting home A. The coefficient estimates on this dummy variable were generally 
insignificant, indicating that conditional on risk and cost the respondents were not more likely to 
choose one alternative over the other.  However, for the Italian homeowners this coefficient was 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that respondents in this subsample were 
systematically more likely to choose the left-most alternative (home A), all else constant. This result 
only held for the second choice question, where home A was randomly assigned a hypothetical change 
in mortality risks,, and omitting the alternative-specific intercept did not meaningfully change the 




interaction with the strong or very strong agreement that the respondent is aware of 
local pollution levels, drisk_lower is based on agreement that people can personally 
do things to lower the health risks from air pollution, and drisk_sensitive uses the 
responses to the statement that the respondent is physically sensitive to air pollution. 
For simplicity, attention is restricted to homeowners. When the 
abovementioned interactions are entered one at a time in the model, they are generally 
positively and significantly associated with the VSL. For example, believing that air 
pollution is serious implies a VSL that is over €6 million and €3.8 million higher than 
the rest of the sample of the Italy and UK homeowners, respectively.  
In tables 9 (Italy) and 10 (UK), we present the results of three specifications. 
The first, labelled as (A), includes interactions between the risk reduction and cost 
with individual characteristics of the respondents. The second specification (B) 
includes interactions between risk reductions and risk perceptions, and the third (C) 
enters an interaction between the risk reduction and a dummy variable equal to one if 
the respondent believes that the government is responsible for reducing mortality 
risks from cancer and heart disease. Again, attention is restricted to homeowners. 
Starting with table 9 (Italian homeowners), in Italy persons with higher 
education levels place a higher value on risk reductions. For example, in the Italy 
sample, all else the same a respondent with a college degree has a VSL that is €4.70 
million higher than someone without college degree. Table 10 shows that in the UK, 
the coefficient on the risk reduction interacted with college degree is also positive, but 




we ignore for the moment the fact that this coefficient is not statistically significant) 
is smaller than that for Italy. 
Gender is somewhat important in the UK, but not in Italy, and age and 
children do not lead to statistically different responses in either country. We checked 
whether the marginal utility of income changes with the level of income, and our 
results are consistent with the expectation that wealthier persons have a smaller 
marginal utility of income, but this effect is not statistically significant at the 
conventional levels. 
In column (B) of tables 9 and 10, we augment the model with interactions 
between the risk reductions and risk perceptions. People who believe air pollution is 
high value risk reductions much more. The effect on the VSL is about €5 million for 
Italy and €3.5 million in the UK (2010 PPP euro), which is similar to the results in the 
previous tables.  Of the other interactions we entered in model (B), only that with the 
belief that it is possible for people to personally do something to reduce harm is 
significant, and only for the UK. In column (C), the positive coefficient on drisk_govt 
suggests that a higher value for a risk reduction is held by respondents who believe 




In tables 11 and 12 we examine whether respondents value risk reductions 
differently in the housing context depending on recent activity in the housing market 
and characteristics of their home.  In columns (A) and (B) we see that in both 
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 We believe that the included interactions properly account for heterogeneity in respondents‘ 
preferences for a risk reduction. For completeness, we also attempted account for potential unobserved 
heterogeneity by estimating mixed logit specifications (Train, 2009). However, the maximum 
simulated likelihood routines would not converge. We speculate that this may be due to the fact that 




countries, all else constant, homeowners who moved within the last 7 years are 
similar to the rest of the homeowners in the sample. As we expected, the results in 
columns (C) and (D) suggest that respondents who have relatively expensive homes 
are less sensitive to the increased cost of a new home associated with a risk reduction 
(although statistically speaking this effect is only marginally significant at best).  
We next examine whether there are any systematic differences across cities by 
interacting the size of the mortality risk reduction with dummy variables for each of 
the cities from which our sample was drawn. The results are presented in table 13.  In 
columns (A) and (C) we estimate the model that only includes the cost and an 
interaction term between the risk reduction and a dummy for each city in Italy and the 
UK, respectively.  The inferred city specific VSLs are presented in figure 2.  
We can see that for Italy the VSL estimates vary a bit across cities, with the 
highest VSL of €10.2 million in Florence. We marginally reject the null hypothesis (p 
= 0.0778) that the respondents‘ marginal utility from a mortality risk reduction (α) is 
equal across the 8 Italian cities from which our sample was drawn. However, after 
controlling for socio-economic characteristics and perceptions regarding air quality 
and health risks, we fail to reject the null that α is statistically different across the 
cities, as seen in column (B).  
In contrast, in the UK we reject the null hypothesis that α is statistically equal 
across cities, even after controlling for socio-economic characteristics and perceptions 
(see column D in table 13). As shown in figure (2), among UK homeowners the 




One concern with our models is that, while we emphasized in the 
questionnaire that the respondent should interpret all risk reductions to apply to 
himself (or herself) only, respondents may have thought otherwise. If they replaced 
another risk reduction for the one we expressed to them in the housing choice 
question, then the risk reductions entered in our econometric models are affected by a 
measurement error. If the measurement error is classical, then our estimate 
understates the true value of the risk reduction (Morey and Waldman, 1998).  
For good measure, we re-estimated the models after restricting attention to 
those respondents who are homeowners and live by themselves (n=540 in Italy, and 
n=316 in the UK). There is no question that these respondents are the only 
beneficiaries of the risk reduction coming from the hypothetical move. The full 
results are not reported here for the sake of brevity, but the estimates of the VSL 
based on these groups of respondents are €3.824 million (Italy) and €359,460 (UK). 
For Italy, this figure is less than the all-sample VSL. For the UK, this figure is not 




We have conducted a stated preference study asking Italian and British 
respondents to engage in tradeoffs between mortality risk reductions associated with 
improved air quality and the cost of housing. Such tradeoffs are often analyzed using 
hedonic property value models, an attractive revealed preference technique. Despite 




hedonic property value models in practice are fraught with difficulties. First, hedonic 
analyses are often susceptible to omitted variable biases. Second, researchers are 
often forced to assume, without testing, that buyers and sellers in the property market 
are well aware of the environmental good of interest, and perceive that good using the 
same measure specified by the researcher in the right-hand-side of the hedonic price 
equation. 
In this study we take an alternative stated preference approach where we ask 
respondents to choose between hypothetical variants of their home, where the air 
pollution levels around the home, and hence the mortality risks, as well as the cost of 
the home, vary. Since this is a hypothetical setting we are able to implement an 
experimental design that eliminates the potential for unobserved confounding 
influences. Furthermore, we do not need to assume that respondents are aware of and 
correctly perceive environmental measures, we know they do.  Mortality risks are 
clearly presented to respondents as an attribute of the home, and respondents undergo 
several probability tutorials before the conjoint choice exercise. 
Only a few studies have implemented a stated preference approach in the 
context of housing in order to estimate the non-market value of environmental 
amenities (e.g., Earnhart, 2001; 2002) and disamenities (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2002; 
Chattopadhyay et al., 2005; Simons and Winson-Geideman, 2005; Phaneuf et al., 
2010). In all of these earlier studies environmental quality was defined qualitatively, 
and we believe that it remains unclear how respondents interpret such subjective 
measures.  A unique contribution of our study is that we measure air quality in terms 




knowledge this is the first stated preference study in the housing context that uses a 
clearly defined quantitative measure of the environmental good.  There have been 
several stated preference studies that estimate the value of reductions in health risks 
(e.g., Alberini and Chiabai, 2007a, 2007b; Alberini et al., 2007; Alberini and Šcasný, 
2011a; Tsuge et al., 2005), but to our knowledge we are the first to do so in the 
context of housing. 
Our results, at least in Italy, show that people are willing and capable of 
making tradeoffs between mortality risks associated with air pollution and the cost of 
their home. Their responses are consistent with the economic paradigm: The marginal 
utilities of a risk reduction and income were positive and significant, and so the 
responses pass the ―scope‖ test. In other words, the larger the risk reduction, the more 
people are willing to pay for it. We did notice large differences in the VSL between 
homeowners and renters (€5.775 million versus €1.313 million, respectively), a result 
that might be explained by income and education differences between the two groups, 
or perhaps by the fact that homeowners expect to stay at the dwelling for a long time. 
In the UK, homeowners reported lower VSL figures (around €1.828 million) 
than their Italy counterparts, and with renters we were unable to estimate a proper 
VSL. Since the UK respondents are no less wealthy than the Italy sample, we 
attribute this result to the fact that our British sample is less concerned about air 
pollution and its effect on their health.  
People who perceive air pollution in their city to be more serious of a problem 
tend to hold a much higher value for a reduction in mortality risk.  We also find 




economic characteristics, beliefs regarding government responsibility for mortality 
risk reductions, the value of their home, and at least in the UK, the city in which they 
live. 
One direction for future research is to conduct a similar study where we vary 
home structure, neighborhood, and environmental and health risk attributes among 
the alternative housing bundles. Doing so would allow us to re-create choice 
experiments that are much more similar to the actual choices one has to make when 
purchasing a home. In this study, due to practical constraints in the implementation of 
this questionnaire, we only varied two attributes of the housing alternatives: mortality 
risks from air pollution and price.  Drawing attention to an emotionally sensitive 
attribute such as mortality risks may lead to exaggerated responses, an effect known 
as ―focusing illusion‖ in the psychology literature (Schkade and Kahneman, 1998). 
Including other attributes in the housing alternatives may reduce this potential bias. 
Ideally this analysis should be repeated using a similar valuation questionnaire 
in conjunction with a supplemental hedonic property value study. Both hedonic 
property value and stated preference methods have their strengths and weaknesses.
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Building on the combined hedonic and stated preference work of Earnhart (2001, 
2002), Chattopadhyay et al. (2005), and Phaneuf et al. (2010) may help us better 
compare the two approaches, and more accurately identify how environmental quality 
affects home values, and in turn, welfare. 
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Figure 2. City Specific VSLs for Homeowners (from models A and C in table 13). 
 
 
















































































Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample. 
2.a. Italy Respondents 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Male (dummy) 2360 0.495339 0.500084 0 1 
Age (years) 2360 48.73771 5.971482 40 60 
Perceived health status 
(1 to 5, 1=poor and 5= excellent) 
2359 3.169987 0.882599 1 5 
Married (dummy) 2369 0.747151 0.434737 0 1 
Single (dummy) 2369 0.252427 0.434497 0 1 
Hhsize (# people in household) 2365 3.1074 1.203267 1 13 
has_children (dummy) 2369 0.74293 0.437111 0 1 
children0_5 (# of children 0-5 yrs) 1772 0.204571 0.616951 0 13 
College degree (dummy) 2369 0.264669 0.44125 0 1 
Hhinc (household income, euros) 2368 32391.78 17205.67 0 70001 
Owner (dummy indicating home 
ownership) 
2369 0.788518 0.408445 0 1 
 
2.b. United Kingdom Respondents 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Male (dummy) 2419 0.512195 0.499955 0 1 
Age (years) 2417 49.74969 6.10116 40 60 
Perceived health status 
(1 to 5, 1=poor and 5= excellent) 
2419 3.147582 1.086863 1 5 
Married (dummy) 2426 0.634378 0.481704 0 1 
Single (dummy) 2426 0.36521 0.481588 0 1 
Hhsize (# people in household) 2409 2.6044 1.265763 1 9 
has_children (dummy) 2426 0.666117 0.471696 0 1 
children0_5 (# of children 0-5 yrs) 1622 0.1418 0.42543 0 3 
College degree (dummy) 2426 0.221764 0.415519 0 1 
Hhinc (household income, euros) 2426 39276.75 27242.2 0 128972 




Table 3. Comparison between Homeowners and Renters. 
3.a. Italy Respondents 
 Italian Renters Italian Owners 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. t-test 
        male 499 0.476954 0.49997 1861 0.500269 0.500134 -0.925 
age 499 47.86774 5.419226 1861 48.97098 6.091349 -3.9304*** 
Perceived 
health status 
499 3.068136 0.97528 1860 3.197312 0.854248 -2.6944*** 
married 501 0.634731 0.481987 1868 0.777302 0.416169 -6.0441*** 
single 501 0.363274 0.481423 1868 0.222698 0.416169 5.9653*** 
hhsize 498 2.985944 1.37006 1867 3.139796 1.152962 -2.2983** 
has_children 501 0.692615 0.461872 1868 0.756424 0.429355 -2.7862*** 
children0_5 350 0.235714 0.626089 1422 0.196906 0.614662 1.0426 
children0_18 350 1.552857 3.650675 1422 1.085091 2.270997 2.2905** 
collegedeg 501 0.211577 0.408835 1868 0.278908 0.448582 -3.2050*** 
hhinc 500 25750.51 16061.3 1868 34169.42 17070.3 -10.2706*** 
         
3.b. United Kingdom Respondents 
 UK Renters UK Homeowners 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. t-test 
        male 749 0.46996 0.49943 1670 0.531138 0.499179 -2.7859*** 
age 749 48.92924 5.867436 1668 50.11811 6.169556 -4.5331*** 
Perceived 
health status 
749 2.798398 1.151933 1670 3.304192 1.018543 10.3399*** 
married 752 0.445479 0.497349 1674 0.719235 0.449507 -12.9103*** 
single 752 0.553192 0.497494 1674 0.280765 0.449507 12.8448*** 
hhsize 748 2.393048 1.313326 1661 2.699579 1.232367 -5.4017*** 
has_children 752 0.651596 0.476782 1674 0.67264 0.46939 -1.0103 
children0_5 494 0.131579 0.413875 1128 0.146277 0.430497 -0.6502 
children0_18 494 1.02834 2.016968 1128 0.912234 1.259678 1.1824 
collegedeg 752 0.146277 0.353619 1674 0.255675 0.43637 -6.5374*** 
hhinc 752 26563.01 20155.21 1674 44988.06 28072.64 -18.3248*** 




Table 4. Respondents Choosing Home A vs. Home B. 
Table 4.a. Percent Respondents Choosing Home A vs. Home B. 
 




A 2,618 54.6% 54.6% 
 
B 2,175 45.36% 99.96% 
 
NA 2 0.04% 100% 
 
Total 4,795 100% 
 




A 2,515 52.45% 52.45% 
 
B 2,278 47.51% 99.96% 
 
NA 2 0.04% 100% 
 
Total 4,795 100% 
 
      
Table 4.b. Percent Respondents Choosing Home A vs. Home B by Country. 
Home Choice UK Italy Total 
Question 1 
   A 1,444 1,174 2,618 
 
(59.52%) (49.56%) (54.6%) 
B 981 1,194 2,175 
 
(40.44%) (50.4%) (45.36%) 
NA 1 1 2 
 
(0.04%) (0.04%) (0.04%) 
Total 2,426 2,369 4,795 
 
(100%) (100%) (100%) 
    Question 2 
   
A 1,273 1,242 2,515 
 
(52.47%) (52.43%) (52.45%) 
B 1,152 1,126 2,278 
 
(47.49%) (47.53%) (47.51%) 
NA 1 1 2 
 
(0.04%) (0.04%) (0.04%) 
Total 2,426 2,369 4,795 
 






Table 5. Base Estimation Results: Italy. 
  (A) (B) 
VARIABLES Homeowners Renters 
      
drisk 0.090107*** 0.078374** 
 
(0.016739) (0.033405) 
dcost -0.000016*** -0.000060*** 
 
(0.000003) (0.000007) 
   VSL 5,774,708*** 1,313,378*** 
 
(800,577) (463,307) 
   
Observations 7,472 2,000 
ll -2576.7344 -629.7753 






Table 6. Base Estimation Results: United Kingdom. 
 
(A) (B) 
VARIABLES Homeowners Renters 
   
drisk 0.066033*** -0.044138 
 
(0.018082) (0.028194) 
dcost -0.000036*** -0.000070*** 
 
(0.000003) (0.000006) 
   VSL 1,828,219*** -628,177 
 
(301,358) (440,770) 
   
Observations 6,696 3,004 
ll -2244.2098 -837.7145 






Table 7. Estimation Results with Risk Perceptions of Italy Homeowners. 
VARIABLES (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
            
drisk 0.061870*** 0.048012** 0.068020*** 0.063965*** 0.064588*** 
 
(0.018218) (0.023179) (0.020956) (0.022758) (0.020028) 
drisk_high 0.096836*** 
    
 
(0.024970) 
    drisk_harm 
 
0.063147*** 
   
  
(0.024134) 




   
(0.022877) 
  drisk_lower 
   
0.040011* 
 
    
(0.023668) 
 drisk_sensitive 
    
0.052564** 
     
(0.022786) 
dcost -0.000016*** -0.000016*** -0.000016*** -0.000015*** -0.000016*** 
 
(0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) 
      Observations 7,472 7,472 7,472 7,472 7,472 
ll -2569.1384 -2573.3099 -2575.2120 -2575.3058 -2574.0698 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Table 8. Estimation Results with Risk Perceptions of UK Homeowners. 
VARIABLES (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
drisk 0.045574** 0.021117 0.035400* 0.031320 0.057136*** 
 
(0.018771) (0.019993) (0.019066) (0.020322) (0.018858) 
drisk_high 0.141091*** 
    
 
(0.034076) 
    drisk_harm 
 
0.140175*** 
   
  
(0.026122) 




   
(0.030895) 
  drisk_lower 
   
0.094732*** 
 
    
(0.025126) 
 drisk_sensitive 
    
0.059243* 
     
(0.035623) 
dcost -0.000036*** -0.000037*** -0.000036*** -0.000037*** -0.000036*** 
 
(0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) 
      Observations 6,696 6,696 6,696 6,696 6,696 
ll -2235.5555 -2229.7145 -2230.5736 -2237.0838 -2242.8264 




Table 9. Estimation Results with Socio-demographic Characteristics and Risk 
Perceptions: Italy Homeowners. 
          
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION (A) (B) (C) 
     drisk mortality risk 0.063561*** 0.003768 -0.088958** 
  (0.022650) (0.029201) (0.036537) 
drisk_above55 drisk × (age>55 dummy) 0.011345 0.013201 0.017783 
  (0.027786) (0.027975) (0.028139) 
drisk_college drisk × college degree dummy 0.079147*** 0.072967*** 0.066036** 
  (0.026257) (0.026422) (0.026561) 
drisk_male drisk × male dummy -0.006627 -0.000877 -0.000699 
  (0.023089) (0.023231) (0.023344) 
drisk_child0_5 drisk × has child 0-5 yrs old 
(dummy) 
0.038496 0.043560 0.047686 
  (0.037440) (0.037619) (0.037902) 
dcost cost -0.000017*** -0.000017*** -0.000017*** 
  (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) 
dcost_highinc dcost × (income > national 
median homeowner income 
dummy) 
0.000005 0.000005 0.000004 
  (0.000004) (0.000004) (0.000005) 
drisk_high drisk × "air pollution where I 
live is high" (dummy) 
 0.086629*** 0.080635*** 
   (0.025407) (0.025526) 
drisk_sensitive drisk × "I am physically 
sensitive to air pollution" 
(dummy) 
 0.032046 0.018645 
   (0.024430) (0.024735) 
drisk_lower drisk × "people can personally 
do things to lower their health 
risks" (dummy) 
 0.025514 0.008230 
   (0.025166) (0.025627) 
drisk_govt drisk × "government should be 
responsible for reducing risks" 
(dummy) 
  0.135643*** 
  
  (0.031495) 
     Observations 
 
7,444 7,444 7,444 
ll   -2560.5571 -2551.6762 -2542.2904 






Table 10. Estimation Results with Socio-demographic Characteristics and Risk 
Perceptions: UK Homeowners. 
          
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION (A) (B) (C) 
  
      
drisk mortality risk 0.082791*** 0.025792 0.003820 
  (0.025214) (0.027623) (0.028616) 
drisk_above55 drisk × (age>55 dummy) -0.032104 -0.031603 -0.026711 
  (0.027271) (0.027541) (0.027644) 
drisk_college drisk × college degree 
dummy 
0.035783 0.026720 0.021447 
  (0.028456) (0.028851) (0.028992) 
drisk_male drisk × male dummy -0.041048* -0.038634 -0.040700 
  (0.024717) (0.024923) (0.024998) 
drisk_child0_5 drisk × has child 0-5 yrs old 
(dummy) 
0.030697 0.030370 0.030720 
  (0.045449) (0.045890) (0.046026) 
dcost cost -0.000037*** -0.000037*** -0.000038*** 
  (0.000004) (0.000004) (0.000004) 
dcost_highinc dcost × (income > national 
median homeowner income 
dummy) 
0.000002 0.000001 0.000002 
  (0.000005) (0.000005) (0.000005) 
drisk_high drisk × "air pollution where 
I live is high" (dummy) 
 0.134617*** 0.130066*** 
   (0.034680) (0.034813) 
drisk_sensitive drisk × "I am physically 
sensitive to air pollution" 
(dummy) 
 0.026185 0.014079 
   (0.036562) (0.036915) 
drisk_lower drisk × "people can 
personally do things to 
lower their health risks" 
(dummy) 
 0.094493*** 0.086956*** 
   (0.025564) (0.025743) 
drisk_govt drisk × "government should 
be responsible for reducing 
risks" (dummy) 
  0.079252*** 
 
 
  (0.026179) 
  
   
Observations 
 
6,680 6,680 6,680 
ll 
 
-2235.3589 -2219.8615 -2215.2805 






Table 11. Estimation Results with Home Characteristics and Housing Market 
Experience: Italy Homeowners. 
          
VARIABLES (A) (B) (C) (D) 
      
drisk 0.090135*** 0.003853 0.093974*** 0.008352 
 (0.016743) (0.029206) (0.016901) (0.029604) 
dcost -0.000016*** -0.000017*** -0.000018*** -0.000018*** 
 (0.000003) (0.000004) (0.000003) (0.000004) 
     × moved w/in 7 yrs     -0.000000 -0.000001   
        (dummy) (0.000005) (0.000005)   
     × (home value in top       0.000009* 0.000006 
         25% of homeowners)   (0.000005) (0.000005) 
drisk_above55  0.012805  0.010138 
  (0.028087)  (0.028441) 
drisk_college  0.073077***  0.077453*** 
  (0.026432)  (0.026858) 
drisk_male  -0.000878  -0.002563 
  (0.023231)  (0.023466) 
drisk_child0_5  0.044214  0.045032 
  (0.037852)  (0.038134) 
dcost_highinc  0.000005  0.000002 
  (0.000004)  (0.000005) 
drisk_high  0.086547***  0.086557*** 
  (0.025412)  (0.025698) 
drisk_sensitive  0.032054  0.032714 
  (0.024430)  (0.024698) 
drisk_lower  0.025482  0.024311 
  (0.025167)  (0.025490) 
 
    
Observations 7,472 7,444 7,328 7,300 
ll -2576.7317 -2551.6637 -2524.5711 -2500.3287 






Table 12. Estimation Results with Home Characteristics and Housing Market 
Experience: UK Homeowners 
          
VARIABLES (A) (B) (C) (D) 
          
drisk 0.066048*** 0.025819 0.076013*** 0.045644 
 (0.018082) (0.027622) (0.018570) (0.028521) 
dcost -0.000035*** -0.000036*** -0.000041*** -0.000041*** 
 (0.000004) (0.000004) (0.000004) (0.000004) 
     × moved w/in 7 yrs     -0.000002 -0.000003   
        (dummy) (0.000005) (0.000005)   
     × (home value in top    0.000010* 0.000009* 
         25% of homeowners)   (0.000005) (0.000006) 
drisk_above55  -0.033216  -0.033646 
  (0.027670)  (0.028581) 
drisk_college  0.027470  0.023741 
  (0.028884)  (0.029498) 
drisk_male  -0.038550  -0.053458** 
  (0.024926)  (0.025607) 
drisk_child0_5  0.033900  0.017240 
  (0.046285)  (0.046670) 
dcost_highinc  0.000001  -0.000000 
  (0.000005)  (0.000005) 
drisk_high  0.134353***  0.142992*** 
  (0.034685)  (0.035740) 
drisk_sensitive  0.026068  0.017951 
  (0.036565)  (0.037766) 
drisk_lower  0.094469***  0.093245*** 
 
 (0.025566)  (0.026219) 
     Observations 6,696 6,680 6,384 6,368 
ll -2244.1123 -2219.6775 -2130.4229 -2105.8033 







Table 13. City Specific Effects: Homeowners in Italy and the UK. 
  Italy Homeowners 
 
  UK Homeowners 
VARIABLES (A) (B) 
 
VARIABLES (C) (D) 
drisk 
   
drisk 
       × Bari  -0.011489 -0.082693* 
 





     × Bologna  0.084503 0.000334 
 





     × Florence  0.160286*** 0.093375 
 





     × Milan  0.106908*** 0.012781 
 





     × Naples  0.118462*** 0.029542 
 





     × Palermo  0.028646 -0.061765 
 





     × Rome  0.104725*** 0.010726 
 





     × Turin  0.083470** 0.004620 
    
 
(0.033540) (0.041106) 
    dcost -0.000016*** -0.000017*** 
 



























































































   
(0.025679) 
Wald Test:     
 
Wald Test:     
     equal  
  across cities p = 0.0778 p = 0.1720 
 
     equal  
  across cities p = 0.0138 p = 0.0373 
Observations 7,444 7,444 
 
Observations 6,680 6,680 
ll -2561.0302 -2546.4757 
 
ll -2230.1911 -2212.8204 




Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
Hedonic property values models are one of the primary nonmarket valuation 
tools used by economists. This approach is particularly attractive because welfare 
estimates are based on observed market behavior. However, in hedonic studies 
researchers are usually forced to make two necessary, but often untested, 
assumptions. The first is that all unobserved and potentially confounding influences 
on house prices have been correctly controlled for, thus eliminating any omitted 
variable bias. The second assumption is that the measure of environmental quality 
specified by the researcher is the one that buyers and sellers in the housing market are 
actually aware of, and care about. If these assumptions are proven invalid, we may in 
fact be incorrectly inferring welfare effects from changes in property values. I believe 
stated preference approaches offer an opportunity to test, and in some cases, 
circumvent these potentially unwarranted assumptions. 
In this dissertation I presented a hedonic property value analysis and two 
stated preference studies examining how environmental pollution affects home 
values. I paid particular attention to (i) potentially confounding influences on home 
prices and (ii) how environmental quality is expressed.  
The first study (chapter 2) was a hedonic analysis of how home prices are 
affected by leaking underground storage tanks (LUSTs) and groundwater pollution. I 
find that the values of homes near a LUST (e.g., within 500 meters) generally do not 
decrease upon the discovery of a leak, and there is no clear evidence that prices are 
affected by cleanup and the closure of a leak investigation. These findings persist 




house prices, such as including neighborhood fixed effects, repeat sales and spatial 
econometric models, and quasi experimental approaches accounting for the 
endogeneity of leaks with house prices. 
This raises the question of whether home buyers and sellers are aware of the 
contamination and cleanup events in the first place. This suspicion is confirmed by 
the fact that I did find a significant 9-12% depreciation at homes where the private 
well was tested by environmental regulators. These households were well-informed, 
and likely perceived the LUST as a disamenity since they faced actual (or suspected) 
health risks. I conclude that despite their ubiquity, the presence of LUST sites and the 
associated risks may not be known to most people. 
A disadvantage of hedonics (and revealed preference in general) is that 
researchers may not always observe the proper counterfactual. For example, the UST 
program was established in the mid-1980s, and is very proactive in preventing and 
minimizing damage from LUSTs. Therefore, there are few homes (at least in 
Maryland) that experience levels of pollution severe enough to capture how the 
situation might be in the complete absence of the UST program.    
With stated preference studies, it is possible to introduce variation in 
environmental quality at levels that are infrequently (or never) observed in the actual 
housing market (Earnhart, 2002). This allows researchers to better establish a 
counterfactual for estimating the welfare effects of an environmental program. 
Another advantage of stated preference approaches is that researchers can reduce 
multicollinearity and omitted variable bias because, by design, stated preference data 




observed and unobserved variables. Furthermore, the environmental amenity or 
disamenity of interest is clearly specified to respondents in the valuation scenario, and 
so we know exactly what the respondents are valuing.  
Framing stated preference studies in the context of home values seems like a 
natural step to facilitate cross-method comparisons. In fact, Earnhart (2001, 2002) and 
Phaneuf et al. (2010) actually combine stated preference responses with actual 
transaction data, and jointly estimate preferences. Beyond that, there have only been a 
few stated preference studies investigating how environmental goods affect home 
values (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2002; Chattopadhyay et al., 2005; Simons and Winson-
Geideman, 2005). In these studies environmental quality was expressed qualitatively, 
and it remains unclear how people interpret such subjective measures.  
In chapters 3 and 4, I experimented with different quantitative, and clearly 
specified, measures of environmental quality. To my knowledge these are the first 
stated preference studies in the context of housing to do so. The study in chapter 3 
provided respondents with groundwater pollution levels from a local LUST (e.g., X 
parts-per-billion), and examines how home prices are affected. Corresponding to the 
hedonic study in chapter 2, this information mimics that sent to households whose 
private wells were actually tested for LUST contamination by environmental 
regulators. I find that higher pollution levels and the presence of an exposure pathway 
do lead to lower home values, which is consistent with expectations from economic 
theory. 
In chapter 4, I presented a stated preference study where respondents were 




1,000 probability of dying), and were asked to choose between hypothetical variants 
of their home. Consistent with economic theory, I find that respondents prefer a home 
that is less expensive, and that is associated with lower mortality risks from air 
pollution. From these responses, I infer a Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) of €1.828 
to €5.775 million euro ($2.422 to $7.653 million USD), which is well within the 




Overall, in my hedonic application I find LUSTs generally have little effect on 
local home values. I believe this is because buyers and sellers (at least in these 
housing markets and during this period) are typically unaware of the disamenity. I do, 
however, find a significant depreciation at homes where I know households are well-
informed, as well as in the stated preference studies, where respondents are explicitly 
informed as part of the study design.  
While hedonics is a useful non-market valuation tool, we must be cautious in 
what we infer from changes in property values, and must pay particular attention to 
what people know about an environmental good, and how they interpret this 
information. Stated preference methods offer an opportunity to address these 
concerns, but lack the advantage of being based on actual market behavior.  In some 
applications, pursuing both approaches will help us better characterize how 
environmental quality affects property values, and ultimately welfare. 
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